Gal 6 Sb.

THE WORKS OF Dr. Jonathan Swift,

Dean of St. PATRICK's, Dublin.

VOLUME IX.

LONDON,
Printed for T. OSBORNE, W. BOWYER, C. BATHURST, W. STRAHAN, J. RIVINGTON, J. HINTON, L. DAVIS and C. REYMERS, R. BALDWIN, J. DODSLEY, S. CROWDER and Co. and B. COLLINS.
MDCCLXVI.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

CONTENTS

OF

VOLUME IX.

THE Public Spirit of the Whigs, ſet forth in their generous encouragement of the Author of the Criſis, with ſome Obſervations on that Treatiſe pag. 3

The Conduct of the Allies, and of the late Miniſtry, in beginning and carrying on the preſent War, 1712 63

Remarks on the Barrier-treaty between her Majeſty and the States-General 155

The ſaid Barrier-treaty 172

The Articles of the Counter-Project, which were ſtruck out or altered by the Dutch, *with ſome Remarks* 188

The Sentiments of Prince Eugene *and of Count* Sinzendorf, *relating to the Barrier* 193

Repreſentation of the Engliſh *Merchants at* Bruges *relating to the Barrier-treaty* 197

A Preface to Biſhop Burnet's *Introduction to the third Volume of his Hiſtory of the Reformation of the Church of* England 203

TRACTS relating to IRELAND.

Some Arguments againſt enlarging the Power of Biſhops in letting Leaſes 247

The Presbyterians Plea of Merit in order to take off the Test impartially examined pag. 271
The Advantages proposed by repealing the Sacramental Test impartially considered 295
Queries relating to the Sacramental Test 308
Reasons offered to the Parliament of Ireland *for repealing the Test in favour of the Catholicks* 317
Some Reasons against the Bill for settling the Tithe of Flax and Hemp by a Modus 334

THE

THE PUBLIC SPIRIT OF THE WHIGS,

Set forth in their generous Encouragement of the Author of The Crisis.

WITH

Some Obſervations on the Seaſonableneſs, Candour, Erudition, and Style of that Treatiſe.

Upon the firſt publication of this pamphlet, all the Scotch *Lords, then in* London, *went in a body, and complained to Queen* ANNE *of the affront put on them and their nation by the author of this Treatiſe. Whereupon a proclamation was publiſhed by her Majeſty, offering a reward of three hundred pounds to diſcover him. The reaſon for offering ſo ſmall a ſum was, that the Queen and Miniſtry had no deſire to have the author taken into cuſtody.*

THE

THE PUBLIC SPIRIT OF THE WHIGS [a].

I Cannot without ſome envy, and a juſt reſentment againſt the oppoſite conduct of others, reflect upon that generoſity and tenderneſs, wherewith the heads and principal members of a ſtruggling faction treat thoſe who will undertake to hold a pen in their defence. And the behaviour of theſe patrons is yet the more laudable, becauſe the benefits they confer are almoſt *gratis*. If any of their labourers can ſcratch out a pamphlet, they deſire no more; there is no queſtion offered about

[a] It was written in the year 1712, by the conſent, if not the encouragement, of the miniſters of that æra, in anſwer to the Criſis by Sir *Richard Steele*. ORRERY.

The noble commentator, who appears in another inſtance to have given an account of the works of his author, from a peruſal of no more than a title * in the *Dublin* editions, has been betrayed into miſtakes, which, if he had read the piece, he would have eſcaped. This tract, in the title which his lordſhip conſulted, is ſaid to have been written in the year 1712: but in that part of it which moſt deſerves the notice of a critic, becauſe it occaſioned the complaint in the Houſe of Lords, mention is made of a motion to diſſolve the Union, which did not happen till 1713. The complaint, which is ſaid in the note to happen upon the *firſt* publication, was made the 2d of *March* 1713-14, and the pamphlet, according to the cuſtom of printers, was dated 1714.

* See Voyage to *Brobdingnag*, Chap. VI.

the wit, the ſtyle, the argument. Let a pamphlet come out upon demand in a proper juncture, you ſhall be well and certainly paid; you ſhall be paid before-hand; every one of the party, who is able to read, and can ſpare a ſhilling, ſhall be a ſubſcriber; ſeveral thouſands of each production ſhall be ſent among their friends through the kingdom; the work ſhall be reported admirable, ſublime, unanſwerable; ſhall ſerve to raiſe the ſinking clamours, and confirm the ſcandal of introducing popery and the pretender upon the QUEEN and her miniſters.

Among the preſent writers on that ſide I can recollect but three of any great diſtinction, which are the *Flying-poſt*, Mr. *Dunton*, and the author of *The Criſis* [*b*]. The firſt of theſe ſeems to have been much ſunk in reputation, ſince the ſudden retreat of the *only true genuine original author*, Mr. *Ridpath*, who is celebrated by the *Dutch gazetteer as one of the beſt pens in* England. Mr. *Dunton* hath been longer and more converſant in books than any of the three, as well as more voluminous in his productions: however, having employed his ſtudies in ſo great a variety of other ſubjects, he hath, I think, but lately turned his genius to politicks. His famous tract, intituled *Neck or nothing*, muſt be allowed to be the ſhrewdeſt piece, and written with the moſt ſpirit of any, which hath appeared

[*b*] Mr. *Steele* was expelled the Houſe of Commons for this pamphlet, at the very ſame time that the Houſe moved againſt the Dean for the Reply.

from

from that ſide ſince the change of the miniſtry: it is indeed a moſt cutting ſatire upon the lord treaſurer and lord *Bolingbroke*; and I wonder none of our friends ever undertook to anſwer it. I confeſs, I was at firſt of the ſame opinion with ſeveral good judges, who, from the ſtyle and manner, ſuppoſe it to have iſſued from the ſharp pen of the earl of *Nottingham*; and I am ſtill apt to think it might receive his lordſhip's laſt hand. The third and principal of this triumvirate is the author of *The Criſis*; who, although he muſt yield to the *Flying-poſt* in knowledge of the world and ſkill in politicks, and to Mr. *Dunton* in keenneſs of ſatire and variety of reading, hath yet other qualities enough to denominate him a writer of a ſuperior claſs to either; provided he would a little regard the propriety and diſpoſition of his words, conſult the grammatical part, and get ſome information in the ſubject he intends to handle.

Omitting the generous countenance and encouragement that have been ſhewn to the perſons and productions of the two former authors, I ſhall here only conſider the great favour conferred upon the laſt. It hath been advertiſed for ſeveral months in *The Engliſhman* [*c*], and others papers, that a pamphlet, called *The Criſis*, ſhould be publiſhed at a proper time, in order to open the eyes of the nation. It was propoſed to be printed by ſubſcription, price a ſhilling. This was a little out of

[*c*] A paper written by the ſame author, in favour of the preceding adminiſtration.

form; becauſe ſubſcriptions are uſually begged only for books of great price, and ſuch as are not likely to have a general ſale. Notice was likewiſe given of what this pamphlet ſhould contain; only an extract from certain acts of parliament relating to the ſucceſſion, which at leaſt muſt ſink nine-pence in the ſhilling, and leave but three-pence for the author's political reflexions; ſo that nothing very wonderful or deciſive could be reaſonably expected from this performance. But, a work was to be done, a hearty writer to be encouraged, and accordingly many thouſand copies were beſpoke. Neither could this be ſufficient; for when we expected to have our bundles delivered us, all was ſtopt; the friends to the cauſe ſprang a new project; and it was advertiſed that *The Criſis* could not appear, till the ladies had ſhewn their zeal againſt the *pretender*, as well as the men; againſt the *pretender* in the bloom of his youth, reported to be handſome, and endued with an underſtanding exactly of a ſize to pleaſe the ſex. I ſhould be glad to have ſeen a printed liſt of the fair ſubſcribers prefixed to this pamphlet; by which the *chevalier* might know, he was ſo far from *pretending* to a monarchy here, that he could not ſo much as *pretend* to a miſtreſs.

At the deſtined period, the firſt news we hear, is of a huge train of dukes, earls, viſcounts, barons, knights, eſquires, gentlemen, and others, going to *Sam. Buckley's*, the publiſher of *The Criſis*, to fetch home their cargoes, in order to tranſmit them by dozens,

dozens, ſcores, and hundreds, into the ſeveral counties, and thereby to prepare the wills and underſtandings of their friends againſt the approaching ſeſſions. Aſk any of them, whether they have read it? they will anſwer no; but they have ſent it every where, and it will do a world of good. It is a pamphlet, and a pamphlet they hear againſt the miniſtry; talks of ſlavery, *France*, and the *pretender:* they deſire no more; it will ſettle the wavering, confirm the doubtful, inſtruct the ignorant, inflame the clamorous, although it never be once looked into. I am told by thoſe who are expert in the trade, that the author and bookſeller of this twelve-penny treatiſe will be greater gainers, than from one edition of any folio that hath been publiſhed theſe twenty years. What needy writer would not ſolicit to work under ſuch maſters, who will pay us before hand, take off as much of our ware as we pleaſe at our own rates, and trouble not themſelves to examine, either before or after they have bought it, whether it be ſtaple or no?

But, in order to illuſtrate the implicit munificence of thoſe noble patrons, I cannot take a more effectual method than by examining the production itſelf; by which we ſhall eaſily find that it was never intended, further than from the noiſe, the bulk, and the title of *Criſis*, to do any ſervice to the factious cauſe. The entire piece conſiſts of a title-page, a dedication to the clergy, a preface,

an extract from certain acts of parliament, and about ten pages of dry reflections on the proceedings of the QUEEN and her ſervants; which his coadjutors, the earl of *Nottingham*, Mr. *Dunton*, and the *flying-poſt*, had long ago ſet before us in a much clearer light.

In popiſh countries, when ſome impoſtor cries out, *A miracle! a miracle!* it is not done with a hope or intention of converting hereticks, but confirming the deluded vulgar in their errors; and ſo the cry goes round, without examining into the cheat. Thus the *whigs* among us give about a cry, *A pamphlet! a pamphlet! the Criſis! the Criſis!* not with a view of convincing their adverſaries, but to raiſe the ſpirits of their friends, recall their ſtragglers, and unite their numbers by ſound and impudence; as bees aſſemble and cling together by the noiſe of braſs.

That no other effect could be imagined or hoped by the publication of this timely treatiſe, will be manifeſt from ſome obvious reflections upon the ſeveral parts of it; wherein the follies, the falſhoods, or the abſurdities, appear ſo frequent, that they may boldly contend for number with the lines.

When the hawker holds this pamphlet towards you, the firſt words you perceive are, *The Criſis*; or, *A diſcourſe*, &c. The interpreter of *Suidas* gives four tranſlations of the word *Criſis*; any of which may be as properly applied to this author's letter

ter to the *bailiff* of *Stockbridge* [*d*]. Next, what he calls a *diſcourſe*, conſiſts only of two pages, prefixed to twenty-two more, which contain extracts from acts of parliament; for as to the twelve laſt pages, they are provided for by themſelves in the title under the name of *Some ſeaſonable remarks on the danger of a* popiſh *ſucceſſor*. Another circumſtance worthy of our information in the title-page is, that the crown hath been ſettled *by previous acts*. I never heard of any act of parliament that was not previous to what it enacted, unleſs thoſe two, by which the earl of *Strafford* and Sir *John Fenwick* loſt their heads, may paſs for exceptions. *A diſcourſe, repreſenting from the moſt authentic records, &c.* He hath borrowed this expreſſion from ſome writer, who probably underſtood the words; but this gentleman hath altogether miſapplied them; and, under favour, he is wholly miſtaken; for a heap of extracts from ſeveral acts of parliament cannot be called a diſcourſe; neither do I believe he copied them from the moſt authentic records, which, as I take it, are lodged in the *Tower*, but out of ſome printed copy. I grant there is nothing material in all this, further than to ſhew the generoſity of our adverſaries in encouraging a writer, who cannot furniſh out ſo much as a title-page with propriety or common ſenſe.

[*d*] *Steele* addreſſed a letter to the *bailiff* of *Stockbridge*, who appears to have been returning officer for this borough, which *Steele* repreſented in parliament.

Next

Next follows the dedication to the clergy of the church of *England*, wherein the modeſty and the meaning of the firſt paragraphs are hardly to be matched. He tells them, he hath made a *comment upon the acts of* ſettlement, which he *lays before them, and conjures them to recommend in their writings and diſcourſes to their fellow-ſubjects:* and he doth all this, *out of a juſt deference to their great power and influence.* This is the right whig ſcheme of directing the clergy what to preach. The archbiſhop of *Canterbury's* juriſdiction extends no farther than over his own province; but the author of *the criſis* conſtitutes himſelf vicar-general over the whole clergy of the church of *England.* The biſhops in their letters or ſpeeches to their own clergy proceed no further than to *exhortation*; but this writer *conjures* the whole clergy of the church to *recommend* his *comment upon the laws* of the land, *in their writings and diſcourſes.* I would fain know, who made him a *commentator upon the laws* of the land: after which it will be time enough to aſk him, by what authority he directs the clergy *to recommend his* comments from the pulpit or the preſs?

He tells the clergy *there are two circumſtances which place the minds of the people under their direction*; the firſt circumſtance is their education; the ſecond circumſtance is the tenths of our lands. This laſt, according to the *Latin* phraſe, is ſpoken *ad invidiam*; for he knows well enough, they have not a twentieth: but if you take it in his own way,

way, the landlord has nine parts in ten of the people's minds under his direction. Upon this rock the author before us is perpetually ſplitting, as often as he ventures out beyond the narrow bounds of his literature. He hath a confuſed remembrance of words ſince he left the univerſity, but hath loſt half their meaning, and puts them together with no regard, except to their cadence; as I remember a fellow nailed up maps in a gentleman's cloſet, ſome ſideling, others upſide down, the better to adjuſt them to the pannels.

I am ſenſible it is of little conſequence to their cauſe, whether this defender of it underſtands grammar or no; and if what he would fain ſay, diſcovered him to be a well-wiſher to reaſon or truth, I would be ready to make large allowances. But when, with great difficulty, I deſcry a compoſition of rancour and falſhood intermixed with plauſible nonſenſe, I feel a ſtruggle between contempt and indignation at ſeeing the character of a *cenſor*, a *guardian*, an *Engliſhman*, a *commentator* on the *laws*, an *inſtructor* of the *clergy*, aſſumed by a child of obſcurity, without one ſingle qualification to ſupport them.

This writer, who either affects, or is commanded, of late to copy after the biſhop of *Sarum*, hath, out of the pregnancy of his invention, found out an old way of inſinuating the groſſeſt reflections under the appearance of admonitions; and is ſo judicious a follower of the prelate, that he taxes the clergy for *inflaming their people with apprehenſions*

ſions of danger to them and their *conſtitution from men, who are innocent of ſuch deſigns*; when we muſt needs confeſs, the whole *deſign* of his pamphlet is *to inflame the people with apprehenſions of danger* from the preſent miniſtry, whom *we* believe to be at leaſt as *innocent men* as the laſt.

What ſhall I ſay to a pamphlet, where the malice and falſhood of every line would require an anſwer, and where the dulneſs and abſurdities will not deſerve one?

By his pretending to have always maintained an inviolable reſpect to the clergy, he would inſinuate, that thoſe papers among the *Tatlers* and *Spectators*, where the whole order is abuſed, were not his own. I will appeal to all who know the flatneſs of his ſtyle, and the barrenneſs of his invention, whether he doth not groſly prevaricate? was he ever able to walk without leading-ſtrings, or ſwim without bladders, without being diſcovered by his hobbling and his ſinking? hath he adhered to his character in his paper called *The Engliſhman*, whereof he is allowed to be ſole author without any competition? what does he think of the letter ſigned by himſelf, which relates to *Moleſworth* [*e*],

[*e*] The right honourable *Robert Moleſworth*, Eſq; one of the privy council and member of the Houſe of Commons, created a peer by king *George* I. The lower houſe of convocation there preferred a complaint againſt him for diſreſpectful words, which being repreſented in *England*, he was removed from the council: to juſtify him againſt this complaint was the ſubject of *Steele's* letter.

in whoſe defence he affronts the whole convocation of *Ireland?*

It is a wiſe maxim, that becauſe the clergy are no civil lawyers, they ought not to preach obedience to governors; and therefore they ought not to preach temperance, becauſe they are no phyſicians. Examine all this author's writings, and then point me out a divine who knoweth leſs of the conſtitution of *England* than he; witneſs thoſe many egregious blunders in his late papers, where he pretended to dabble in the ſubject.

But the clergy have, it ſeems, imbibed their notions of power and obedience, abhorrent from our laws, *from the pompous ideas of imperial greatneſs and the ſubmiſſion to abſolute emperors.* This is groſs ignorance, below a ſchool-boy in his *Lucius Florus.* The *Roman* Hiſtory, wherein lads are inſtructed, reacheth little above eight hundred years, and the authors do every where inſtil republican principles; and, from the account of nine in twelve of the firſt emperors, we learn to have a deteſtation againſt tyranny. The *Greeks* carry this point yet a great deal higher, which none can be ignorant of, who hath read or heard them quoted. This gave *Hobbes* the occaſion of advancing a poſition directly contrary; that the youth of *England* were corrupted in their political principles, by reading the hiſtories of *Rome* and *Greece*, which, having been written under republicks, taught the readers to have ill notions of monarchy. In this aſſertion there was

ſomething

ſomething ſpecious, but that advanced by *The Criſis* could only iſſue from the profoundeſt ignorance.

But, would you know his ſcheme of education for young gentlemen at the univerſity? it is, that they ſhould ſpend their time in peruſing thoſe acts of parliament, whereof his pamphlet is an extract, which *if it had been done, the kingdom would not be in its preſent condition, but every member ſent into the world thus inſtructed, ſince the Revolution, would have been an advocate for our rights and liberties.*

Here now is a project for getting more money by *the criſis*; to have it read by tutors in the univerſities. I thoroughly agree with him, that, if our ſtudents had been thus employed for twenty years paſt, *the kingdom had not been in its preſent condition:* but we have too many of ſuch proficients already among the young nobility and gentry, who have gathered up their politicks from chocolate-houſes, and factious clubs, and who, if they had ſpent their time in hard ſtudy at *Oxford* or *Cambridge*, we might indeed have ſaid, that the factious part of this kingdom *had not been in its preſent condition*, or have ſuffered themſelves to be taught, that a few acts of parliament relating to the ſucceſſion are preferable to all other *civil inſtitutions* whatſoever. Neither did I ever before hear, that an act of parliament relating to one particular point could be called a civil inſtitution.

He ſpends almoſt a quarto page in telling the clergy, that they will be certainly perjured if they bring in the *pretender*, whom they have abjured; and

and he wiſely reminds them, that they have ſworn without equivocation or mental reſervation; otherwiſe the clergy might think, as ſoon as they received the *pretender*, and turned *papiſts*, they would be free from their oath.

This honeſt, civil, ingenious gentleman knows in his conſcience, that there are not ten clergymen in *England* (except nonjurors) who do not abhor the thoughts of the *pretender* reigning over us, much more than himſelf. But this is the ſpittle of the biſhop of *Sarum* [*f*], which our author licks up, and ſwallows, and then coughs out again with an addition of his own phlegm. I would fain ſuppoſe the body of the clergy were to return an anſwer by one of their members to theſe worthy counſellors; I conceive it might be in the following terms:

" *My lord and gentleman*,

" The clergy command me to give you thanks " for your advice; and if they knew any crimes, " from which either of you were as free, as they " are from thoſe which you ſo earneſtly exhort " them to avoid, they would return your favour " as near as poſſible in the ſame ſtyle and manner. " However, that your advice may not be wholly " loſt, particularly that part of it which relates to " the *pretender*, they deſire you would apply it to " more proper perſons. Look among your own

[*f*] Dr. *Gilbert Burnet*.

" leaders; examine which of them engaged in a " plot to reſtore the late king *James*, and received " pardons under his ſeal; examine which of them " have been ſince tampering with his pretended " ſon, and to gratify their ambition, their avarice, " their malice and revenge, are now willing to re- " ſtore him at the expence of the religion and li- " berty of their country. Retire, good my lord, " with your pupil, and let us hear no more of " theſe hypocritical inſinuations, leſt the QUEEN " and miniſters, who have been hitherto content " with only *diſappointing* the lurking villainies of " your faction, may be at laſt provoked to *ex-* " *poſe* them."

But his reſpect for the clergy is ſuch, that he doth not inſinuate as if they really had theſe evil diſpoſitions; he only *inſinuates*, that they give *too much cauſe* for ſuch *inſinuations*.

I will, upon occaſion, ſtrip ſome of his *inſinuations* from their generality and ſoleciſms, and drag them into the light. His dedication to the clergy is full of them, becauſe here he endeavours to mould up his rancour and civility together; by which conſtraint he is obliged to ſhorten his paragraphs, and to place them in ſuch a light, that they obſcure one another. Suppoſing, therefore, that I have ſcraped off his good manners in order to come at his meaning, which lies under; he tells the clergy, that the favour of the QUEEN and her miniſters is but a *colour of zeal towards them*; that the people

people were deluded by a groundleſs cry of the church's danger at *Sacheverel's* trial; that the clergy, as they are *men of ſenſe and honour*, ought to preach this truth to their ſeveral congregations; and let them know, that the true deſign of the preſent men in power, in that and all their proceedings ſince in favour of the church, was to bring in *popery*, *France*, and the *pretender*, and to enſlave all *Europe*, contrary to the *laws of our country*, *the power of the legiſlature*, *the faith of nations*, *and the honour of God.*

I cannot ſee why the clergy, as *men of ſenſe and men of honour* (for he appeals not to them as men of *religion)*, ſhould not be allowed to know when they are in danger, and be able to gueſs whence it comes, and who are their protectors. The deſign of their deſtruction indeed may have been projected in the dark; but when all was ripe, their enemies proceeded to ſo many overt-acts in the face of the nation, that it was obvious to the meaneſt people, who wanted no other motives to rouze them. On the other ſide, can this author, or the wiſeſt of his faction, aſſign one ſingle act of the preſent miniſtry any way tending towards bringing in the *pretender*, or to weaken the ſucceſſion of the houſe of *Hanover?* Obſerve then the reaſonableneſs of this gentleman's advice: the clergy, the gentry, and the common people, had the utmoſt apprehenſions of danger to the church under the late miniſtry; yet then it was the greateſt impiety to *inflame the people with any ſuch apprehenſions.* His

danger of a *popiſh* ſucceſſor, from any ſteps of the preſent miniſtry, is an artificial calumny, raiſed and ſpread againſt the conviction of the inventors, pretended to be believed only by thoſe, who abhor the conſtitution in church and ſtate; an obdurate faction, who compaſs heaven and earth to reſtore themſelves upon the ruin of their country; yet here our author *exhorts the clergy* to preach up his imaginary danger to their people, and diſturb the public peace with his ſtrained ſeditious comments.

But how comes this gracious licence to the clergy from the *whigs* to concern themſelves with politicks of any ſort, although it be only the gloſſes and comments of Mr. *Steele?* The ſpeeches of the managers at *Sacheverel's* trial, particularly thoſe of *Stanhope*, *Lechmere*, *King*, *Parker* [*g*], and ſome others, ſeemed to deliver a different doctrine. Nay, this very dedication complains of *ſome in holy orders, who have made the conſtitution of their country* (in which and the *coptick* Mr. *Steele* is equally ſkilled) *a very little part of their ſtudy, and yet made obedience and government the frequent ſubjects of their diſcourſes.* This difficulty is eaſily ſolved; for by *politicks* they mean *obedience.* Mr. *Hoadley* [*h*], who is a champion for reſiſtance, was never charged with meddling out of his function: *Hugh Peters*, and his brethren, in the times of uſurpation, had

[*g*] Theſe perſons were created peers by king *George* I.

[*h*] Doctor *Benjamin Hoadley*, created biſhop of *Bangor* by king *George* I. in 1715, tranſlated to *Hereford* in 1721, to *Saliſbury* in 1723, and to *Wincheſter* in 1734.

full liberty to preach up ſedition and rebellion; and ſo here Mr. *Steele* iſſues out his licence to the clergy to preach up the *danger of a popiſh pretender*, in defiance of the QUEEN and her adminiſtration.

Every whiffler in a laced coat, who frequents the chocolate-houſe, and is able to ſpell the title of a pamphlet, ſhall talk of the conſtitution with as much plauſibility as this very ſolemn writer; and, with as good a grace, blame the clergy for meddling with politicks, which they do no underſtand. I have known many of theſe able politicians furniſhed, before they were of age, with all the neceſſary topicks of their faction, and by the help of about twenty polyſyllables capable of maintaining an argument, that would ſhine in *The Criſis*; whoſe author gathered up his little ſtock from the ſame ſchools, and hath written from no other fund.

But, after all, it is not clear to me, whether this gentleman addreſſeth himſelf to the clergy of *England* in general, or only to thoſe very few (hardly enough, in caſe of a change, to ſupply the mortality of thoſe *ſelf-denying prelates* he celebrates) who are in his principles, and among theſe only ſuch as live in and about *London*; which probably will reduce the number to about half a dozen at moſt. I ſhould incline to gueſs the latter; becauſe he tells them they *are ſurrounded by a learned, wealthy, knowing gentry, who know with what firmneſs, ſelf-denial, and charity, the biſhops adhered to the public cauſe, and what contumelies thoſe clergymen*

have undergone, &c. who adhered to the cauſe of truth. By thoſe terms, *the public cauſe, and the cauſe of truth*, he underſtands the *cauſe* of the *whigs*, in oppoſition to the QUEEN and her ſervants: therefore, by the *learned, wealthy, and knowing gentry*, he muſt underſtand the *Bank* and *Eaſt-India company*, and thoſe other merchants or citizens within the bills of mortality, who have been ſtrenuous againſt the church and crown, and whoſe ſpirit of faction hath lately got the better of their intereſt. For let him ſearch all the reſt of the kingdom, he will find the *ſurrounded* clergy, and the *ſurrounding* gentry, wholly ſtrangers to the merits of thoſe prelates, and adhering to a very different *cauſe of truth*, as will ſoon, I hope, be manifeſt, by a fair appeal to the repreſentatives of both.

It was very unneceſſary in this writer to beſpeak the treatment of *contempt and deriſion*, which the clergy are to expect from his faction, whenever they come into power. I believe, that venerable body is in very little concern after what manner their moſt mortal enemies intend to *treat* them, whenever it ſhall pleaſe God, for our ſins, to viſit us with ſo fatal an event; which, I hope, it will be the united endeavours both of clergy and laity to hinder. It will be ſome ſupport to this hope, if I could have any opinion of his predicting talent (which ſome have aſcribed to people of this author's character) where he tells us, that *noiſe and wrath will not always paſs for zeal.* What other inſtances of zeal hath this gentleman, or the reſt of

of his party, been able to produce? If clamour be *noiſe*, it is but opening our ears to know from what ſide it comes; and, if ſedition, ſcurrility, ſlander and calumny be the fruit of *wrath*, read the pamphlets and papers iſſuing from the *zealots* of that faction, or viſit their clubs and coffee-houſes, in order to form a judgment of the tree.

When Mr. *Steele* tells us, *we have a religion that wants no ſupport from the enlargement of ſecular power, but is well ſupported by the wiſdom and piety of its preachers, and its own native truth*; it would be good to know what religion he profeſſeth: for the clergy, to whom he ſpeaks, will never allow him a member of the church of *England*. They cannot agree that the *truth* of the goſpel, and the *piety* and *wiſdom* of its preachers, are a ſufficient *ſupport*, in an evil age, againſt infidelity, faction, and vice, without the aſſiſtance of *ſecular power*; unleſs God would pleaſe to confer the gift of miracles on thoſe who wait at the altar. I believe they venture to go a little further, and think, that, upon ſome occaſions, they want a little *enlargement of aſſiſtance from the ſecular power* againſt *atheiſts*, *deiſts*, *ſocinians*, and other hereticks. Every firſt *Sunday* in *Lent*, a part of the liturgy is read to the people, in the preface to which the church declares her wiſhes for the reſtoring of that diſcipline ſhe formerly had, and which, for ſome years paſt, hath been more wanted than ever. But of this no more, leſt it might *inſinuate jealouſies between the clergy and laity*; which, the author tells us, is the

policy of vain and ambitious men among the former, in hopes to derive, from their order, a veneration they cannot deſerve from their virtue. If this be their method for procuring veneration, it is the moſt ſingular that ever was thought on; and the clergy would then indeed have no more to do with politicks of any ſort, than Mr. *Steele* or his faction will allow them.

Having thus toiled through his dedication, I proceed to conſider his preface, which, half conſiſting of quotation, will be ſo much the ſooner got through. It is a very unfair thing in any writer to employ his *ignorance* and *malice* together; becauſe it gives his anſwerer double work: it is like the ſort of ſophiſtry that the logicians call *two mediums*, which are never allowed in the ſame ſyllogiſm. A writer with a weak head, and a corrupt heart, is an over-match for any ſingle pen; like a hireling jade, dull and vicious, hardly able to ſtir, yet offering at every turn to kick.

He begins his preface with ſuch an account of the original of power, and the nature of civil inſtitutions, as, I am confident, was never once imagined by any writer upon government, from *Plato* to Mr. *Locke*. Give me leave to tranſcribe his firſt paragraph. *I never ſaw an unruly crowd of people cool by degrees into temper, but it gave me an idea of the original of power, and the nature of civil inſtitutions. One particular man has uſually, in thoſe caſes, from the dignity of his appearance, or other qualities known or imagined by the multitude, been received*

ceived into ſudden favour and authority; the occaſion of their difference has been repreſented to him, and the matter referred to his deciſion.

I have known a poet, who never was out of *England*, introduce a fact, by way of ſimile, which could probably no where happen nearer than in the plains of *Libya*; and begin with, *So have I ſeen* [*i*]. Such a fiction, I ſuppoſe, may be juſtified by poetical licence; yet *Virgil* is much more modeſt. This paragraph of Mr. *Steele's*, which he ſets down as an obſervation of his own, is a miſerable mangled tranſlation of ſix verſes out of that famous poet, who ſpeaks after this manner; *As when a ſedition ariſes in a great multitude*, &c. *then if they ſee a wiſe grave man*, &c. *Virgil*, who lived but a little after the ruin of the *Roman* republick, where ſeditions often happened, and the force of oratory was great among the people, made uſe of a ſimile, which Mr. *Steele* turns into a fact after ſuch a manner, as if he had ſeen it an hundred times; and builds upon it a ſyſtem of the origin of government. When the vulgar here in *England* aſſemble in a riotous manner (which is not very frequent of late years) the prince takes a much more effectual way than that of ſending orators to appeaſe them: but Mr. *Steele* imagines ſuch a crowd of people as this, where there is no government at all; their *unrulineſs* quelled, and their paſſions *cooled* by a particular man, whoſe great qualities they

[*i*] See the Περὶ Βάθους.

had known before. Such an aſſembly muſt have riſen ſuddenly from the earth, and the *man of authority* dropt from the clouds; for, without ſome previous form of government, no ſuch crowd did ever yet aſſemble, or could poſſibly be acquainted with the merits and dignity of any *particular man* among them. But to purſue his ſcheme; this man of authority, who *cools* the *crowd* by degrees, and to whom they all appeal, muſt, of neceſſity, prove either an open or *clandeſtine tyrant*. A *clandeſtine tyrant* I take to be a king of *Brentford*, who keeps his army in diſguiſe; and whenever he happens either to die naturally, be knocked on the head, or depoſed, the people *calmly take further meaſures, and improve upon what was begun under his unlimited power*. All this our author tells us, with extreme propriety, *is what ſeems reaſonable to common ſenſe*; that is, in other words, it ſeems *reaſonable* to *reaſon*. This is what he calls *giving an idea of the original of power, and the nature of civil inſtitutions*. To which I anſwer, with great phlegm, that I defy any man alive to ſhew me, in double the number of lines, although writ by the ſame author, ſuch a complicated ignorance in hiſtory, human nature, or politicks, as well as in the ordinary properties of thought or of ſtyle.

But, it ſeems, theſe profound ſpeculations were only premiſed to introduce ſome quotations in favour of *reſiſtance*. What hath *reſiſtance* to do with the ſucceſſion of the houſe of *Hanover*, that the whig writers ſhould perpetually affect to tag them together?

together? I can conceive nothing elſe, but that their hatred to the QUEEN and miniſtry puts them upon thoughts of introducing the ſucceſſor by *another* Revolution. Are caſes of *extreme neceſſity* to be produced as common maxims, by which we are always to proceed? Should not theſe gentlemen ſometimes inculcate the general rule of obedience, and not always the exception of reſiſtance; ſince the former hath been the perpetual dictate of all laws both divine and civil, and the latter is ſtill in diſpute?

I ſhall meddle with none of the paſſages he cites to prove the lawfulneſs of reſiſting princes, except that from the preſent lord chancellor's [*k*] ſpeech in defence of Dr. *Sacheverel:* that *there are extraordinary caſes, caſes of neceſſity, which are implied, although not expreſſed, in the general rule* [of obedience]. Theſe words, very clear in themſelves, Mr. *Steele* explains into nonſenſe; which, in any other author, I ſhould ſuſpect to have been intended as a reflection upon as great a perſon as ever filled or adorned that high ſtation: but I am ſo well acquainted with his pen, that I much more wonder how it can trace out a true quotation than a falſe comment. To ſee him treat my lord *Harcourt* with ſo much civility, looks indeed a little ſuſpicious, and as if he had malice in his heart.

[*k*] Sir *Simon Harcourt*, who, at the time of *Sacheverel's* trial, had reſigned his place of attorney general, which he afterwards accepted again; upon the change of the miniſtry, he was made lord keeper, and in 1711 created a baron.

He calls his lordſhip *a very great man*, and *a great living authority*; places himſelf in company with general *Stanhope* and Mr. *Hoadley*; and, in ſhort, takes the moſt effectual method in his power of ruining his lordſhip in the opinion of every man, who is wiſe or good. I can only tell my lord *Harcourt* for his comfort, that theſe praiſes are encumbered with the doctrine of *reſiſtance*, and the true revolution-principles; and provided he will not allow Mr. *Steele* for his commentator, he may hope to recover the honour of being libelled again, as well as his ſovereign and fellow-ſervants.

We now come to *The Criſis*; where we meet with two pages by way of introduction to thoſe extracts from acts of parliament, that conſtitute the body of his pamphlet. This introduction begins with a definition of liberty, and then proceeds in a panegyrick upon that great bleſſing. His panegyrick is made up of half a dozen ſhreds, like a ſchool-boy's theme, beaten general topicks, where any other man alive might wander ſecurely; but this politician, by venturing to vary the good old phraſes, and give them a new turn, commits an hundred ſoleciſms and abſurdities. The weighty truths, which he endeavours to preſs upon his reader, are ſuch as theſe. That *liberty is a very good thing*; that *without liberty we cannot be free*; that *health is good, and ſtrength is good, but liberty is better than either*; that *no man can be happy without the liberty of doing whatever his own mind tells him is beſt*; that *men of quality love liberty, and common people*

people love liberty; even women and children love liberty; and you cannot pleaſe them better than by letting them do what they pleaſe. Had Mr. *Steele* contented himſelf to deliver theſe and the like maxims in ſuch intelligible terms, I could have found where we agreed and where we differed. But us let hear ſome of theſe axioms, as he hath involved them. *We cannot poſſeſs our ſouls with pleaſure and ſatisfaction, except we preſerve in ourſelves that ineſtimable bleſſing, which we call liberty. By liberty, I deſire to be underſtood to mean the happineſs of men's living, &c.*——The true *life of man conſiſts in conducting it according to his own juſt ſentiments and innocent inclinations*——*man's being is degraded below that of a free agent, when his affections and paſſions are no longer governed by the dictates of his own mind.*——*Without liberty, our health* (among other things) *may be at the will of a tyrant employed to our own ruin, and that of our fellow-creatures.* If there be any of theſe maxims which is not groſly defective in truth, in ſenſe, or in grammar, I will allow them to paſs for uncontroulable. By the firſt, omitting the pedantry of the whole expreſſion, there are not above one or two nations in the world, where any one man can *poſſeſs his ſoul with pleaſure and ſatisfaction.* In the ſecond, he *deſires to be underſtood to mean*; that is, he deſires to be meant to mean, or to be underſtood to underſtand. In the third, *the life of man conſiſts in conducting* his life. In the fourth he affirms, that *men's beings are degraded, when their paſſions*

paſſions are no longer governed by the dictates of their own minds; directly contrary to the leſſons of all moraliſts and legiſlators; who agree unanimouſly, that the paſſions of men muſt be under the government of reaſon and law; neither are laws of any other uſe than to correct the irregularity of our affections. By the laſt, *our health is ruinous to ourſelves and other men when a tyrant pleaſes*; which I leave to him to make out.

I cannot ſufficiently commend our anceſtors for tranſmitting to us the bleſſing of liberty; yet, having *laid out their blood and treaſure upon the purchaſe*, I do not ſee how they *acted parſimoniouſly*; becauſe I can conceive nothing more generous than that of employing our blood and treaſure for the ſervice of others. But I am ſuddenly ſtruck with the thought, that I have found his meaning; our anceſtors acted parſimoniouſly, becauſe they only ſpent their own treaſure for the good of their poſterity; whereas we ſquandered away the treaſures of our poſterity too; but whether they will be thankful, and think it was done for the preſervation of their liberty, muſt be left to themſelves for a deciſion.

I verily believe, although I could not prove it in *Weſtminſter-hall* before a *lord chief juſtice*, that, by *enemies to our conſtitution*, and *enemies to our preſent eſtabliſhment*, *Mr.* Steele *would deſire to be underſtood to mean* my lord treaſurer and the reſt of the miniſtry: *by thoſe who are grown ſupine in proportion to the danger, to which our liberty is every day more expoſed*,

expoſed, I ſhould gueſs, he means the *tories:* and by *honeſt men, who ought to look up with a ſpirit that becomes honeſty*, he underſtands the *whigs*. I likewiſe believe, he would take it ill, or think me ſtupid, if I did not thus expound him. I ſay then, that according to this expoſition, the four great officers of ſtate, together with the reſt of the cabinet-council (except the archbiſhop of *Canterbury* [*l*]) are *enemies to our eſtabliſhment, making artful and open attacks upon our conſtitution*, and are now *practiſing indirect arts, and mean ſubtleties, to weaken the ſecurity of thoſe acts of parliament* for ſettling the ſucceſſion in the houſe of *Hanover*. The firſt and moſt notorious of theſe criminals is *Robert Harley*, earl of *Oxford*, lord high treaſurer, who is reputed to be chief miniſter: the ſecond is *James Butler*, duke of *Ormond*, who commands the army, and deſigns to employ it in bringing over the *pretender:* the third is *Henry St. John*, lord viſcount *Bolingbroke*, ſecretary of ſtate, who muſt be ſuppoſed to hold a conſtant correſpondence at the court of *Bar le Duc*, as the late earl of *Godolphin* did with that at *St. Germains:* and, to avoid tediouſneſs, Mr. *Bromley* [*m*] and the reſt are employed in their ſeveral diſtricts to the ſame end. Theſe are the opinions, which Mr. *Steele* and his faction, under the direction of their leaders, are endeavouring, with all their might, to propagate among the people of

[*l*] Dr. *Tenniſon*.

[*m*] Speaker of the Houſe of Commons.

England,

England, concerning the preſent miniſtry; with what reſervation to the honour, wiſdom or juſtice of the QUEEN, I cannot determine; who, by her own free choice, after long experience of their abilities and integrity, and in compliance to the general wiſhes of her people, called them to her ſervice. Such an accuſation againſt perſons in ſo high truſt ſhould require, I think, at leaſt one ſingle overt-act to make it good. If there be no other choice of perſons fit to ſerve the crown without danger from the *pretender*, except among thoſe who are called the *whig* party, the *Hanover* ſucceſſion is then indeed in a very deſperate ſtate: that illuſtrious family will have almoſt nine in ten of the kingdom againſt it, and thoſe principally of the landed intereſt; which is moſt to be depended upon in ſuch a nation as ours.

I have now got as far as his extracts, which I ſhall not be at the pains of comparing with the originals, but ſuppoſe he hath gotten them fairly tranſcribed: I only think, that whoever is patentee for printing acts of parliament may have a very fair action againſt him for invaſion of property: but this is none of my buſineſs to inquire into.

After two and twenty pages ſpent in reciting acts of parliament, *he deſires leave to repeat the hiſtory and progreſs of the Union*; upon which I have ſome few things to obſerve.

This *work*, he tells us, *was unſucceſsfully attempted by ſeveral of her majeſty's predeceſſors*; although

though I [n] do not remember it was ever thought on by any except king *James* the firſt, and the late king *William*. I have read indeed, that ſome ſmall overtures were made, by the former of theſe princes, towards an Union between the two kingdoms, but rejected with indignation and contempt by the *Engliſh:* and the hiſtorian tells us, that, how degenerate and corrupt ſoever the court and parliament then were, they would not give ear to ſo infamous a propoſal. I do not find, that any of the ſucceeding princes, before the Revolution, ever reſumed the deſign; becauſe it was a project for which there could not poſſibly be aſſigned the leaſt reaſon or neceſſity: for I defy any mortal to name one ſingle advantage that *England* could ever expect from ſuch an union.

But towards the end of the late king's reign, upon apprehenſions of the want of iſſue from him or the princeſs *Anne*, a propoſition, for uniting both kingdoms, was begun; becauſe *Scotland* had not ſettled their crown upon the houſe of *Hanover*, but left themſelves at large, in hopes to make their advantage; and it was thought highly dangerous to leave that part of the iſland, inhabited by a poor fierce northern people, at liberty to put themſelves under a different king. However, the oppoſition to this work was ſo great, that it could not be overcome until ſome time after her preſent majeſty

[n] The author's memory failed him a little in this aſſertion, as one of his anſwerers obſerved.

came

came to the crown; when, by the weakneſs or corruption of a certain miniſter, ſince dead, an act of parliament was obtained by the *Scots*, which gave them leave to arm themſelves [*o*]; and ſo the Union became neceſſary, not for any actual good it could poſſibly do us, but to avoid a probable evil; and at the ſame time ſave an obnoxious miniſter's head; who was ſo wiſe as to take the firſt opportunity of procuring a general pardon by act of parliament, becauſe he could not, with ſo much decency and ſafety, deſire a particular one for himſelf. Theſe facts are well enough known to the whole kingdom. And I remember, diſcourſing above ſix years ago with the moſt conſiderable [*p*] perſon of the adverſe party, and a great promoter of the Union, he frankly owned to me, that this neceſſity, brought upon us by the wrong management of the earl of *Godolphin*, was the only cauſe of the Union.

Therefore, I am ready to grant two points to the author of *The Criſis: firſt*, that the Union became neceſſary for the cauſe above related; becauſe it prevented this iſland from being governed by two kings, which *England* would never have ſuffered; and it might probably have coſt us a war of a year or two to reduce the *Scots*. *Secondly*, that it would be dangerous to break this Union, at leaſt at this juncture, while there is a *pretender* abroad, who

[*o*] See the Examiner, N°. XIX. vol. VIII. p. 61.

[*p*] Lord *Somers*.

might probably lay hold of ſuch an opportunity. And this made me wonder a little at the ſpirit of faction laſt ſummer among ſome people, who, having been the great promoters of the *Union*, and ſeveral of them the principal gainers by it [*q*], could yet proceed ſo far as to propoſe in the houſe of lords, that it ſhould be diſſolved; while at the ſame time thoſe peers, who had ever oppoſed it in the beginning, were then for preſerving it, upon the reaſon I have juſt aſſigned, and which the author of *The Criſis* hath likewiſe taken notice of.

But when he tells us, *the Engliſhmen ought, in generoſity, to be more particularly careful in preſerving this Union*, he argues like himſelf. *The late kingdom of* Scotland (ſaith he) *had as numerous a nobility as* England, *&c.* They had indeed; and to that we owe one of the great and neceſſary evils of the Union, upon the foot it now ſtands. Their nobility is indeed ſo numerous, that the whole revenues of their country would be hardly able to maintain them according to the dignity of their titles; and, what is infinitely worſe, they are never likely to be extinct until the laſt period of all things; becauſe the greateſt part of them deſ-

[*q*] The duke of *Argyle*, who zealouſly promoted the Union, the earl of *Mar*, Mr. *Lockhart*, and Mr. *Cockburn*, having been deputed on purpoſe, remonſtrated to the queen againſt the malt tax, which, they ſaid, would probably prompt the *Scots* to declare the Union diſſolved. The earl of *Finlater* ſoon after moved the houſe of lords for leave to bring in a bill for diſſolving the Union; he was ſeconded by the earl of *Mar*, and ſupported by lord *Eglinton*, earl of *Hay*, the duke of *Argyle*, and others.

cend to heirs general. I imagine a perſon of quality prevailed on to marry a woman much his inferior, and without a groat to her fortune, and her friends arguing ſhe was as good as her huſband, becauſe ſhe brought him as numerous a family of relations and ſervants as ſhe found in his houſe. *Scotland*, in the taxes, is obliged to contribute one penny for every forty pence laid upon *England*; and the repreſentatives they ſend to parliament are about a thirteenth. Every other *Scotch* peer hath all the privileges of an *Engliſh* one, except that of ſitting in parliament, and even precedence before all of the ſame title that ſhall be created for the time to come. The penſions and employments, poſſeſſed by the natives of that country now among us, do amount to more than the whole body of their nobility ever ſpent at home; and all the money they raiſe upon the publick is hardly ſufficient to defray their civil and military liſts. I could point out ſome with great titles, who affected to appear very vigorous for diſſolving the Union, although their whole revenues, before that period, would have ill maintained a *Welch* juſtice of the peace; and have ſince gathered more money than ever any *Scotchman*, who had not travelled, could form an idea of.

I have only one thing more to ſay upon occaſion of the Union-act; which is, that the author of *The Criſis* may be be fairly proved, from his own citations, to be guilty of HIGH TREASON. In a paper of his called *The Engliſhman*, of *October* 29,

there is an advertiſement about taking in ſubſcriptions for printing *The Criſis*, where the title is publiſhed at length with the following clauſe, which the author thought fit to drop in the publication; [*and that no power on earth can bar, alter, or make void, the preſent ſettlement of the crown, etc.* By *Richard Steele.*] In his extract of an act of parliament made ſince the Union, it appears to be *high treaſon for any perſon, by writing or printing, to maintain and affirm, that the kings or queens of this realm, with and by the authority of parliament, are not able to make laws and ſtatutes of ſufficient force and validity to limit and bind the crown, and the deſcent, limitation, inheritance, and government thereof.* This act being ſubſequent to the ſettlement of the crown confirmed at the Union, it is probable ſome friend of the author adviſed him to leave out thoſe *treaſonable* words in the printed title-page, which he had before publiſhed in the *advertiſement*; and, accordingly, we find, that in the treatiſe itſelf he only *offers it to every good ſubject's conſideration, whether this article of the ſettlement of the crown is not as firm as the Union itſelf, and as the ſettlement of epiſcopacy in* England, *etc.* And he thinks the *Scots underſtood it ſo, that the ſucceſſion to the crown was never to be controverted.*

Theſe I take to be only treaſonable inſinuations; but the advertiſement before mentioned is actually *high treaſon*; for which the author ought to be proſecuted, if that would avail any thing under a juriſdiction, where curſing the QUEEN is not above the penalty of twenty marks.

Nothing is more notorious than that the *whigs* of late years, both in their writings and diſcourſes, have affected, upon all occaſions, to allow the legitimacy of the *pretender*. This makes me a little wonder to ſee our author labouring to prove the contrary, by producing all the popular chat of thoſe times, and other ſolid arguments from *Fuller's* narrative: but it muſt be ſuppoſed, that this gentleman acts by the commands of his ſuperiors, who have thought fit, at this juncture, to iſſue out new orders, for reaſons beſt known to themſelves. I wiſh they had been more clear in their directions to him upon that weighty point, whether the ſettlement of the ſucceſſion in the houſe of *Hanover* be alterable or no. I have obſerved where, in his former pages, he gives it in the negative; but, in the turning of a leaf, he hath wholly changed his mind. He tells us, *he wonders there can be found any* Briton *weak enough to contend againſt a power in their own nation, which is practiſed in a much greater degree in other ſtates:* and *how hard it is, that* Britain *ſhould be debarred the privilege of eſtabliſhing its own ſecurity by relinquiſhing only thoſe branches of the royal line, which threaten it with deſtruction; whilſt other nations never ſcruple, upon leſs occaſions, to go much greater lengths*; of which he produceth inſtances in *France*, *Spain*, *Sicily*, *Sardinia*; and then adds, *can* Great Britain *help to advance men to other thrones, and have no power in limiting its own?* How can a ſenator, capable of *doing honour to Sir* Thomas Hanmer, be guilty of ſuch ridiculous inconſiſtencies; the author of *The conduct of the allies* (ſays he) *hath dared to drop inſinuations about altering the*

ſucceſſion,

ſucceſſion. The author of *The conduct of the allies* writes ſenſe and Engliſh; neither of which the author of *The Criſis* underſtands. The former thinks it *wrong in point of policy to call in a foreign power to be guarantee of our ſucceſſion, becauſe it puts it out of the power of our own legiſlature to change our ſucceſſion without the conſent of that prince or ſtate, who is guarantee, whatever neceſſity may happen in future times.* Now, if it be high treaſon to affirm by writing, that the legiſlature hath no ſuch power; and if Mr. *Steele* thinks it ſtrange, that *Britain* ſhould be debarred this privilege, what could be the crime of putting ſuch a caſe, that in future ages a neceſſity might happen of limiting the ſucceſſion, as well as it hath happened already?

When Mr. *Steele reflects upon the many ſolemn, ſtrong barriers* (to our ſucceſſion) *of laws and oaths, &c.* he *thinks all fear vaniſhed before them.* I think ſo too, provided the epithet *ſolemn* goes for nothing; becauſe, although I have often heard of a *ſolemn* day, a *ſolemn* feaſt, and a *ſolemn* coxcomb, yet I can conceive no idea to myſelf of a *ſolemn barrier.* However, be that as it will, his *thoughts*, it ſeems, *will not let him reſt, but, before he is aware, he aſks himſelf ſeveral queſtions*; and, ſince he cannot reſolve them, I will endeavour to give him what ſatisfaction I am able. The firſt is, *What are the marks of a laſting ſecurity?* To which I anſwer, that the ſigns of it in a kingdom or ſtate are, firſt, good laws; and, ſecondly, thoſe laws well executed: we are pretty well provided with the former, but ex-

tremely defective in the latter.—Secondly, *What are our tempers and our hearts at home?* If by *ours* he means thoſe of himſelf and his abettors, they are moſt damnably wicked; impatient for the death of the QUEEN; ready to gratify their ambition and revenge by all deſperate methods; wholly alienate from truth, law, religion, mercy, conſcience, or honour.—Thirdly, *In what hands is power lodged abroad?* To anſwer the queſtion naturally, *Louis* XIV. is king of *France*, *Philip* V. (by the counſels and acknowledgements of the whigs) is king of *Spain*, and ſo on. If by power he means money; the duke of *Marlborough* is thought to have more ready money than all the kings of *Chriſtendom* together; but, by the peculiar diſpoſition of Providence, it is locked up in a trunk, to which his ambition hath no key; and that is our ſecurity.---Fourthly, *are our unnatural diviſions our ſtrength?* I think not; but they are the ſign of it; for, being *unnatural*, they cannot laſt; and this ſhews, that *union*, the foundation of all ſtrength, is more agreeable to our nature.---Fifthly, *Is it nothing to us, which of the princes of* Europe *has the longeſt ſword?* Not much, if we can tie up his hands, or put a ſtrong *ſhield* into thoſe of his neighbours; or, if our *ſword* be as *ſharp* as his is *long*; or, if it be neceſſary for him to turn his own *ſword* into a *plowſhare*; or, if ſuch a *ſword* happeneth to be in the hands of an *infant*, or ſtruggled for by two competitors.---Sixthly, *The powerful hand that deals out crowns and kingdoms all around us, may it not, in time, reach a*

king

king out to us too? If the *powerful hand* he means be that of *France*, it may *reach out* as many kings as it pleaſeth; but we will not accept them. Whence does this man get his intelligence? I ſhould think, even his brother *Ridpath* might furniſh him with better. What *crowns* or *kingdoms* hath *France* dealt about? *Spain* was given by the will of the former king, in conſequence of that infamous treaty of *partition*, the adviſer of which will, I hope, never be forgot in *England*. *Sicily* was diſpoſed of by her majeſty of *Great Britain*; ſo, in effect, was *Sardinia*. *France* indeed once *reached out* a king to *Poland*, but the people would not receive him. This queſtion of Mr. *Steele's* was therefore only put *in terrorem* without any regard to truth.---Seventhly, *Are there no pretentions to our crown that can never be revived?* There may, for ought I know, be about a dozen; and thoſe in time may poſſibly beget a hundred; but we muſt do as well as we can. Captain *Beſſus*, when he had fifty challenges to anſwer, proteſted he could not fight above three duels a day. *If the pretender ſhould fail* (ſays the writer), *the* French *king has, in his quiver, a ſucceſſion of them; the ducheſs of* Savoy, *or her ſons, or the* dauphin *her grandſon*. Let me ſuppoſe the *chevalier de St. George* to be dead; the ducheſs of *Savoy* will then be a *pretender*, and conſequently muſt leave her huſband, becauſe his royal highneſs (for Mr. *Steele* has not yet acknowledged him for a king) is in alliance with her *Britiſh* majeſty; her ſons, when they grow *pritenders*, muſt undergo the ſame fate. But I am

at a loſs how to diſpoſe of the *dauphin*, if he happen to be king of *France* before the *pretenderſhip* to *Britain* falls to his ſhare; for, I doubt, he will never be perſuaded to remove out of his own kingdom, only becauſe it is too near *England*.

But *the duke of* Savoy *did, ſome years ago, put in his claim to the crown of* England, *in right of his wife; and he is a prince of great capacity, in ſtrict alliance with* France, *and may therefore very well add to our fears of a popiſh ſucceſſor*. Is it the fault of the preſent, or of any miniſtry, that this prince put in his claim; muſt we give him opium to deſtroy his *capacity?* or can we prevent his alliance with any prince, who is in peace with her majeſty? Muſt we ſend to ſtab or poiſon all the *popiſh* princes, who have any pretended title to our crown by the proximity of blood? What, in the name of God, can theſe people drive at? what is it they demand? Suppoſe the preſent *dauphin* were now a man, and king of *France*, and next *popiſh* heir to the crown of *England*; is he not excluded by the laws of the land? But what regard will he have to our laws? I anſwer; hath not the QUEEN as good a title to the crown of *France?* and how is ſhe excluded, but by their law againſt the ſucceſſion of females, which we are not bound to acknowledge? And is it not in our power to exclude female ſucceſſors, as well as in theirs? If ſuch a pretence ſhall prove the cauſe of a war, what human power can prevent it? But our cauſe muſt neceſſarily be good and righteous; for either the kings of *England* have been un-

juſtly kept out of the poſſeſſion of *France*, or the *dauphin*, although neareſt of kin, can have no legal title to *England*. And he muſt be an ill prince indeed, who will not have the hearts and hands of ninety-nine in an hundred among his ſubjects againſt ſuch a *popiſh pretender*.

I have been the longer in anſwering the ſeventh queſtion, becauſe it led me to conſider all he had afterwards to ſay upon the ſubject of the *pretender*. ---Eighthly, and laſtly, he aſks himſelf, *Whether popery and ambition are become tame and quiet neighbours?* In this I can give him no ſatisfaction, becauſe I never was in that ſtreet where they live; nor do I converſe with any of their friends; only I find they are perſons of a very evil reputation. But I am told for certain, that *ambition* hath removed her lodging, and lives the very next door to *faction*, where they keep ſuch a racket, that the whole pariſh is diſturbed, and every night in an uproar.

Thus much in anſwer to thoſe eight *uneaſy queſtions* put by the author to himſelf, in order to *ſatisfy every* Briton, and give him an occaſion of *taking an impartial view of the affairs of* Europe *in general, as well as of* Great Britain *in particular*.

After enumerating the great actions of the *confederate* armies under the command of prince *Eugene* and the duke of *Marlborough*, Mr. *Steele* obſerves, in the bitterneſs of his ſoul, that the Britiſh *general, however unaccountable it may be to poſterity, was not permitted to enjoy the fruits of his glorious labour*. Ten years *fruits*, it ſeems, were not ſufficient;

ſufficient; and yet they were the *fruitfulleſt* campaigns that ever any general cropt. However, I cannot but hope, that poſterity will not be left in the dark, but ſome care taken both of her majeſty's glory, and the reputation of thoſe ſhe employs. An impartial hiſtorian may tell the world (and the next age will eaſily believe what it continues to feel) that the avarice and ambition of a few factious inſolent ſubjects had almoſt deſtroyed their country by continuing a ruinous war in conjunction with allies, for whoſe ſakes principally we fought, who refuſed to bear their juſt proportion of the charge, and were connived at in their refuſal, for private ends: that theſe factious people treated the beſt and kindeſt of ſovereigns with inſolence, cruelty, and ingratitude (of which he will be able to produce ſeveral inſtances); that they encouraged perſons and principles alien from our religion and government, in order to ſtrengthen their faction: he will tell the reaſons, why the *general* and *firſt miniſter* were ſeduced to be heads of this faction, contrary to the opinions they had always profeſſed. Such an hiſtorian will ſhew many reaſons, which made it neceſſary to remove the *general* and his friends, who, knowing the bent of the nation was againſt them, expected to loſe their power when the war was at an end. Particularly, the hiſtorian will diſcover the whole intrigue of the duke of *Marlborough's* endeavouring to procure a commiſſion to be *general for life* *; wherein juſtice will be

[r] See Examiner, number xix, and the ſubſequent papers.

done

done to a perſon at that time of high ſtation in the law, who (I mention it to his honour) adviſed the duke, when he was conſulted upon it, not to accept of ſuch a *commiſſion*. By theſe and many other inſtances, which time will bring to light, it may perhaps appear not very unaccountable to poſterity, why this great man was diſmiſſed at laſt; but rather why he was diſmiſſed no ſooner.

But this is entering into a wide field. I ſhall therefore leave *poſterity* to the information of better hiſtorians than the author of *The Criſis*, or myſelf; and go on to inform the preſent age in ſome facts, which this great orator and politician thinks fit to miſrepreſent with the utmoſt degree either of natural or wilful ignorance. He aſſerts, that in the duke of *Ormond's* campaign, *after a ſuſpenſion of arms between* Great Britain *and* France *proclaimed at the head of the armies, the* britiſh troops, *in the midſt of the enemy's garriſons, withdrew themſelves from their confederates.* The fact is directly otherwiſe; for the *britiſh* troops were moſt infamouſly deſerted by the confederates, after all that could be urged by the duke of *Ormond* and the earl of *Stafford* to preſs the confederate generals not to forſake them. The duke was directed to avoid engaging in any action, until he had further orders, becauſe an account of the king of *Spain's* renunciation was every day expected. This the *Imperialiſts* and *Dutch* knew well enough; and therefore propoſed to the duke, in that very juncture, to engage the *French*, for no other reaſon but to render deſperate all the QUEEN's meaſures

ſures towards a peace. Was not the certain poſſeſſion of *Dunkirk* of equal advantage to the uncertainty of a battle? A whole campaign under the duke of *Marlborough*, with ſuch an acquiſition, although at the coſt of many thouſand lives, and ſeveral millions of money, would have been thought very glorioufly ended.

Neither, after all, was it a new thing, either in the *Britiſh* general or the *Dutch* deputies, to refuſe fighting, when they did not approve it. When the duke of *Marlborough* was going to inveſt *Bouchain*, the deputies of the *ſtates* preſſed him in vain to engage the enemy; and one of them was ſo far diſcontented upon his grace's refuſal, that he preſently became a partizan of the peace; yet I do not remember any clamour then raiſed here againſt the duke upon that account. Again: When the *French* invaded *Doway*, after the confederates had deſerted the duke of *Ormond*, prince *Eugene* was violently bent upon a battle, and ſaid they ſhould never have another ſo good an opportunity; but monſieur ——, a private deputy, roſe up, and oppoſed it ſo far, that the prince was forced to deſiſt. Was it then more criminal in the duke of *Ormond* to refuſe fighting by expreſs command of the QUEEN, and in order to get poſſeſſion of *Dunkirk*, than for the duke of *Marlborough* to give the ſame refuſal, without any ſuch orders, or any ſuch advantage? or ſhall a *Dutch* deputy aſſume more power than the

the QUEEN of *Great Britain's* general, acting by the immediate commands of his ſovereign?

The *emperor and the empire* (ſays Mr. *Steele* by way of admiration) *continue the war!* Is his *imperial* majeſty able to continue it or no? if he be, then *Great Britain* hath been ſtrangely uſed for ten years paſt: then how came it to paſs, that of above thirty thouſand men in his ſervice in *Italy*, at the time of the battle of *Turin*, there were not above four thouſand paid by himſelf? if he be not able to continue it, why does he go on? The reaſons are clear; becauſe the war only affects the princes of the empire (whom he is willing enough to expoſe) but not his own dominions. Beſides, the *imperial* miniſters are in daily expectation of the QUEEN's death, which, they hope, will give a new turn to affairs, and rekindle the war in *Europe* upon the old foot; and we know how the miniſters of that court publicly aſſign it for a reaſon of their obſtinacy againſt peace, that they hope for a ſudden revolution in *England*. In the mean time, this appearance of the *emperor's* being forſaken by his ally will ſerve to increaſe the clamour, both here and in *Holland*, againſt her majeſty and thoſe ſhe employs.

Mr. *Steele* ſays, *there can be no crime in affirming (if it be truth) that the houſe of* Bourbon *is at this juncture become more formidable, and bids fairer for an univerſal monarchy, and to engroſs the whole trade of* Europe, *than it did before the war.*

No *crime in affirming it, if it be truth.* I will for once allow his propoſition. But if it be falſe, then

then I affirm, that whoever advanceth ſo ſeditious a falſhood deſerves to be hanged. Doth he mean by the houſe of *Bourbon*, the two kings of *France* and *Spain?* If ſo, I reject his meaning, which would inſinuate, that the intereſts and deſigns of both thoſe princes will be the ſame; whereas they are more oppoſite than thoſe of any two other monarchs in *Chriſtendom*. This is the old fooliſh ſlander ſo frequently flung upon the peace, and as frequently refuted. Theſe factious undertakers of the preſs write with great advantage; they ſtrenuouſly affirm a thouſand falſhoods without fear, wit, concience, or knowledge; and, we, who anſwer them, muſt be at the expence of an argument for each; after which, in the very next pamphlet, we ſee the ſame aſſertions produced again, without the leaſt notice of what hath been ſaid to diſprove them. By the houſe of *Bourbon* doth he mean only the *French* king for the time being? If ſo, and his aſſertion be true, then that prince muſt either deal with the devil, or elſe the money and blood ſpent in our ten years victories againſt him might as well have continued in the purſes and veins of her majeſty's ſubjects.

But the *particular* aſſertions of this author are eaſier detected than his *general* ones; I ſhall therefore proceed upon examining the former. For inſtance; I deſire him to aſk the *Dutch*, who can beſt inform him, *why they delivered up* Traerbach *to the* Imperialiſts? for, as to the QUEEN, her majeſty was never once conſulted with it; whatever his preceptors,

preceptors, the politicians of *Button's* coffee-houſe, may have informed him to the contrary.

Mr. *Steele* affirms, that *the* French *have begun the demolition of* Dunkirk *contemptuouſly and arbitarily their own way.* The governor of the town, and thoſe gentlemen entruſted with the inſpection of this work, do aſſure me, that the fact is altogether otherwiſe; that the method preſcribed by thoſe whom her majeſty employs, hath been exactly followed, and that the works are already demoliſhed. I will venture to tell him further, that the demolition was ſo long deferred in order to remove thoſe difficulties, which the *barrier* treaty hath put us under; and the event hath ſhewn, that it was prudent to proceed no faſter, until thoſe difficulties were got over. The *mole* and *harbour* could not be deſtroyed, until the ſhips were got out; which, by reaſon of ſome profound ſecrets of ſtate, did not happen until the other day. Who *gave him thoſe juſt ſuſpicions, that the mole and harbour will never be deſtroyed?* what is it he would now inſinuate? that the miniſtry is bribed to leave the moſt important part of the work undone; or that the *pretender* is to invade us from thence; or that the QUEEN hath entered into a conſpiracy with her ſervants to prevent the good effects of the peace for no other end, but to loſe the affections of her people, and endanger herſelf?

Inſtead of any further information, which I could eaſily give, but which no honeſt man can want, I venture to affirm, that the mole and harbour of *Dunkirk* will, in a ſhort time, be moſt effectually

fectually deſtroyed; and at the ſame time I venture to propheſy, that neither Mr. *Steele*, nor his faction, will ever confeſs they believe it.

After all, it is a little hard, that the QUEEN cannot be allowed to demoliſh this town in whatever manner ſhe pleaſes to fancy. Mr. *Steele* muſt have it done in his own way, and is angry the *French* have pretended to do in theirs; and yet he wrongs them in the bargain. For my own part, I do ſeriouſly think the moſt *Chriſtian* king to be a much better friend of her majeſty's than Mr. *Steele*, or any of his faction. Beſides, it is to be conſidered, that he is a monarch and a relation; and therefore, if I were a privy counſellor, and my advice to be aſked, which of thoſe two [*s*] GENTLEMEN BORN ſhould have the direction in the demolition of *Dunkirk*, I would give it for the former; becauſe I look upon Mr. *Steele*, in quality of member of his party, to be much more ſkilful in *demoliſhing at home* than *abroad*.

There is a proſpect of much danger to the balance of *Europe*, and to the trade of *Britain*, from the *emperor* over-running *Italy*, than from *France* over-running the *empire*; that his *imperial* majeſty entertains ſuch thoughts, is viſible to the world: and although little can be ſaid to juſtify many actions of the *French* king, yet the worſt of them have never equalled the emperor's arbitrary keeping the poſſeſſion of *Milan* directly contrary to his oath and the expreſs words of the *golden bull*, which oblige

[*s*] Mr. *Steele* often ſtyles himſelf ſo.

him

him to deliver up every *fief* that falls, or elſe they muſt all, in the courſe of time, lapſe into his own hands.

I was at a loſs, who it was that Mr. *Steele* hinted at ſome time ago by *the powerful hand, that deals out crowns and kingdoms all around us:* I now plainly find he means no other hand but his own. He hath dealt out the crown of *Spain* to *France*; to *France* he hath given leave to invade the *empire* next ſpring with two hundred thouſand men; and now at laſt he deals to *France* the *imperial* dignity; *and ſo farewel liberty*; Europe *will be* French. But in order to bring all this about, *the capital of* Auſtria, *the reſidence of his* imperial *majeſty*, muſt continue to be *viſited by the plague*, of which the *emperor* muſt die, and ſo the thing is done.

Why ſhould not I venture to *deal out* one *ſceptre* in my turn, as well as Mr. *Steele?* I therefore *deal out* the *empire* to the *elector* of *Saxony*, upon failure of iſſue to this *emperor* at his death; provided the *whigs* will prevail on the *ſon* to turn *papiſt* to get an *empire*, as they did upon the *father* to get a *kingdom*. Or if this prince be not approved of, I *deal it out* in his ſtead to the *elector* of *Bavaria:* and in one or the other of theſe I dare engage to have all *Chriſtendom* to ſecond me, whatever the ſpleen, in the ſhape of politicks, may dictate to the author of *The Criſis*.

The deſign of Mr. *Steele*, in *repreſenting the circumſtances of the affairs of* Europe, is to ſignify to the world, that all *Europe* is put in the high road

to ſlavery, by the corruption of her majeſty's preſent miniſters; and ſo he goes on to *Portugal*; which *having, during the war, ſupplied us with gold in exchange for our* woollen manufacture, *hath only at preſent a ſuſpenſion of arms for its protection, to laſt no longer than till the* Catalonians *are reduced*; *and then the old pretenſions of* Spain *to* Portugal *will be revived:* and *Portugal*, when once enſlaved by *Spain*, falls naturally with the reſt of *Europe* into the gulph of *France*. In the mean time, let us ſee what relief a little truth can give this unhappy kingdom. That *Portugal* hath yet no more than a ſuſpenſion of arms, they may thank themſelves, becauſe they came ſo late into the treaty; and that they came ſo late, they may thank the *whigs*, whoſe falſe repreſentations they were ſo weak as to believe. However, the QUEEN hath voluntarily given them a guarantee to defend them againſt *Spain*, until the peace ſhall be made; and ſuch terms after the peace are ſtipulated for them, as the *Portugueſe* themſelves are contented with.

Having mentioned the *Catalonians*, he puts the queſtion, *Who can name the* Catalonians *without a tear?* That can I; for he hath told ſo many melancholy ſtories, without one ſyllable of truth, that he hath blunted the edge of my fears, and I ſhall not be ſtartled at the worſt he can ſay. What he affirms concerning the *Catalonians* is included in the following particulars; firſt, *that they were drawn into the war by the encouragement of the maritime powers*; by which are underſtood *England* and *Holland:*

Holland: but he is too good a friend of the *Dutch* to give them any part of the blame. Secondly, that *they are now abandoned and expoſed to the reſentment of an enraged prince.* Thirdly, that *they always oppoſed the perſon and intereſt of that prince,* who is their preſent king. Laſtly, that *the doom is dreadful of thoſe, who ſhall, in the ſight of God, be eſteemed their deſtroyers.* And if we interpret the inſinuation he makes, according to his own mind, the deſtruction of thoſe people muſt be imputed to the preſent miniſtry.

I am ſometimes, in charity, diſpoſed to hope, that this writer is not always ſenſible of the flagrant falſhoods he utters, but is either biaſſed by an inclination to believe the worſt, or a want of judgment to chuſe his informers. That the *Catalonians* were *drawn into the war by the encouragement of her majeſty,* ſhould not, in decency, have been affirmed until about fifty years hence; when it might be ſuppoſed there would be no living witneſs left to diſprove it. It was only upon the aſſurances of a revolt given by the prince of *Heſſe* and others, and their invitation, that the QUEEN was prevailed with to ſend her forces upon that expedition. When *Barcelona* was taken by a moſt unexpected accident of a bomb lighting on the magazine, then indeed the *Catalonians* revolted, having before ſubmitted and ſworn allegiance to *Philip,* as much as any other province in *Spain.* Upon the peace between that crown and *Britain,* the QUEEN, in order to eaſe the *emperor,* and ſave his troops, ſti-

pulated with king *Philip* for a neutrality in *Italy*, and that his *imperial* majeſty ſhould have liberty to evacuate *Catalonia*; upon condition of abſolute indemnity to the *Catalans*, with an entire reſtitution to their honours, dignities, and eſtates. As this neutrality was never obſerved by the *emperor*, ſo he never effectually evacuated *Catalonia*; for although he ſent away the main body, he left behind many officers and private men, who now ſpirit up and aſſiſt thoſe obſtinate people to continue in their rebellion. It is true indeed that king *Philip* did not abſolutely *reſtore* the *Catalans* to *all* their old privileges, of which they never made other uſe than as an encouragement to rebel; but admitted them to the ſame privileges with the ſubjects of *Caſtile*, particularly to the liberty of trading, and having employments in the *Weſt-Indies*, which they *never enjoyed before*. Beſides, the QUEEN reſerved to herſelf the power of procuring further immunities for them, wherein the moſt *chriſtian* king was obliged to ſecond her; for his *catholic* majeſty intended no more than to retrench thoſe privileges, under the pretext of which they now rebel, as they had formerly done in favour of *France*. *How dreadful* then *muſt be the doom of thoſe*, who hindered theſe people from ſubmitting to the gentle terms offered them by their prince! and who, although they be conſcious of their own inability to furniſh one ſingle ſhip for the ſupport of the *Catalans*, are, at this inſtant, ſpurring them on to their ruin by promiſes of aid and protection!

Thus

Thus much in anſwer to Mr. *Steele's* account of the affairs of *Europe*; from which he deduceth the univerſal monarchy of *France*, and the danger of I know not how many *popiſh ſucceſſors* to *Britain*. His political reflections are as good as his facts. *We muſt obſerve*, ſays he, *that the perſon who ſeems to be the moſt favoured by the* French *king in the late treaties, is the duke of* Savoy. Extremely right; for whatever that prince got by the peace, he owes entirely to her majeſty, as a juſt reward for his having been ſo firm and uſeful an ally; neither was *France* brought with more difficulty to yield any one point than that of allowing the duke ſuch a barrier as the QUEEN inſiſted on.

He is become the moſt powerful prince in Italy. I had rather ſee *him* ſo than the *emperor*. *He is ſuppoſed to have entered into a ſecret and ſtrict alliance with the houſe of* Bourbon. This is one of thoſe facts wherein I am moſt inclined to believe the author, becauſe it is what he muſt needs be utterly ignorant of, and therefore may poſſibly be true.

I thought indeed we ſhould be ſafe from all popiſh ſucceſſors as far as *Italy*, becauſe of the prodigious clutter about ſending the *pretender* thither. But they will never agree where to fix their *longitude*. The duke of *Savoy* is the more dangerous for removing to *Sicily:* he *adds to our fears* for being *too near*. So *whether* France *conquer* Germany, *or be in peace and good underſtanding with it*, either event *will put us and* Holland *at the mercy of* France,

which hath a quiver full of *pretenders* at its back, whenever the *chevalier* ſhall die.

This was juſt the logick of poor *prince Butler*, a ſplenetick mad-man, whom every body may remember about the town. Prince *Pamphilio* in *Italy* employed emiſſaries to torment *prince Butler* here. But what if prince *Pamphilio* die? Why then he had left in his will, that his heirs and executors torment *prince Butler* for ever.

I cannot think it a misfortune what Mr. *Steele* affirms, that *treaſonable books lately diſperſed among us, ſtriking apparently at the* Hanover *ſucceſſion, have paſſed almoſt without obſervation from the generality of the people*; becauſe it ſeems a certain ſign, that *the generality of the people* are well diſpoſed to that illuſtrious family: but I look upon it as a great evil, to ſee ſeditious books *diſperſed among us, apparently ſtriking at the* QUEEN and her adminiſtration, at the conſtitution in church and ſtate, and at all religion; yet *paſſing without obſervation from the generality of* thoſe in power: but whether this remiſsneſs may be imputed to *White-hall*, or *Weſtminſter-hall*, is other men's buſineſs to enquire. Mr. *Steele* knows, in his conſcience, that the *Queries concerning the* pretender iſſued from one of his own party. And as for the poor nonjuring-clergyman, who was truſted with committing to the preſs a late book *on the ſubject* of *hereditary right*, by a ſtrain of the *ſummum jus*, he is now, as I am told, with half a ſcore children, ſtarving and rotting among thieves and pick-pockets in the common room

room of a ſtinking gaol [*t*]. I have never ſeen either the book or the publiſher; however, I would fain aſk *one ſingle perſon* [*u*] in the world a queſtion; why he hath ſo often drank the abdicated king's health upon his knees?——But the tranſition is natural and frequent, and I ſhall not trouble him for an anſwer.

It is the hardeſt caſe in the world, that Mr. *Steele* ſhould take up the artificial reports of his own faction, and then put them off upon the world as *additional fears of a popiſh ſucceſſor*. I can aſſure him, that no good ſubject of the QUEEN is under the leaſt concern, whether the *pretender* be converted or no, further than their wiſhes that all men would embrace the true religion. But, reporting backwards and forwards upon this point helps to keep up the noiſe, and is a topick for Mr. *Steele* to enlarge himſelf upon, by ſhewing how little we can depend on ſuch converſions, by collecting a liſt of *popiſh* cruelties, and repeating, after himſelf and the biſhop of *Sarum*, the diſmal effects likely to follow upon the return of that ſuperſtition among us.

But as this writer is reported by thoſe who know him to be what the *French* call *journalier*, his fears and courage operating according to the weather in our uncertain climate; I am apt to believe the two laſt pages of his *Criſis* were written on a

[*t*] Upon his conviction, he was committed to the *Marſhalſea*; and at his ſentence, to the *Queen's-Bench* for three years.

[*u*] *Parker*, afterwards lord chancellor.

ſun-ſhine day. This I gueſs from the general tenor of them, and particularly from an unwary aſſertion, which, if he believes as firmly as I do, will at once overthrow all his foreign and domeſtic *fears of a popiſh ſucceſſor. As divided a people as we are, thoſe who ſtand for the houſe of* Hanover *are* INFINITELY *ſuperior in number, wealth, courage, and all arts military and civil, to thoſe in the contrary intereſt; beſides which, we have the laws, I ſay, the laws on our ſide. The laws, I ſay, the laws.* This elegant repetition is, I think, a little out of place; for the ſtreſs might better have been laid upon ſo great a majority of the nation; without which, I doubt, the laws would be of little weight, although they be very good additional ſecurities. And if what he here aſſerts be true, as it certainly is, although he aſſert it (for I allow even the majority of his own party to be againſt the *pretender*), there can be no danger of a *popiſh* ſucceſſor, except from the unreaſonable jealouſies of the *beſt* among that party, and from the malice, the avarice, or ambition of the *worſt*; without which, *Britain* would be able to defend her ſucceſſion againſt all her enemies, both at home and abroad. Moſt of the dangers from abroad, which he enumerates as the conſequences of this very bad peace made by the QUEEN, and approved by parliament, muſt have ſubſiſted under any peace at all; unleſs, among other projects equally feaſible, we could have ſtipulated to cut the throats of every *popiſh* relation to the royal family.

Well,

Well, by this author's own confeſſion, a number infinitely ſuperior, and the beſt circumſtantiated imaginable, are for the *ſucceſſion* in the houſe of *Hanover*. This *ſucceſſion* is eſtabliſhed, confirmed, and ſecured by ſeveral laws; her majeſty's repeated declarations, and the oaths of all her ſubjects, engage both her and them to preſerve what thoſe laws have ſettled. This is a ſecurity indeed, a *ſecurity* adequate at leaſt to the importance of the thing; and yet, according to the whig-ſcheme, as delivered to us by Mr. *Steele* and his coadjutors, is altogether inſufficient; and the ſucceſſion will be defeated, the *pretender* brought in, and *popery* eſtabliſhed among us, without the further aſſiſtance of this writer and his faction.

And what ſecurities have our adverſaries ſubſtituted in the place of theſe? A club of politicians, where *Jenny Man* preſides; A *Criſis* written by Mr. *Steele*; a confederacy of knaviſh ſtock-jobbers to ruin credit; a report of the QUEEN's death; an *effigies* of the *pretender* run twice through the body by a valiant peer; a ſpeech by the author of *The Criſis*; and, to ſum up all, an unlimited freedom of reviling her majeſty and thoſe ſhe employs.

I have now finiſhed the moſt diſguſtful taſk that ever I undertook. I could, with more eaſe, have written *three* dull pamphlets, than remarked upon the falſhoods and abſurdities of *one*. But I was quite confounded laſt *Wedneſday*, when the printer came with another pamphlet in his hand, written by the ſame author, and entitled, *The Engliſhman*, *being*

being the cloſe of the paper ſo called, &c. He deſired I would read it over, and conſider it in a paper by itſelf; which laſt I abſolutely refuſed. Upon peruſal, I found it chiefly an invective againſt *Toby*, the miniſtry, the *Examiner*, the clergy, the QUEEN, and the *Poſt-boy*; yet at the ſame time, with great juſtice, exclaiming againſt thoſe, who preſumed to offer the leaſt word againſt the heads of that faction whom her majeſty diſcarded. The author likewiſe propoſes an *equal diviſion of favour and employments* between the *whigs* and *tories*; for if the former *can have no part or portion* [*w*] *in* David, *they deſire no longer to be his ſubjects*. He inſiſts, that her majeſty *hath exactly followed* Monſieur Tughe's *memorial* [*x*] *againſt demoliſhing of* Dunkirk. He reflects, with *great ſatisfaction*, *on the good already done to his country by* The Criſis. *Non nobis*, *Domine*, *non nobis*, &c.——He gives us hopes that he will leave off writing, *and conſult his own quiet and happineſs*; and concludes with a *letter to a friend at court*. I ſuppoſe, by the ſtyle of *old friend*, and the like, it muſt be ſome body *there* of his own level; among whom his party have indeed more *friends* than I could wiſh. In this letter he aſſerts, that the preſent miniſters were not edu-

[*w*] What portion have we in *David?* 1 Kings, xii. 16.

[*x*] "*Tughe* was deputed by the magiſtrates of *Dunkirk*, to inter-
" cede with the Queen, that ſhe would recall part of her ſentence
" concerning *Dunkirk*, by cauſing her thunderbolts to fall only on
" the martial works, and to ſpare the moles and dykes, which, in
" their naked condition, could be no more than objects of pity."

cated

cated in the church of *England*, but are *new converts from preſbytery*. Upon which I can only reflect, how blind the malice of that man muſt be, who invents a groundleſs lie in order to defame his ſuperiors, which would be no diſgrace if it had been a truth. And he concludes with making three demands, *for the ſatisfaction of himſelf* and other *malecontents*. Firſt, *the demolition of the harbour of* Dunkirk. Secondly, *that* Great-Britain *and* France *would heartily join againſt the exorbitant power of the duke of* Lorrain, *and force the* pretender *from his* aſylum *at* Bar-le-Duc. Laſtly, *that his* electoral highneſs *of* Hanover *would be ſo grateful to ſignify to all the world the perfect good underſtanding he hath with the court of* England, *in as plain terms as her majeſty was pleaſed to declare ſhe had with that houſe on her part.*

As to the firſt of theſe demands, I will venture to undertake it ſhall be granted; but then Mr. *Steele*, and his brother *malecontents*, muſt promiſe to believe the thing is done, after thoſe employed have made their report; or elſe bring vouchers to diſprove it. Upon the ſecond; I cannot tell whether her majeſty will engage in a war againſt the duke of *Lorrain*, to *force him to remove the* pretender; but, I believe, if the parliament ſhould think it neceſſary to addreſs upon ſuch an occaſion, the QUEEN will move that prince to ſend him away. His laſt demand, offered under the title of a *wiſh*, is of ſo inſolent and ſeditious a ſtrain, that I care not to touch it. Here he directly chargeth her majeſty

majeſty with delivering a falſhood to her parliament from the throne; and declares he will not believe her, until the elector of *Hanover* himſelf ſhall vouch for the truth of what he hath ſo ſolemnly affirmed.

I agree with this writer, that it is an idle thing in his antagoniſts to trouble themſelves upon the *articles of his birth*, *education*, or *fortune*; for whoever writes at this rate of his ſovereign, to whom he owes ſo many perſonal obligations, I ſhould never enquire whether he be a GENTLEMAN BORN, but whether he be a HUMAN CREATURE.

THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES, And of the LATE MINISTRY,

In beginning and carrying on the preſent WAR.

Written in the Year 1712.

Partem tibi Gallia noſtri
Eripuit: Partem duris Hiſpania bellis:
Pars jacet Heſperia; totoque exercitus orbe,
Te vincente, perit.
Odimus accipitrem, quia ſemper vivit in armis.
Victrix Provincia plorat.

To this Tract and the Examiners, which make Vol. V. of the *Iriſh* Edition, there is a preface in the name of the publiſher, which lord *Orrery* aſcribes to *Swift*, for no other apparent reaſon, than to accuſe him of praiſing himſelf; but, beſides, the incorrectneſs of the ſtyle, which his lordſhip ſuppoſes to be affected, there is an aſſertion that theſe papers *produced* the change in the queen's miniſtry, which even in his lordſhip's opinion they were written to *defend*, and to which they appear, by their date, as well as tenor, to be *ſubſequent*; an abſurdity of which *Swift*, even in the character of a publiſher, cannot be ſuppoſed to have been guilty.

PRE-

PREFACE.

I Cannot ſufficiently admire the induſtry of a ſort of men, wholly out of favour with the prince and people, and openly profeſſing a ſeparate intereſt from the bulk of the landed men, who yet are able to raiſe, at this juncture, ſo great a clamour againſt a peace, without offering one ſingle reaſon, but what we find in their *ballads*. I lay it down for a maxim, that no reaſonable man, whether *whig* or *tory*, (ſince it is neceſſary to uſe thoſe fooliſh terms) can be of opinion for continuing the war upon the foot it now is, unleſs he be a gainer by it, or hopes it may occaſion ſome new turn of affairs at home to the advantage of his party; or, laſtly, unleſs he be very ignorant of the kingdom's condition, and by what means we have been reduced to it. Upon the two firſt caſes, where intereſt is concerned, I have nothing to ſay: but as to the laſt, I think it highly neceſſary that the publick ſhould be freely and impartially told what circumſtances they are in, after what manner they have been treated by thoſe, whom they truſted ſo many years with the diſpoſal of their blood and treaſure, and what the conſequences of this management are like to be upon themſelves and their poſterity.

Thoſe who, either by writing or diſcourſe, have undertaken to defend the proceedings of the late miniſtry in the management of the war, and of the

treaty

treaty of *Gertruydenburgh*, have ſpent time in celebrating the conduct and valour of our leaders and their troops, in ſumming up the victories they have gained, and the towns they have taken. Then they tell us, what high articles were inſiſted on by our miniſters and thoſe of the confederates, and what pains both were at in perſuading *France* to accept them. But nothing of this can give the leaſt ſatisfaction to the juſt complaints of the kingdom. As to the war our grievances are, that a greater load has been laid on us than was either juſt or neceſſary, or than we have been able to bear; that the groſſeſt impoſitions have been ſubmitted to, for the advancement of private wealth and power, or in order to forward the more dangerous deſigns of a *faction*, to both which a peace would have put an end; and that the part of the war which was chiefly our province, which would have been moſt beneficial to us, and deſtructive to the enemy, was wholly neglected. As to a peace, we complain of being deluded by a *mock-treaty*; in which thoſe who negotiated took care to make ſuch demands as they knew were impoſſible to be complied with; and therefore might ſecurely preſs every article as if they were in earneſt.

Theſe are ſome of the points I deſign to treat of in the following diſcourſe; with ſeveral others, which I thought it neceſſary at this time for the kingdom to be informed of. I think I am not miſtaken in thoſe facts I mention; at leaſt not in any

any circumſtance ſo material as to weaken the conſequences I draw from them.

After ten years war with perpetual ſucceſs, to tell us it is yet impoſſible to have a good peace, is very ſurprizing, and ſeems ſo different from what hath ever happened in the world before, that a man of any party may be allowed ſuſpecting, that we have been either ill-uſed, or have not made the moſt of our victories, and might therefore deſire to know where the difficulty lay. Then it is natural to enquire into our preſent condition; how long we ſhall be able to go on at this rate; what the conſequences may be upon the preſent and future ages; and whether a peace without that impracticable point, which ſome people do ſo much inſiſt on, be really ruinous in itſelf, or equally ſo with the continuance of the war.

THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES, &c. [y].

THE motives that may engage a wiſe prince, or ſtate in war, I take to be one or more of theſe: either to check the overgrown power of ſome ambitious neighbour; to recover what hath been unjuſtly taken from them; to revenge ſome injury they have received (which all political caſuiſts allow); to aſſiſt ſome ally in a juſt quarrel; or laſtly, to defend themſelves when they are invaded. In all theſe caſes the writers upon politicks admit a war to be juſtly undertaken. The laſt is what hath been uſually called *pro aris et focis*; where no expence or endeavour can be too great, becauſe all we have is at ſtake, and conſequently our utmoſt force to be exerted; and the diſpute is ſoon determined, either in ſafety or utter deſtruction. But in the other four, I believe, it will be found, that no monarch or commonwealth did

[y] This was written preparatory to the peace which the miniſters were then concerting, and which was afterwards perfected at *Utrecht*. ORRERY.

This tract, and Remarks on the Barrier treaty, contain the principal facts which the author of *John Bull* has thrown into allegory; and greatly illuſtrate that piece, of which indeed it is poſſible they were the ground-work.

ever

ever engage beyond a certain degree; never proceeded ſo far as to exhauſt the ſtrength and ſubſtance of their country by anticipations and loans, which in a few years muſt put them in a worſe condition, than any they could reaſonably apprehend from thoſe evils, for the preventing of which they firſt entered into the war; becauſe this would be to run into real infallible ruin, only in hopes to remove what might perhaps but appear ſo by a probable ſpeculation.

And as a war ſhould be undertaken upon a juſt and prudent motive, ſo it is ſtill more obvious, that a prince ought maturely to conſider the condition he is in, when he enters on it; whether his coffers be full, his revenues clear of debts, his people numerous and rich by a long peace and free trade, not over-preſſed with many burthenſome taxes; no violent faction ready to diſpute his juſt prerogative, and thereby weaken his authority at home, and leſſen his reputation abroad. For, if the contrary of all this happen to be his caſe, he will hardly be perſuaded to diſturb the world's quiet and his own, while there is any other way left of preſerving the latter with honour and ſafety.

Suppoſing the war to have commenced upon a juſt motive; the next thing to be conſidered is, when a prince ought, in prudence, to receive the overtures of a peace; which I take to be, either when the enemy is ready to yield the point originally contended for; or when that point is found impoſſible to be ever obtained; or when contend-

ing any longer, although with probability of gaining that point at laſt, would put ſuch a prince and his people in a worſe condition than the preſent loſs of it. All which conſiderations are of much greater force, where a war is managed by an alliance of many confederates, which, in the variety of intereſts, among the ſeveral parties, is liable to ſo many unforeſeen accidents.

In a confederate war it ought to be conſidered, which party has the deepeſt ſhare in the quarrel: for although each may have their particular reaſons, yet one or two among them will probably be more concerned than the reſt, and therefore ought to bear the greateſt part of the burthen in proportion to their ſtrength. For example: two princes may be competitors for a kingdom, and it will be your intereſt to take the part of him, who will probably allow you good conditions of trade, rather than of the other, who poſſibly may not. However, that prince whoſe cauſe you eſpouſe, although never ſo vigorouſly, is the principal in that war, and you, properly ſpeaking, are but a ſecond. Or a commonwealth may lie in danger to be overrun by a powerful neighbour, which, in time, may produce very bad conſequences upon your trade and liberty: it is therefore neceſſary, as well as prudent, to lend them aſſiſtance, and help them to win a ſtrong ſecure frontier; but, as they muſt in courſe be the firſt and greateſt ſufferers, ſo in juſtice they ought to bear the greateſt weight. If a houſe be on fire, it behoves all in the neighbourhood

hood to run with buckets to quench it; but the owner is ſure to be undone firſt; and it is not impoſſible, that thoſe at next door may eſcape by a ſhower from heaven, or the ſtillneſs of the weather, or ſome other favourable accident.

But if an ally, who is not ſo immediately concerned in the good or ill fortune of the war, be ſo generous as to contribute more than the principal party, and even more in proportion to his abilities, he ought at leaſt to have his ſhare in what is conquered from the enemy; or, if his romantic diſpoſition tranſport him ſo far as to expect little or nothing from this, he might however hope, that the principals would make it up in dignity and reſpect; and he would ſurely think it monſtrous to find them intermeddling in his domeſtic affairs, preſcribing what ſervants he ſhould keep or diſmiſs, preſſing him perpetually with the moſt unreaſonable demands, and at every turn threatning to break the alliance if he will not comply.

From theſe reflexions upon war in general, I deſcend to conſider thoſe wars wherein *England* hath been engaged ſince the conqueſt. In the civil wars of the *Barons*, as well as thoſe between the houſes of *York* and *Lancaſter*, great deſtruction was made of the nobility and gentry; new families raiſed and old ones extinguiſhed; but the money ſpent on both ſides was employed and circulated at home; no public debts contracted; and a very few years of peace quickly ſet all right again.

The like may be affirmed even of that unnatural rebellion againſt king *Charles* I. The uſurpers maintained great armies in conſtant pay, had almoſt continual war with *Spain* or *Holland*; but, managing it by their fleets, they increaſed very much the riches of the kingdom, inſtead of exhauſting them.

Our foreign wars were generally againſt *Scotland* or *France:* the firſt, being in this iſland, carried no money out of the kingdom, and were ſeldom of long continuance. During our firſt wars with *France*, we poſſeſſed great dominions in that country, where we preſerved ſome footing till the reign of queen *Mary*; and although ſome of our later princes made very chargeable expeditions thither, a ſubſidy and two or three fifteenths cleared all the debt. Beſides, our victories were then of ſome uſe as well as glory; for we were ſo prudent as to fight, and ſo happy as to conquer, only for ourſelves.

The *Dutch* wars in the reign of king *Charles* II. although begun and carried on under a very corrupt adminiſtration, and much to the diſhonour of the crown, did indeed keep the king needy and poor by diſcontinuing or diſcontenting his parliament, when he moſt needed their aſſiſtance; but neither left any debt upon the nation, nor carried any money out of it.

At the *Revolution*, a general war broke out in *Europe*, wherein many princes joined in alliance againſt *France* to check the ambitious deſigns of that monarch; and here the *emperor*, the *Dutch*, and

and *England* were principals. About this time the cuſtom firſt began among us of borrowing millions upon funds of intereſt. It was pretended, that the war could not poſſibly laſt above one or two campaigns; and that the debts contracted might be eaſily paid in a few years by a gentle tax, without burthening the ſubject. But the true reaſon for embracing this expedient was the ſecurity of a new prince not firmly ſettled on the throne. People were tempted to lend by great premiums and large intereſt; and it concerned them nearly to preſerve that government, which they had truſted with their money. The perſon [z] ſaid to have been author of ſo deteſtable a project, lived to ſee ſome of its fatal conſequences, whereof his grand-children will not ſee an end. And this pernicious counſel cloſed very well with the poſture of affairs at that time: for a ſett of upſtarts, who had little or no part in the *Revolution*, but valued themſelves upon their noiſe and pretended zeal when the work was over, were got into credit at court, by the merit of becoming undertakers, and projectors of loans and funds. Theſe, finding that the gentlemen of eſtates were not willing to come into their meaſures, fell upon thoſe new ſchemes of raiſing money, in order to create a monied intereſt that might, in time, vie with the landed, and of which they hoped to be at the head.

[z] Dr. *Burnet*, biſhop of *Sarum*.

This ground of the firſt war for ten years after the *Revolution*, as to the part we had in it, was to make *France* acknowledge the late king, and to recover *Hudſon's-Bay*. But, during that whole war, the ſea was almoſt entirely neglected, and the greateſt part of *ſix* millions annually employed to enlarge the frontier of the *Dutch*. For the king was a general, but not an admiral; and, although king of *England*, was a native of *Holland*.

After ten years fighting to little purpoſe, after the loſs of above a hundred thouſand men, and a debt remaining of twenty millions, we, at length, hearkened to the terms of peace, which was concluded with great advantages to the *empire* and *Holland*, but none at all to us; and clogged ſoon after with the famous treaty of *partition*, by which *Naples*, *Sicily*, and *Lorrain* were to be added to the *French* dominions; or, if that crown ſhould think fit to ſet aſide the treaty upon the *Spaniards* refuſing to accept it, as they declared they would to the ſeveral parties at the very time of tranſacting it, then the *French* would have pretenſions to the whole monarchy. And ſo it proved in the event; for the late king of *Spain* reckoning it an indignity to have his territories cantoned out into parcels by other princes during his own life, and without his conſent, rather choſe to bequeath the monarchy entire to a younger ſon of *France*; and this prince was acknowledged for king of *Spain* both by us and *Holland*.

It muſt be granted, that the counſels of entering into this war were violently oppoſed by the *church-party*, who firſt adviſed the late king to acknowledge the duke of *Anjou*; and particularly it is affirmed, that a certain [*a*] *great perſon*, who was then in the church intereſt, told the king in *November* 1701, that, ſince his majeſty was determined to engage in a war ſo contrary to his private opinion, he could ſerve him no longer, and accordingly gave up his employment; although he happened afterwards to change his mind, when he was to be at the head of the treaſury, and have the ſole management of affairs at home, while thoſe abroad were to be in the hands of [*b*] *one*, whoſe advantage, by all ſorts of ties, he was engaged to promote.

The declarations of war againſt *France* and *Spain*, made by us and *Holland*, are dated within a few days of each other. In that publiſhed by the *States*, they ſay very truly, that *they are neareſt and moſt expoſed to the fire*; that *they are blocked up on all ſides, and actually attacked by the kings of* France *and* Spain; *that their declaration is the effect of an urging and preſſing neceſſity*; with other expreſſions to the ſame purpoſe. They *deſire the aſſiſtance of all kings and princes*, &c. The grounds of their quarrel with *France* are ſuch as only affect themſelves, or at leaſt more immediately than any other prince or ſtate; ſuch as, *the* French *refuſing to grant the* tariff *promiſed by the treaty of* Ryſwick;

[*a*] Earl of *Godolphin*. [*b*] Duke of *Marlborough*.

the

the loading the Dutch *inhabitants ſettled in* France *with exceſſive duties, contrary to the ſaid treaty; the violation of the* partition treaty *by the* French *accepting the king of* Spain's *will, and threatning the* ſtates *if they would not comply; the ſeizing the* Spaniſh Netherlands *by the* French *troops, and turning out the* Dutch, *who, by permiſſion of the late king of* Spain, *were in garriſon there, by which means that republick was deprived of her barrier, contrary to the treaty of* partition, *where it was particularly ſtipulated, that the* Spaniſh Netherlands *ſhould be left to the archduke.* They alledged, that *the* French *king governed* Flanders *as his own, although under the name of his grandſon, and ſent great numbers of troops thither to frighten them* [c]; *that he had ſeized the city and citadel of* Liege; *had poſſeſſed himſelf of ſeveral places in the archbiſhoprick of* Cologne, *and maintained troops in the county of* Wolfenbuttel, *in order to block up the* Dutch *on all ſides; and cauſed his reſident to give in a memorial, wherein he threatned the* States *to act againſt them if they refuſed complying with the contents of that memorial.*

The QUEEN's declaration of war is grounded upon the *grand alliance*, as this was upon the unjuſt uſurpations and encroachments of the *French* king; whereof the inſtances produced are, *his keeping in poſſeſſion a great part of the* Spaniſh *dominions, ſeizing* Milan *and the* Spaniſh *Low-countries,*

[c] This the author of *John Bull* calls frighting the children out of their bread and butter.

making himſelf maſter of Cadiz, *&c. And inſtead of giving ſatisfaction in theſe points, his putting an indignity and affront on her majeſty and kingdoms, by declaring the pretended prince of* Wales *king of* England, *&c.* Which laſt was the only perſonal quarrel we had in the war; and even this was poſitively denied by *France*, that king being willing to acknowledge her majeſty.

I think it plainly appears, by both declarations, that *England* ought no more to have been a principal in this war than *Pruſſia*, or any other power, who came afterwards into that alliance. *Holland* was firſt in danger, the *French* troops being at that time juſt at the gates of *Nimeguen*. But the complaints made in our declaration do all, except the laſt, as much or more concern almoſt every prince in *Europe*.

For among the ſeveral parties who came firſt or laſt into this confederacy, there were few but who in proportion had more to get or to loſe, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill ſucceſs of this war than we. The *Dutch* took up arms to defend themſelves from immediate ruin; and, by a ſucceſsful war, they propoſed to have a larger extent of country, and a better frontier againſt *France*. The *emperor* hoped to recover the monarchy of *Spain*, or ſome part of it, for his younger ſon, chiefly at the expence of us and *Holland*. The king of *Portugal* had received intelligence, that *Philip* deſigned to renew the old pretenſions of *Spain* upon that kingdom, which is ſurrounded by the

the other on all ſides, except towards the ſea; and could therefore only by defended by *maritime powers*. This, with the advantageous terms offered by king *Charles* as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The duke of *Savoy's* temptations and fears were yet greater: the main chance of the war on that ſide was to be ſupplied by *England*, and the profit to redound to him. In caſe *Milan* ſhould be conquered, it was ſtipulated, that his highneſs ſhould have the duchy of *Montſerrat* belonging to the duke of *Mantua*, the provinces of *Alexandria* and *Valencia* and *Lomellino*, with other lands between the *Po* and the *Tanaro*, together with the *Vigevenaſco*, or in lieu of it an equivalent out of the province of *Novara*, adjoining to his own ſtate; beſides whatever elſe could be taken from *France* on that ſide by the confederate forces. Then he was in terrible apprehenſions of being ſurrounded by *France*, who had ſo many troops in the *Milaneſe*, and might have eaſily ſwallowed up his whole duchy.

The reſt of the allies came in purely for ſubſidies, whereof they ſunk conſiderable ſums into their own coffers, and refuſed to ſend their *contingent* to the *emperor*, alledging their troops were already hired by *England* and *Holland*.

Some time after the duke of *Anjou's* ſucceeding to the monarchy of *Spain*, in breach of the *partition* treaty, the queſtion here in *England* was, whether the peace ſhould be continued, or a new war begun. Thoſe who were for the former, alledged

ledged the debts and difficulties we laboured under; that both we and the *Dutch* had already acknowledged *Philip* for king of *Spain*; that the inclinations of the *Spaniards* to the houſe of *Auſtria*, and their averſion from that of *Bourbon*, were not ſo ſurely to be reckoned upon as ſome would pretend; that we thought it a piece of inſolence as well as injuſtice in the *French* to offer putting a king upon us, and the *Spaniards* would conceive we had as little reaſon to force one upon them: that it was true, the nature and genius of thoſe two people differed very much, and ſo would probably continue to do, as well under a king of *French* blood as one of *Auſtrian*; but that, if we ſhould engage in a war for dethroning the duke of *Anjou*, we ſhould certainly effect what by the progreſs and operations of it we endeavoured to prevent, I mean an union of intereſt and affections between the two nations; for the *Spaniards* muſt, of neceſſity, call in *French* troops to their aſſiſtance; this would introduce *French* counſellors into king *Philip's* court, and this by degrees would habituate and reconcile the two nations; that to aſſiſt king *Charles* by *Engliſh* and *Dutch* forces would render him odious to his new ſubjects, who have nothing in ſo great abomination as thoſe whom they hold for *hereticks*; that the *French* would, by this means, become maſters of the treaſures in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*; that in the laſt war, when *Spain*, *Cologne*, and *Bavaria* were in our alliance, and, by a modeſt computation, brought ſixty thouſand men into

into the field againſt the common enemy; when *Flanders*, the ſeat of war, was on our ſide, and his majeſty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reaſon to boaſt of our ſucceſs; how then ſhould we be able to oppoſe *France* with thoſe powers againſt us, which could carry ſixty thouſand men from us to the enemy; and ſo make us upon the balance weaker by one hundred and twenty thouſand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688?

On the other ſide, thoſe, whoſe opinion or ſome private motives inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alledged how dangerous it would be for *England* that *Philip* ſhould be king of *Spain*; that we could have no ſecurity for our trade while that kingdom was ſubject to a prince of the *Bourbon* family, nor any hopes of preſerving the balance of *Europe*, becauſe the grandfather would, in effect, be king, while his grandſon had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever of purſuing his deſign for univerſal monarchy. Theſe and the like arguments prevailed; and ſo, without offering at any other remedy, without taking time to conſider the conſequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we haſtily engaged in a war, which hath coſt us ſixty millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected, ſucceſs in arms, hath put us and our poſterity in a worſe condition, not only than any

of

of our allies, but even our conquered enemies themſelves.

The part we have acted in the conduct of this whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I ſhall now particularly examine; where, I preſume, it will appear by plain matters of fact, that no nation was ever ſo long or ſo ſcandalouſly abuſed by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, and the ambition of its domeſtic enemies; or treated with ſo much inſolence, injuſtice, and ingratitude by its foreign friends.

This will be manifeſt by proving the three following points:

Firſt, that againſt all manner of prudence or common reaſon we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.

Secondly, that we ſpent all our vigour in purſuing that part of the war, which could leaſt anſwer the end we propoſed by beginning it; and made no efforts at all, where we could have moſt weakened the common enemy, and, at the ſame time, enriched ourſelves.

Laſtly, that we ſuffered each of our allies to break every article in thoſe treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the burthen upon us.

Upon the firſt of theſe points, that we ought to have entered into this war only as auxiliaries, let any man reflect upon our condition at that time:

time: juſt come out of the moſt tedious, expenſive, and unſucceſsful war that ever *England* had been engaged in [*d*]; ſinking under heavy debts, of a nature and degree never heard of by us or our anceſtors; the bulk of the gentry and people heartily tired of the war and glad of a peace, although it brought no other advantage but itſelf; no ſudden proſpect of leſſening our taxes, which were grown as neceſſary to pay our debts as to raiſe armies; a ſort of artificial wealth of funds and ſtocks in the hands of thoſe, who, for ten years before, had been plundering the publick; many corruptions in every branch of our government that needed reformation. Under theſe difficulties, from which twenty years peace and the wiſeſt management could hardly recover us, we declare war againſt *France*, fortified by the acceſſion and alliance of thoſe powers I mentioned before, and which, in the former war, had been parties in our confederacy. It is very obvious, what a change muſt be made in the balance by ſuch weights taken out of our ſcale and put into theirs; ſince it was manifeſt, by ten years experience, that *France*, without thoſe additions of ſtrength, was able to maintain itſelf againſt us. So that human probability ran with mighty odds on the other ſide; and in this caſe nothing under the moſt extreme neceſſity ſhould force any ſtate to engage in a war. We had already acknowledged *Philip* for king of *Spain*;

[*d*] I was then lean, being juſt come out of a fit of ſickneſs. *John Bull.*

neither

neither does the QUEEN's declaration of war take notice of the duke of *Anjou's* ſucceſſion to that monarchy as a ſubject of quarrel, but the *French* king's governing it as if it were his own; his ſeizing *Cadiz*, *Milan*, and the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, with the indignity of proclaiming the *Pretender*. In all which we charge that prince with nothing directly relating to us, excepting the laſt: and this, altho' indeed a great affront, might eaſily have been redreſſed without a war; for the *French* court declared they did not acknowledge the *Pretender*, but only gave him the title of king, which was allowed to *Auguſtus* by his enemy of *Sweden*, who had driven him out of *Poland*, and forced him to acknowledge *Staniſlaus*.

It is true indeed, the danger of the *Dutch*, by ſo ill a neighbourhood in *Flanders*, might affect us very much in the conſequences of it; and the loſs of *Spain* to the *Houſe* of *Auſtria*, if it ſhould be governed by *French* influence and *French* politicks, might, in time, be very pernicious to our trade. It would therefore have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our neighbour; and ſo we might have done without injuring ourſelves; for, by an old treaty with *Holland*, we were bound to aſſiſt that republick with ten thouſand men, whenever they were attacked by the *French*; whoſe troops, upon the king of *Spain's* death, taking poſſeſſion of *Flanders* in right of *Philip*, and ſecuring the *Dutch* garriſons till they would acknowledge him, the

States-general, by memorials from their envoys here, demanded only the ten thouſand men we were obliged to give them by virtue of that treaty. And I make no doubt but the *Dutch* would have exerted themſelves ſo vigorouſly, as to be able, with that aſſiſtance alone, to defend their frontiers; or, if they had been forced to a peace, the *Spaniards*, who abhor diſmembring their monarchy, would never have ſuffered the *French* to poſſeſs themſelves of *Flanders*. At that time, they had none of thoſe endearments to each other, which this war hath created; and whatever hatred and jealouſy were natural between the two nations would then have appeared. So that there was no ſort of neceſſity for us to proceed further, although we had been in a better condition. But our politicians, at that time, had other views; and a new war muſt be undertaken upon the advice of thoſe, who, with their partizans and adherents, were to be the ſole gainers by it. A grand alliance was therefore made between the *Emperor*, *England*, and the *States-general*; by which, if the injuries complained of from *France* were not remedied in two months, the parties concerned were obliged mutually to aſſiſt each other *with their whole ſtrength*.

Thus we became parties in a war in conjunction with two allies, whoſe ſhare in the quarrel was beyond all proportion greater than ours. However, I can ſee no reaſon from the words of the grand alliance, by which we were obliged to make

thoſe prodigious expences we have ſince been at. By what I have always heard and read, I take the *whole ſtrength of a nation*, as underſtood in that treaty, to be the utmoſt that a prince can raiſe annually from his ſubjects. If he be forced to mortgage and borrow, whether at home or abroad, it is not, properly ſpeaking, *his own ſtrength*, or that of the nation, but the entire ſubſtance of particular perſons, which, not being able to raiſe out of the annual income of his kingdom, he takes upon ſecurity, and can only pay the intereſt. And by this method one part of the nation is pawned to the other, with hardly a poſſibility left of being ever redeemed.

Surely it would have been enough for us to have ſuſpended the payment of our debts contracted in the former war; and to have continued our land and malt taxes, with thoſe others which have ſince been mortgaged. Theſe, with ſome additions, would have made up ſuch a ſum, as, with prudent management, might, I ſuppoſe, have maintained an hundred thouſand men by ſea and land; a reaſonable *quota* in all conſcience for that ally, who apprehended leaſt danger, and expected leaſt advantage. Nor can we imagine that either of the confederates, when the war began, would have been ſo unreaſonable as to refuſe joining with us upon ſuch a foot, and expect that we ſhould, every year, go between three and four millions in debt (which hath been our caſe), becauſe the *French* could hardly have con-

trived any offers of peace ſo ruinous to us as ſuch a war. Poſterity will be at a loſs to conceive, what kind of ſpirit could poſſeſs their anceſtors, who after ten years ſuffering by the unexampled politicks of a nation maintaining a war by annually pawning itſelf; and during a ſhort peace, while they were looking back with horror on the heavy loads of debts they had contracted, univerſally condemning thoſe pernicious counſels which had occaſioned them; racking their invention for ſome remedies or expedients to mend their ſhattered condition; I ſay, that theſe very people, without giving themſelves time to breathe, ſhould again enter into a more dangerous, chargeable, and extenſive war, for the ſame or perhaps a greater period of time, and without any apparent neceſſity. It is obvious in a private fortune, that whoever annually runs out, and continues the ſame expences, muſt every year mortgage a greater quantity of land than he did before; and as the debt doubles and trebles upon him, ſo doth his inability to pay it. By the ſame proportion we have ſuffered twice as much by this laſt ten years war, as we did by the former; and, if it were poſſible to continue it five years longer at the ſame rate, it would be as great a burthen as the whole twenty. This computation being ſo eaſy and trivial that it is almoſt a ſhame to mention it, poſterity will think, that thoſe who firſt adviſed the war, wanted either the ſenſe or the honeſty to conſider it.

And as we have waſted our ſtrength and vital ſubſtance in this profuſe manner, ſo we have ſhamefully miſapplied it to ends at leaſt very different from thoſe, for which we undertook the war, and often to effect others, which after a peace we may ſeverely repent. This is the ſecond article I propoſed to examine.

We have now, for ten years together, turned the whole force and expence of the war where the enemy was beſt able to hold us at a bay; where we could propoſe no manner of advantage to ourſelves; where it was highly impolitic to enlarge our conqueſts; utterly neglecting that part, which would have ſaved and gained us many millions, which the perpetual maxims of our government teach us to purſue; which would have ſooneſt weakened the enemy, and muſt either have promoted a ſpeedy peace, or enabled us to continue the war.

Thoſe who are fond of continuing the war, cry up our conſtant ſucceſs at a moſt prodigious rate, and reckoned it infinitely greater than, in all human probability, we had reaſon to hope. Ten glorious campaigns are paſſed, and now at laſt, like the ſick man, we are juſt expiring with all ſorts of good ſymptoms. Did the adviſers of this war ſuppoſe it would continue ten years without expecting the ſucceſs we have had; and yet at the ſame time determine, that *France* muſt be reduced, and *Spain* ſubdued, by employing our whole ſtrength upon *Flanders*? Did they believe, the laſt war left us in a condition to furniſh ſuch vaſt ſupplies for

ſo long a period without involving us and our poſterity in unextricable debts? If, after ſuch miraculous *doings*, we are not yet in a condition of bringing *France* to our terms, nor can tell when we ſhall be ſo, although we ſhould proceed without any reverſe of fortune; what could we look for in the ordinary courſe of things, but a *Flanders* war of at leaſt twenty years longer? Do they indeed think, a town taken from the *Dutch* is a ſufficient recompence to us for ſix millions of money; which is of ſo little conſequence to determine the war, that the *French* may yet hold out a dozen years more, and afford a town every campaign at the ſame price?

I ſay not this by any means to detract from the army, or its leaders. Getting into the enemy's lines, paſſing rivers, and taking towns, may be actions attended with many glorious circumſtances: but when all this brings no real ſolid advantage to us; when it hath no other end than to enlarge the territories of the *Dutch*, and increaſe the fame and wealth of our *general*; I conclude, however it comes about, that things are not as well as they ſhould be; and that ſurely our forces and money might be better employed, both towards reducing our enemy, and working out ſome benefit to ourſelves. But the caſe is ſtill much harder; we are deſtroying many thouſand lives, exhauſting our ſubſtance, not for our own intereſt, which would be but common prudence; not for a thing indifferent, which would be ſufficient folly; but perhaps to our own deſtruction, which is perfect madneſs.

We may live to feel the effects of our own valour more ſenſibly, than all the conſequences we imagine from the dominions of *Spain* in the duke of *Anjou*. We have conquered a noble territory for the *States*, that will maintain ſufficient troops to defend itſelf, and feed many hundred thouſand inhabitants; where all encouragement will be given to introduce and improve manufactures, which was the only advantage they wanted; and which, added to their ſkill, induſtry, and parſimony, will enable them to under-ſell us in every market in the world.

Our ſupply of forty thouſand men according to the firſt ſtipulation, added to the quota's of the *Emperor* and *Holland*, which they were obliged to furniſh, would have made an army of near two hundred thouſand, excluſive of garriſons; enough to withſtand all the power that *France* could bring againſt it; and we might have employed the reſt much better both for the common cauſe and our own advantage.

The war in *Spain* muſt be imputed to the credulity of our miniſters, who ſuffered themſelves to be perſuaded by the imperial court, that the *Spaniards* were ſo violently affected to the houſe of *Auſtria*, as, upon the firſt appearance there, with a few troops under the archduke, the whole kingdom would immediately revolt. This we tried; and found the *Emperor* to have deceived either us or himſelf. Yet there we drove on the war at a prodigious diſadvantage with great expence; and by a

moſt corrupt management the only [e] general, who, by a courſe of conduct and fortune almoſt miraculous, had nearly put us into poſſeſſion of that kingdom, was left wholly unſupported, expoſed to the envy of his rivals, diſappointed by the caprices of a young unexperienced prince under the guidance of a rapacious *German* miniſtry, and at laſt called home in diſcontent. By which our armies both in *Spain* and *Portugal*, were made a ſacrifice to avarice, ill-conduct, or treachery.

In common prudence we ſhould either have puſhed that war with the utmoſt vigour in ſo fortunate a juncture, eſpecially ſince the gaining that kingdom was the great point, for which we pretended to continue the war; or at leaſt when we had *found*, or *made* that deſign impracticable, we ſhould not have gone on in ſo expenſive a management of it; but have kept our troops on the defenſive in *Catalonia*, and purſued ſome other way more effectual for diſtreſſing the common enemy, and advantaging ourſelves.

And what a noble field of honour and profit had we before us wherein to employ the beſt of our ſtrength, which, againſt all maxims of *Britiſh* policy, we ſuffered to lie wholly neglected! I have ſometimes wondered how it came to paſs that the ſtyle of *maritime powers*, by which our allies, in a ſort of contemptuous manner, uſually couple us with the *Dutch*, did never put us in mind of the ſea; and while ſome politicians were ſhewing us

[e] The earl of *Peterborough*,

the

the way to *Spain* by *Flanders*, others to *Savoy* or *Naples*, that the *Weſt-Indies* ſhould never come into their heads. With half the charge we have been at, we might have maintained our original *quota* of forty thouſand men in *Flanders*, and, at the ſame time, by our fleets and naval forces have ſo diſtreſſed the *Spaniards* in the north and ſouth ſeas of *America*, as to prevent any returns of money from thence except in our own bottoms. This is what beſt became us to do as a *maritime power*; this, with any common degree of ſucceſs, would ſoon have compelled *France* to the neceſſities of a peace, and *Spain* to acknowledge the archduke. But while we, for ten years, have been ſquandering away our money upon the continent, *France* hath been wiſely engroſſing all the trade of *Peru*, going directly with their ſhips to *Lima* and other ports, and there receiving ingots of gold and ſilver for *French* goods of little value; which, beſides the mighty advantage to their nation at preſent, may divert the channel of that trade for the future, ſo beneficial to us, who uſed to receive annually ſuch vaſt ſums at *Cadiz* for our goods ſent thence to the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*. All this we tamely ſaw and ſuffered without the leaſt attempt to hinder it; except what was performed by ſome private men at *Briſtol*, who, inflamed by a true ſpirit of courage and induſtry, did, about three years ago, with a few veſſels fitted out at their own charge, make a moſt ſucceſsful voyage into thoſe parts; took one of the *Aquapulco* ſhips, very narrowly miſt of the other, and are lately

lately returned laden with unenvied wealth, to ſhew us what might have been done with the like management by a public undertaking. At leaſt we might eaſily have prevented thoſe great returns of money to *France* and *Spain*, although we could not have taken it ourſelves. And if it be true, as the advocates for war would have it, that the *French* are now ſo impoveriſhed, in what condition muſt they have been, if that iſſue of wealth had been ſtopped?

But great events often turn upon very ſmall circumſtances. It was the kingdom's misfortune, that the ſea was not the duke of *Marlborough's* element; otherwiſe the whole force of the war would infallibly have been beſtowed there infinitely to the advantage of his country, which would then have gone hand in hand with his own. But it is very truly objected, that if we alone had made ſuch an attempt as this, *Holland* would have been jealous; or, if we had done it in conjunction with *Holland* the houſe of *Auſtria* would have been diſcontented. This hath been the ſtyle of late years; which whoever introduced among us, they have taught our allies to ſpeak after them. Otherwiſe it could hardly enter into any imagination, that while we are confederates in a war with thoſe who are to have the whole profit, and who leave a double ſhare of the burthen upon us, we dare not think of any deſign (although againſt the common enemy) where there is the leaſt proſpect of doing good to our own country, for fear of giving umbrage and offence to our allies,

allies, while we are ruining ourſelves to conquer provinces and kingdoms for them. I therefore confeſs with ſhame, that this objection is true: for it is very well known, that while the deſign of Mr. *Hill's* expedition [*f*] remained a ſecret, it was ſuſpected in *Holland* and *Germany* to be intended againſt *Peru*; whereupon the *Dutch* made every where their public complaints; and the miniſters at *Vienna* talked of it as an *inſolence in the* QUEEN *to attempt ſuch an undertaking*; which although it has failed, partly by the accidents of a ſtorm, and partly by the ſtubbornneſs or treachery of ſome in that colony, for whoſe relief, and at whoſe entreaty, it was in ſome meaſure deſigned, is no objection at all to an enterprize ſo well concerted, and with ſuch fair probability of ſucceſs.

It was ſomething ſingular that the *States* ſhould expreſs their uneaſineſs, when they thought we intended to make ſome attempt in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*; becauſe it is agreed between us, that whatever is conquered there by us or them ſhall belong to the conqueror; which is the only article that I can call to mind in all our treaties or ſtipulations with any view of intereſt to this kingdom; and for that very reaſon I ſuppoſe, among others, hath been altogether neglected. Let thoſe, who think this too ſevere a reflexion, examine the whole manage-

[*f*] The expedition in 1711, wherein Sir *Hovendon Walker* commanded the fleet, and Mr. *Hill* the land forces for the reduction of *Quebec* and *Canada*, and regaining the *Newfoundland* fiſhery, which the *French* had taken from us.

ment

ment of the preſent war by ſea and land, with all our alliances, treaties, ſtipulations, and conventions, and conſider whether the whole doth not look, as if ſome particular care and induſtry had been uſed to prevent any benefit or advantage that might poſſibly accrue to *Britain?*

This kind of treatment, from our principal allies, hath taught the ſame dialect to all the reſt; ſo that there is not a petty prince whom we half maintain by ſubſidies and penſions, who is not ready, upon every occaſion, to threaten us, that he will recal his troops (although they muſt rob or ſtarve at home) if we refuſe to comply with him in any demand, however unreaſonable.

Upon the third head I ſhall produce ſome inſtances to ſhew, how tamely we have ſuffered each of our allies to infringe every article in thoſe treaties and ſtipulations, by which they were bound; and to lay the load upon us.

But before I enter upon this, which is a large ſubject, I ſhall take leave to offer a few remarks on certain articles in three of our treaties; which may let us perceive how much thoſe miniſters valued or underſtood the true intereſt, ſafety, or honour of their country.

We have made two alliances with *Portugal*, an offenſive and a defenſive; the firſt is to remain in force only during the preſent war; the ſecond to be perpetual. In the offenſive alliance the *Emperor*, *England*, and *Holland* are parties with *Portugal*; in the defenſive only we and the *States*.

Upon

Upon the firſt article of the offenſive alliance it is to be obſerved, that although the grand alliance, as I have already ſaid, allows *England* and *Holland* to poſſeſs for their own whatever each of them ſhall conquer in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies:* yet there we are quite cut out by conſenting, that the archduke ſhall poſſeſs the dominions of *Spain* in as full a manner as their late king *Charles*. And what is more remarkable, we broke this very article in favour of *Portugal* by ſubſequent ſtipulations; where we agree that king *Charles* ſhall deliver up *Eſtremadura*, *Vigo*, and ſome other places to the *Portugueſe*, as ſoon as we can conquer them from the enemy. They, who are guilty of ſo much folly and contradiction, know beſt whether it proceeded from corruption or ſtupidity.

By two other articles (beſides the honour of being convoys and guards in ordinary to the *Portugueſe* ſhips and coaſts) we are to gueſs the enemy's thoughts, and to take the king of *Portugal's* word whenever he hath a fancy that he ſhall be invaded. We are alſo to furniſh him with a ſtrength ſuperior to what the enemy intends to invade any of his dominions with, let that be what it will. And until we know what the enemy's forces are, his *Portugueſe* majeſty is ſole judge what ſtrength is ſuperior, and what will be able to prevent an invaſion; and may ſend our fleets whenever he pleaſes upon his errands to ſome of the further parts of the world, or keep them attending upon his own coaſts till he think fit to diſmiſs them. Theſe fleets muſt

likewiſe

likewiſe be ſubject in all things not only to the king, but to his viceroys, admirals, and governors, in any of his foreign dominions, when he is in an humour to apprehend an invaſion; which, I believe, is an indignity that was never offered before, except to a conquered nation.

In the defenſive alliance with that crown, which is to remain perpetual, and where only *England* and *Holland* are parties with them, the ſame care in almoſt the ſame words is taken for our fleet to attend their coaſts and foreign dominions, and to be under the ſame obedience. We and the *States* are likewiſe to furniſh them with twelve thouſand men at our own charge, which we are conſtantly to recruit; and theſe are to be ſubject to the *Portugueſe* generals.

In the offenſive alliance we took no care of having the aſſiſtance of *Portugal*, whenever we ſhould be invaded; but in this it ſeems, we are wiſer; for that king is obliged to make war on *France* or *Spain*, whenever we or *Holland* are invaded by either; but, before this, we are to ſupply them with the ſame forces both by ſea and land, as if he were invaded himſelf. And this muſt needs be a very prudent and ſafe courſe for a *maritime power* to take upon a ſudden invaſion; by which, inſtead of making uſe of our fleets and armies for our own defence, we muſt ſend them abroad for the defence of *Portugal*.

By the thirteenth article we are told what this aſſiſtance is which the *Portugueſe* are to give us, and upon what conditions. They are to furniſh ten

ten men of war; and when *England* and *Holland* ſhall be invaded by *France* and *Spain* together, or by *Spain* alone, in either of theſe caſes thoſe ten *Portugueſe* men of war are to ſerve only upon their own coaſts; where, no doubt, they will be of mighty uſe to their allies, and terror to the enemy.

How the *Dutch* were drawn to have a part in either of theſe two alliances is not very material to enquire, ſince they have been ſo wiſe as never to obſerve them; and I ſuppoſe never intended it; but reſolved, as they have ſince done, to ſhift the load upon us.

Let any man read theſe two treaties from the beginning to the end, he will imagine that the king of *Portugal* and his miniſters ſat down and made them by themſelves, and then ſent them to their allies to ſign; the whole ſpirit and tenor of them quite through running only upon this ſingle point, what we and *Holland* are to do for *Portugal*, without any mention of an equivalent, except thoſe ten ſhips, which, at the time when we have greateſt need of their aſſiſtance, are obliged to attend upon their own coaſts.

The barrier-treaty between *Great Britain* and *Holland*, was concluded at the *Hague* on the 29th of *October*, in the year 1709. In this treaty neither her majeſty nor her kingdoms have any intereſt or concern, further than what is mentioned in the ſecond and twentieth articles: by the former the *States* are to aſſiſt the QUEEN in defending the act of ſucceſſion; and by the other, not to treat of

a peace, till *France* had acknowledged the QUEEN and the ſucceſſion of *Hanover*, and promiſed to remove the *Pretender* out of that king's dominions.

As to the firſt of theſe, it is certainly for the ſafety and intereſt of the *States general*, that the Proteſtant ſucceſſion ſhould be preſerved in *England*; becauſe ſuch a popiſh prince, as we apprehended, would infallibly join with *France* in the ruin of that republick. And the *Dutch* are as much bound to ſupport our ſucceſſion, as they are tied to any part of a treaty or league offenſive and defenſive againſt a common enemy, without any ſeperate benefit upon that conſideration. Her majeſty is in the full peaceable poſſeſſion of her kingdoms, and of the hearts of her people, among whom hardly one in five thouſand are in the *Pretender's* intereſt. And whether the aſſiſtance of the *Dutch* to preſerve a right ſo well eſtabliſhed be an equivalent to thoſe many unreaſonable exorbitant articles in the reſt of the treaty, let the world judge. What an impreſſion of our ſettlement muſt it give abroad, to ſee our miniſters offering ſuch conditions to the *Dutch* to prevail on them to be guarantees of our acts of parliament! neither perhaps is it right, in point of policy, or good ſenſe, that a foreign power ſhould be called in to confirm our ſucceſſion by way of guarantee, but only to acknowledge it; otherwiſe we put it out of the power of our own legiſlature to change our ſucceſſion without the conſent of that prince or ſtate, who is guarantee, how much ſoever the neceſſities of the kingdom may require it.

As to the other article, it is a natural conſequence that muſt attend any treaty of peace we can make with *France*; being only the acknowledgment of her majeſty as QUEEN of her own dominions, and the right of ſucceſſion by our own laws, which no foreign power hath any pretence to diſpute.

However, in order to deſerve theſe mighty advantages from the *States*, the reſt of the treaty is wholly taken up in directing what we are to do for them.

By the grand alliance, which was the foundation of the preſent war, the *Spaniſh Low-countries* were to be recovered and delivered to the king of *Spain*; but by this treaty that prince is to poſſeſs nothing in *Flanders* during the war; and after a peace the *States* are to have the military command of about twenty towns, with the dependences, and four hundred thouſand crowns a year from the king of *Spain* to maintain their garriſons. By which means they will have the command of all *Flanders*, from *Newport* on the ſea to *Namur* on the *Maeſe*, and be entirely maſters of the *Pais de waas*, the richeſt part of thoſe provinces. Further, they have liberty to garriſon any place they ſhall think fit in the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, whenever there is an appearance of war; and conſequently to put garriſons into *Oſtend*, or where elſe they pleaſe, upon a rupture with *England*.

By this treaty likewiſe the *Dutch* will, in effect, be entire maſters of all the *Low-countries*; may impoſe duties, reſtrictions in commerce, and prohibitions at their pleaſure; and, in that fertile country, may ſet up all ſorts of manufactures, particularly the woollen, by inviting the diſobliged manufacturers in *Ireland*, and the *French* refugees, who are ſcattered all over *Germany*. And as this manufacture increaſeth abroad, the cloathing people of *England* will be neceſſitated, for want of employment, to follow; and in few years, by help of the low intereſt of money in *Holland*, *Flanders* may recover that beneficial trade, which we got from them. The landed men of *England* will then be forced to re-eſtabliſh the ſtaples of wool abroad; and the *Dutch*, inſtead of being only the carriers, will become the original poſſeſſors of thoſe commodities, with which the greateſt part of the trade of the world is now carried on. And as they increaſe their trade, it is obvious they will enlarge their ſtrength at ſea, and ours muſt leſſen in proportion.

All the ports in *Flanders* are to be ſubject to the like duties, that the *Dutch* ſhall lay upon the *Scheld*, which is to be cloſed on the ſides of the *States*: thus all other nations are, in effect, ſhut out from trading with *Flanders*. Yet in the very ſame article it is ſaid, that the *States ſhall be favoured in all the* Spaniſh *dominions as much as* Great Britain, *or as the people moſt favoured*. We have conquered *Flanders* for them, and are in a worſe condition as to our trade there, than before the war began. We have been

been the great ſupport of the king of *Spain*, to whom the *Dutch* have hardly contributed any thing at all; and yet *they are to be equally favoured with us in all his dominions.* Of all this the QUEEN is under the unreaſonable obligation of being guarantee, and that they ſhall poſſeſs their barrier and their four hundred thouſand crowns a year, even before a peace.

It is to be obſerved, that this treaty was only ſigned by one of our plenipotentiaries [*g*]; and I have been told that the other [*b*] was heard to ſay, he would rather loſe his right hand than ſet it to ſuch a treaty. Had he ſpoke theſe words in due ſeaſon, and loud enough to be heard on this ſide the water, conſidering the credit he had then at court, he might have ſaved much of his country's honour, and got as much to himſelf; therefore, if the report be true, I am inclined to think he only SAID it. I have been likewiſe told, that ſome very neceſſary circumſtances were wanting in the entrance upon this treaty; but the miniſters here rather choſe to ſacrifice the honour of the crown, and the ſafety of their country, than not ratify what one of their favourites had tranſacted.

Let me now conſider in what manner our allies have obſerved thoſe treaties they made with us, and the ſeveral ſtipulations and agreements purſuant to them.

[*g*] Lord *Townſhend.* See *John Bull.*
[*b*] Duke of *Marlborough.*

By the grand alliance between the *Empire*, *England*, and *Holland*, we were to aſſiſt the other two *totis viribus* by ſea and land. By a convention ſubſequent to this treaty, the proportions which the ſeveral parties ſhould contribute towards the war, were adjuſted in the following manner: the *Emperor* was obliged to furniſh ninety thouſand men againſt *France*, either in *Italy*, or upon the *Rhine*; *Holland* to bring ſixty thouſand into the field in *Flanders*, excluſive of *garriſons*; and *we* forty thouſand. In winter, 1702, which was the next year, the duke of *Marlborough* propoſed raiſing ten thouſand men more by way of augmentation, and to carry on the war with greater vigour; to which the parliament agreed, and the *Dutch* were to raiſe the ſame number. This was upon a *par*, directly contrary to the former ſtipulation, whereby our part was to be a third leſs than theirs; and therefore it was granted with a condition that *Holland* ſhould break off all trade and commerce with *France*. But this condition was never executed; the *Dutch* only amuſing us with a ſpecious declaration, till our ſeſſion of parliament was ended; and the following year it was taken off by concert between our *general* and the *States*, without any reaſon aſſigned, for the ſatisfaction of the kingdom. The next and ſome enſuing campaigns, further additional forces were allowed by parliament for the war in *Flanders*; and in every new ſupply the *Dutch* gradually leſſened their proportions, although the parliament addreſſed the QUEEN, that the

the *States* might be desired to observe them according to agreement; which had no other effect, than to teach them to elude it by making their troops nominal corps; as they did by keeping up the number of regiments, but sinking a fifth part of the men and money; so that now things are just inverted. And in all new levies we contributed a third more than the *Dutch*, who at first were obliged to the same proportion more than us.

Besides, the more towns we conquer for the *States*, the worse condition we are in towards reducing the common enemy, and consequently of putting an end to the war. For they make no scruple of employing the troops of their *quota* towards garrisoning every town, as fast as it is taken; directly contrary to the agreement between us, by which all garrisons are particularly excluded. This is at length arrived by several steps to such a height, that there are at present in the field not so many forces under the duke of *Marlborough's* command in *Flanders*, as *Britain* alone maintains for that service, nor have been for some years past.

The duke of *Marlborough* having entered the enemies lines and taken *Bouchain*, formed the design of keeping so great a number of troops, and particularly of cavalry, in *Lisle*, *Tournay*, *Doway*, and the country between, as should be able to harass all the neighbouring provinces of *France* during the winter, prevent the enemy from erecting their magazines, and, by consequence, from subsisting their forces next spring, and render it im-

poſſible for them to aſſemble their army another year, without going back behind the *Soame* to do it. In order to effect this project, it was neceſſary to be at an expence extraordinary of forage for the troops, for building ſtables, finding fire and candle for the ſoldiers, with other incident charges. The QUEEN readily agreed to furniſh her ſhare of the firſt article, that of the forage, which only belonged to her. But the *States* inſiſting that her majeſty ſhould likewiſe come into a proportion of the other articles, which in juſtice belonged totally to them; ſhe agreed even to that, rather than a deſign of this importance ſhould fail. And yet we know it hath failed, and that the *Dutch* refuſed their conſent till the time was paſt for putting it in execution, even in the opinion of thoſe who propoſed it. Perhaps, a certain article in the treaties of contributions ſubmitted to by ſuch of the *French* dominions, as pay them to the *States*, was the principal cauſe of defeating this project; ſince one great advantage to have been gained by it was, as is before mentioned, to have hindered the enemy from erecting their magazines; and one article in thoſe treaties of contributions is, that the produce of thoſe countries ſhall paſs free and unmoleſted. So that the queſtion was reduced to this ſhort iſſue: whether the *Dutch* ſhould loſe this paultry benefit, or the common cauſe an advantage of ſuch mighty importance.

The ſea being the element, where we might moſt probably carry on the war with any advantage

to

to ourſelves, it was agreed that we ſhould bear five eighths of the charge in that ſervice, and the *Dutch* the other three; and by the grand alliance, whatever we or *Holland* ſhould conquer in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, was to accrue to the conquerors. It might therefore have been hoped, that this *maritime ally* of ours would have made up in their fleet what they fell ſhort in their army; but quite otherwiſe, they never once furniſhed their *quota* either of ſhips or men; or if ſome few of their fleet now and then appeared, it was no more than appearing; for they immediately ſeparated to look to their merchants and protect their trade. And we may remember very well, when theſe guarantees of our ſucceſſion, after having not one ſhip for many months together in the *Mediterranean*, ſent that part of their *quota* thither, and furniſhed nothing to us, at the ſame time that they alarmed us with the rumour of an invaſion. And laſt year, when Sir *James Wiſhart* was diſpatched into *Holland* to expoſtulate with the *States*, and to deſire they would make good their agreements in ſo important a part of the ſervice; he met with ſuch a reception as ill became a republick to give, that were under ſo many great obligations to us; in ſhort ſuch an one, as thoſe only deſerve who are content to take it.

It hath likewiſe been no ſmall inconvenience to us, that the *Dutch* are always ſlow in paying their ſubſidies; by which means the weight and preſſure of the payment lies upon the QUEEN, as well as the blame, if her majeſty be not very exact. Nor

will even this always content our allies: for, in *July* 1711, the king of *Spain* was paid all the ſubſidies to the firſt of *January* next; nevertheleſs he hath ſince complained for want of money; and his *ſecretary* threatened, that, if we would not further ſupply his majeſty, he could not anſwer for what might happen; although king *Charles* had not at that time one third of the troops for which he was paid; and even thoſe he had were neither paid nor cloathed.

I cannot forbear mentioning here another paſſage concerning ſubſidies, to ſhew what opinion foreigners have of our eaſineſs, and how much they reckon themſelves maſters of our money, whenever they think fit to call for it. The QUEEN was, by agreement, to pay two hundred thouſand crowns a year to the *Pruſſian* troops; the *States* one hundred thouſand; and the *Emperor* only thirty thouſand for recruiting, which his *imperial* majeſty never paid. Prince *Eugene* happening to paſs by *Berlin*, the miniſters of that court applied to him for redreſs in this particular; and his highneſs very frankly promiſed them, that, in conſideration of this deficiency, *Britain* and the *States* ſhould increaſe their ſubſidies to ſeventy thouſand crowns more between them; and that the *Emperor* ſhould be punctual for the time to come. This was done by that prince without any orders or power whatſoever. The *Dutch* very reaſonably refuſed conſenting to it: but the *Pruſſian* miniſter here, making his application at our court, prevailed

vailed on us to agree to our proportion, before we could hear what reſolution would be taken in *Holland*. It is therefore to be hoped, that his *Pruſſian* majeſty, at the end of this war, will not have the ſame cauſe of complaint, which he had at the cloſe of the laſt; that his military cheſt was emptier by twenty thouſand crowns than at the time the war began.

The *Emperor*, as we have already ſaid, was, by ſtipulation, to furniſh ninety thouſand men againſt the common enemy, as having no fleets to maintain, and, in right of his family, being moſt concerned in the ſucceſs of the war. However, this agreement hath been ſo ill obſerved, that from the beginning of the war to this day neither of the two laſt *Emperors* had ever twenty thouſand men on their own account in the common cauſe, excepting once in *Italy*, when the *imperial* court exerted itſelf in a point they have much more at heart, than that of gaining *Spain* or the *Indies* to their family. When they had ſucceeded in their attempts on the ſide of *Italy*, and obſerved our blind zeal for puſhing on the war at all adventures, they ſoon found out the moſt effectual expedient to excuſe themſelves. They computed eaſily, that it would coſt them leſs to make large preſents to one ſingle perſon than to pay an army, and turn to as good account. They thought they could not put their affairs into better hands; and therefore wiſely left us to fight their battles.

Beſides,

Beſides, it appeared by ſeveral inſtances, how little the *Emperor* regarded his allies, or the cauſe they were engaged in, when once he thought the *empire* itſelf was ſecure. It is known enough, that he might ſeveral times have made a peace with his diſcontented ſubjects in *Hungary*, upon terms not at all unbefitting either his dignity or intereſt; but he rather choſe to ſacrifice the whole alliance to his private paſſion, by entirely ſubduing and enſlaving a miſerable people, who had but too much provocation to take up arms to free themſelves from the oppreſſions, under which they were groaning; yet this muſt ſerve as an excuſe for breaking his agreement, and diverting ſo great a body of troops, which might have been employed againſt *France*.

Another inſtance of the *Emperor's* indifference, or rather diſlike, to the common cauſe of the allies, is the buſineſs of *Toulon*. This deſign was indeed diſcovered here at home by a perſon, whom every body knows to be the creature of a certain *great man* at leaſt as much noted for his ſkill in gaming as in politicks, upon the baſe mercenary end of getting money by wagers; which was then ſo common a practice, that I remember a gentleman in buſineſs, who, having the curioſity to enquire how wagers went upon the *Exchange*, found ſome people deep in the ſecret to have been concerned in that kind of traffick; as appeared by premiums named for towns, which nobody but thoſe behind the curtain could ſuſpect. However, although this

project

project had gotten wind by ſo ſcandalous a proceeding; yet *Toulon* might probably have been taken, if the *Emperor* had not thought fit, in that very juncture, to detach twelve or fifteen thouſand men to ſeize *Naples*, as an enterprize that was more his private and immediate intereſt. But it was manifeſt, that his *imperial* majeſty had no mind to ſee *Toulon* in poſſeſſion of the allies; for, even with theſe diſcouragements, the attempts might yet have ſucceeded, if prince *Eugene* had not thought fit to oppoſe it; which cannot be imputed to his own judgment, but to ſome politic reaſons of his court. The duke of *Savoy* was for attacking the enemy as ſoon as our army arrived; but when the mareſchal *de Teſſe's* troops were all come up, to pretend to beſiege the place in the condition we were at that time, was a farce and a jeſt. Had *Toulon* fallen then into our hands, the maritime power of *France* would, in a great meaſure, have been deſtroyed.

But a much greater inſtance than either of the foregoing, how little the *Emperor* regarded us or our quarrel, after all we had done to ſave his *imperial* crown, and to aſſert the title of his brother to the monarchy of *Spain*, may be brought from the proceedings of that court not many months ago. It was judged, that a war carried on upon the ſide of *Italy* would cauſe a great diverſion of the *French* forces, wound them in a very tender part, and facilitate the progreſs of our arms in *Spain* as well as *Flanders*. It was propoſed to the duke of *Savoy* to make

make this diverſion; and not only a diverſion during the ſummer, but the winter too, by taking quarters on this ſide of the hills. Only, in order to make him willing and able to perform this work, two points were to be ſettled: firſt, it was neceſſary to end the diſpute between the *imperial* court and his royal highneſs, which had no other foundation than the *Emperor's* refuſing to make good ſome articles of that treaty, on the faith of which the duke engaged in the preſent war, and for the execution whereof *Britain* and *Holland* became guarantees, at the requeſt of the late emperor *Leopold*. To remove this difficulty, the earl of *Peterborough* was diſpatched to *Vienna*, got over ſome part of thoſe diſputes to the ſatisfaction of the duke of *Savoy*, and had put the reſt in a fair way of being accommodated at the time the emperor *Joſeph* died. Upon which great event, the duke of *Savoy* took the reſolution of putting himſelf at the head of the army, although the whole matter was not finiſhed, ſince the common cauſe required his aſſiſtance; and that, until a new emperor were elected, it was impoſſible to make good the treaty to him. In order to enable him, the only thing he aſked was, that he ſhould be reinforced by the imperial court with eight thouſand men before the end of the campaign. Mr. *Whitworth* was ſent to *Vienna* to make this propoſal; and it is credibly reported that he was impowered, rather than fail, to offer forty thouſand pounds for the march of thoſe eight thouſand men, if he found it

was

was want *of ability, and not inclination*, that hindered the ſending them. But he was ſo far from ſucceeding, that it was ſaid the miniſters of that court did not ſo much as give him an opportunity to tempt them with any particular ſums; but cut off all his hopes at once, by alledging the impoſſibility of complying with the QUEEN's demands upon any conſideration whatſoever. They could not plead their old excuſe of the war in *Hangary*, which was then brought to an end. They had nothing to offer but ſome general ſpeculative reaſons, which it would expoſe them to repeat; and ſo, after much delay, and many trifling pretences, they utterly refuſed ſo ſmall and ſeaſonable an aſſiſtance; to the ruin of a project that would have more terrified *France*, and cauſed a greater diverſion of their forces, than a much more numerous army in any other part. Thus, for want of eight thouſand men, for whoſe winter-campaign the QUEEN was willing to give forty thouſand pounds; and for want of executing the deſign I lately mentioned of hindering the enemy from erecting magazines, towards which her majeſty was ready not only to bear her own proportion, but a ſhare of that which the *States* were obliged to; our hopes of taking winter-quarters in the north and ſouth parts of *France* are eluded, and the war left in that method which is like to continue it longeſt. Can there an example be given in the whole courſe of this war, where we have treated the pettieſt prince, with whom we had to deal, in ſo contemptuous a manner?

ner? Did we ever once conſider what we could afford, or what we were obliged to when our aſſiſtance was deſired, even while we lay under immediate apprehenſions of being invaded?

When *Portugal* came as a confederate into the grand alliance, it was ſtipulated, that the empire, *England*, and *Holland*, ſhould each maintain four thouſand men of their own troops in that kingdom, and pay between them a million of pattacoons to the king of *Portugal*, for the ſupport of twenty-eight thouſand *Portugueſe*; which number of forty thouſand was to be the confederate army againſt *Spain* on the *Portugal* ſide. This treaty was ratified by all the three powers. But, in a ſhort time after, the *Emperor* declared himſelf unable to comply with his part of the agreement, and ſo left the two thirds upon us; who very generouſly undertook that burthen, and at the ſame time two thirds of the ſubſidies for maintenance of the *Portugueſe* troops. But neither is this the worſt part of the ſtory; for although the *Dutch* did indeed ſend their own *quota* of four thouſand men to *Portugal* (which however they would not agree to but upon condition that the other two thirds ſhould be ſupplied by us); yet they never took care to recruit them; for, in the year 1706, the *Portugueſe*, *Britiſh*, and *Dutch* forces having marched with the earl of *Galway* into *Caſtile*, and by the noble conduct of that general being forced to retire into *Valencia*, it was found neceſſary to raiſe a new army on the *Portugal* ſide; where the QUEEN hath, at ſeveral

ſeveral times, encreaſed her eſtabliſhment to ten thouſand five hundred men; and the *Dutch* never replaced one ſingle man, nor paid one penny of their ſubſidies to *Portugal* in ſix years.

The *Spaniſh* army on the ſide of *Catalonia* is, or ought to be, about fifty thouſand men, excluſive of *Portugal*. And here the war hath been carried on almoſt entirely at our coſt. For this whole army is paid by the QUEEN, excepting only ſeven battalions and fourteen ſquadrons of *Dutch* and *Palatines*; and even fifteen hundred of theſe are likewiſe in our pay; beſides the ſums given to king *Charles* for ſubſidies and the maintenance of his court. Neither are our troops at *Gibraltar* included within this number. And further, we alone have been at all the charge of tranſporting the forces firſt ſent from *Genoa* to *Barcelona*; and of all the *imperial* recruits from time to time. And have likewiſe paid vaſt ſums as levy-money for every individual man and horſe ſo furniſhed to recruit; although the horſes were ſcarce worth the price of tranſportation. But this hath been almoſt the conſtant misfortune of our fleet during the preſent war; inſtead of being employed on ſome enterprize for the good of the nation, or even for the protection of our trade, to be wholly taken up in tranſporting ſoldiers.

We have actually conquered all *Bavaria*, *Ulm*, *Augſbourg*, *Landau*, and a great part of *Alſace*, for the *Emperor*: and by the troops we have furniſhed, the armies we have paid, and the diverſions we have

have given to the enemies forces, have chiefly contributed to the conqueſts of *Milan*, *Mantua*, and *Mirandola*, and to the recovery of the duchy of *Modena*. The laſt *Emperor* drained the wealth of thoſe countries into his own coffers, without increaſing his troops againſt *France* by ſuch mighty acquiſitions, or yielding to the moſt reaſonable requeſts we have made.

Of the many towns we have taken for the *Dutch*, we have conſented, by the Barrier-treaty, that all thoſe which were not in the poſſeſſion of *Spain*, upon the death of the late catholic king, ſhall be part of the *States* dominions; and that they ſhall have the military power in the moſt conſiderable of the reſt; which is, in effect, to be the abſolute ſovereigns of the whole. And the *Hollanders* have already made ſuch good uſe of their time, that, in conjunction with our general, the oppreſſions of *Flanders* are much greater than ever.

And this treatment, which we have received from our two principal allies, hath been pretty well copied by moſt other princes in the confederacy, with whom we have any dealings. For inſtance: ſeven *Portugueſe* regiments, after the battle of *Almanza*, went off with the reſt of that broken army to *Catalonia*: the king of *Portugal* ſaid he was not able to pay them, while they were out of his country; the QUEEN conſented therefore to do it herſelf, provided the king would raiſe as many more to ſupply their place. This he engaged to do, but never performed. Notwithſtanding which, his ſubſidies

ſidies were conſtantly paid him, by my lord *Godolphin*, for almoſt four years, without any deduction upon account of thoſe ſeven regiments; directly contrary to the ſeventh article of our offenſive alliance with that crown, where it is agreed, that a deduction ſhall be made out of thoſe ſubſidies, in proportion to the number of men wanting in that complement which the king is to maintain. But, whatever might have been the reaſons for this proceeding, it ſeems they are above the underſtanding of the [*i*] preſent lord *treaſurer*; who, not entering into thoſe refinements of paying the *public* money upon *private* conſiderations, hath been ſo uncourtly as to ſtop it. This diſappointment, I ſuppoſe, hath put the court of *Liſbon* upon other expedients, of raiſing the price of forage, ſo as to force us either to leſſen our number of troops, or be at a double expence in maintaining them; and this at a time, when their own product, as well as the import of corn, was never greater; and of demanding a duty upon the ſoldiers cloaths we carried over for thoſe troops, which have been their ſole defence againſt an inveterate enemy; and whoſe example might have infuſed courage, as well as taught them diſcipline, if their ſpirits had been capable of receiving either.

In order to augment our forces every year in the ſame proportion as thoſe for whom we fight diminiſh theirs, we have been obliged to hire troops

[*i*] Earl of *Oxford*.

from ſeveral princes of the empire, whoſe miniſters and reſidents here have perpetually importuned the court with unreaſonable demands, under which our late miniſters thought fit to be paſſive. For thoſe demands were always backed with a threat to recall their ſoldiers; which was a thing not to be heard of, becauſe it might *diſcontent the Dutch*. In the mean time, thoſe princes never ſent their contingent to the *Emperor*, as, by the laws of the empire, they are obliged to do; but gave, for their excuſe, that we had already hired all they could poſſibly ſpare.

But if all this be true; if, according to what I have affirmed, we began this war contrary to reaſon; if, as the other party themſelves, upon all occaſions, acknowledge, the ſucceſs we have had was more than we could reaſonably expect; if, after all our ſucceſs, we have not made that uſe of it, which, in reaſon, we ought to have done; if we have made weak and fooliſh bargains with our allies; ſuffered them tamely to break every article even in thoſe bargains to our diſadvantage, and allowed them to treat us with inſolence and contempt at the very inſtant when we were gaining towns, provinces, and kingdoms for them at the price of our ruin, and without any proſpect of intereſt to ourſelves; if we have conſumed all our ſtrength in attacking the enemy on the ſtrongeſt ſide, where (as the old duke of *Schomberg* expreſſed it) *to engage with* France *was to take a bull by the horns*; and left wholly unattempted that part of the war,

war, which could only enable us to continue or to end it; if all this, I ſay, be our caſe, it is a very obvious queſtion to aſk, by what motives, or what management, we are thus become the *dupes* and *bubbles of Europe?* Sure it cannot be owing to the ſtupidity ariſing from the coldneſs of our climate; ſince thoſe among our allies, who have given us moſt reaſon to complain, are as far removed from the ſun as ourſelves.

If, in laying open the real cauſes of our preſent miſery, I am forced to ſpeak with ſome freedom, I think it will require no apology. Reputation is the ſmalleſt ſacrifice thoſe can make us, who have been the inſtruments of our ruin; becauſe it is that for which, in all probability, they have the leaſt value. So that, in expoſing the actions of ſuch perſons, it cannot be ſaid, properly ſpeaking, to do them an injury. But, as it will be ſome ſatisfaction to our people to know by whom they have been ſo long abuſed, ſo it may be of great uſe to us, and our poſterity, not to truſt the ſafety of their country in the hands of thoſe, who act by ſuch principles, and from ſuch motives.

I have already obſerved, that when the counſels of this war were debated in the late king's time, a certain *great man* was then ſo averſe from entering into it, that he rather choſe to give up his employment, and tell the king he could ſerve him no longer. Upon that prince's death, although the grounds of our quarrel with *France* had received no manner of addition, yet this lord thought fit to al-

ter his ſentiments; for the ſcene was quite changed; his lordſhip, and the family with whom he was engaged by ſo complicated an alliance, were in the higheſt credit poſſible with the QUEEN. The treaſurer's ſtaff was ready for his lordſhip; the duke was to command the army, and the ducheſs, by her employments, and the favour ſhe was poſſeſſed of, to be always neareſt her majeſty's perſon; by which the whole power at home and abroad would be devolved upon that family. This was a proſpect ſo very inviting, that, to confeſs the truth, it could not be eaſily withſtood by any, who have ſo keen an appetite for wealth or power. By an agreement, ſubſequent to the grand alliance, we were to aſſiſt the *Dutch* with forty thouſand men, all to be commanded by the duke of *Marlborough*. So that, whether this war was prudently begun or not, it is plain that the true ſpring or motive of it was the aggrandizing a particular family; and, in ſhort, a war of the *general* and the *miniſtry*, and not of the *prince* or *people*; ſince thoſe very perſons were againſt it, when they knew the power, and conſequently the profit, would be in other hands.

With theſe meaſures fell in all that ſett of people, who are called the *monied men*; ſuch as had raiſed vaſt ſums by trading with ſtocks and funds, and lending upon great intereſt and premiums; whoſe perpetual harveſt is war, and whoſe beneficial way of traffick muſt very much decline by a peace.

In

In that whole chain of encroachments made upon us by the *Dutch*, which I have above deduced; and under thoſe ſeveral groſs impoſitions from other princes, if any one ſhould aſk, why our general continued ſo eaſy to the laſt? I know no other way ſo probable, or indeed ſo charitable, to account for it, as by that unmeaſurable love of wealth, which his beſt friends allow to be his predominant paſſion. However, I ſhall wave any thing that is perſonal upon this ſubject. I ſhall ſay nothing of thoſe great preſents made by ſeveral princes, which the ſoldiers uſed to call *winter-foraging*, and ſaid it was better than that of the *ſummer*; of two and half *per cent.* ſubſtracted out of all the ſubſidies we pay in thoſe parts, which amounts to no inconſiderable ſum; and laſtly, of the grand perquiſites, in a long ſucceſsful war, which are ſo amicably adjuſted between him and the *States*.

But when the war was thus begun, there ſoon fell in other incidents here at home, which made the continuance of it neceſſary for thoſe, who were the chief adviſers. The *whigs* were, at that time, out of all credit or conſideration. The reigning favourites had always carried what was called the *tory principles*, at leaſt as high as our conſtitution could bear; and moſt others, in great employments, were wholly in the church intereſt. Theſe, laſt, among whom were ſeveral perſons of the greateſt merit, quality, and conſequence, were not able to endure the many inſtances of pride, inſolence, avarice, and ambition, which thoſe favour-

ites began ſo eaſily to diſpoſe, nor to ſee them preſuming to be ſole diſpenſers of the royal favour. However, their oppoſition was to no purpoſe; they wreſtled with too great a power, and were ſoon cruſhed under it. For thoſe in poſſeſſion, finding they could never be quiet in their uſurpations, while others had any credit, who were at leaſt upon an equal foot of merit, began to make overtures to the diſcarded *whigs*, who would be content with any terms of accommodation. Thus commenced this *ſolemn league and covenant*, which hath ever ſince been cultivated with ſo much application. The great traders in money were wholly devoted to the *whigs*, who had firſt raiſed them. The army, the court, and the treaſury, continued under the old *deſpotic* adminiſtration: the *whigs* were received into employment, left to manage the parliament, cry down the landed intereſt, and worry the church. Mean time our allies, who were not ignorant, that all this artificial ſtructure had no true foundation in the hearts of the people, reſolved to make the beſt uſe of it as long as it ſhould laſt. And the general's credit being raiſed to a great height at home by our ſucceſs in *Flanders*, the *Dutch* began their gradual impoſitions; leſſening their *quotas*, breaking their ſtipulations, gariſoning the towns we took for them, without ſupplying their troops; with many other infringements: all which we were forced to ſubmit to, becauſe the general was *made eaſy*; becauſe the monied men at home were fond of the war; becauſe

the

the *whigs* were not firmly ſettled; and becauſe that exorbitant degree of power, which was built upon a ſuppoſed neceſſity of employing particular perſons, would go off in a peace. It is needleſs to add, that the emperor, and other princes, followed the example of the *Dutch*, and ſucceeded as well, for the ſame reaſons.

I have here imputed the continuance of the war to the mutual indulgence between our general and allies, wherein they both ſo well found their accounts; to the fears of the *money-changers*, leſt their *tables ſhould be overthrown*; to the deſigns of the *whigs*, who apprehended the loſs of their credit and employments in a peace; and to thoſe at home, who held their immoderate engroſſments of power and favour by no other tenure, than their own preſumption upon the neceſſity of affairs. The truth of this will appear indiſputable, by conſidering with what unanimity and concert theſe ſeveral parties acted towards that great end.

When the vote paſſed in the houſe of lords againſt any peace without *Spain* being reſtored to the *Auſtrian* family, the earl of *Wharton* told the houſe, that it was indeed impoſſible and impracticable to recover *Spain*; but however there were *certain reaſons* why ſuch a vote ſhould be made at at that time; which reaſons wanted no explanation: for the general and the miniſtry having refuſed to accept very advantageous offers of a peace, after the battle of *Ramilies*, were forced to take in a ſett of men, with a previous bargain to ſkreen them

from the conſequences of that miſcarriage. And accordingly, upon the firſt ſucceeding opportunity that fell, which was the [k] prince of *Denmark's* death, the chief leaders of the party were brought into ſeveral great employments.

Thus when the QUEEN was no longer able to bear the tyranny and inſolence of thoſe ungrateful ſervants, who, as they *waxed the fatter*, did but *kick the more*; our two great allies abroad, and our ſtock-jobbers at home, took immediate alarm; applied the neareſt way to the throne, by memorials and meſſages, jointly directing her majeſty not to change her ſecretary or treaſurer; who, for the true reaſons that theſe officious intermeddlers demanded their continuance, ought never to have been admitted into the leaſt degree of truſt; ſince what they did was nothing leſs than betraying the intereſt of their native country to thoſe princes, who, in their turns, were to do what they could to ſupport them in power at home.

Thus it plainly appears that there was a conſpiracy on all ſides to go on with thoſe meaſures, which muſt perpetuate the war; and a conſpiracy founded upon the intereſt and ambition of each party; which begat ſo firm an union, that, inſtead of wondering why it laſted ſo long, I am aſtoniſhed to think how it came to be broken. The prudence, courage and firmneſs of her majeſty, in all the ſteps of that great change, would, if the particulars were

[k] Prince *George* of *Denmark*, huſband to queen *Anne*.

truly

truly related, make a very ſhining part in her ſtory; nor is her judgment leſs to be admired, which directed her in the choice of perhaps the only perſons, who had ſkill, credit, and reſolution enough to be her inſtruments in overthrowing ſo many difficulties.

Some would pretend to leſſen the merit of this by telling us, that the rudeneſs, the tyranny, the oppreſſion, the ingratitude of the late favourites towards their miſtreſs were no longer to be borne. They produce inſtances to ſhew, how her majeſty was purſued through all her retreats, particularly at *Windſor*; where, after the enemy had poſſeſſed themſelves of every inch of ground, they at laſt attacked and ſtormed the caſtle, forcing the QUEEN to fly to an adjoining cottage, purſuant to the advice of *Solomon*, who tells us, *It is better to live on the houſe top, than with a ſcolding woman in a large houſe.* They would have it, that ſuch continued ill uſage was enough to enflame the meekeſt ſpirit. They blame the favourites in point of policy, and think it nothing extraordinary, that the QUEEN ſhould be at an end of her patience, and reſolve to diſcard them. But I am of another opinion, and think their proceedings were right. For nothing is ſo apt to break even the braveſt ſpirits as a continual chain of oppreſſions; one injury is beſt defended by a ſecond, and this by a third. By theſe ſteps the old *maſters of the palace* in *France* became [*l*] *maſters of the kingdom*; and by theſe ſteps

[*l*] See the Tale of a Tub.

a *ge-*

a *general during pleaſure* might have grown into a *general for life*, and a *general for life* into a *king*. So that I ſtill inſiſt upon it as a wonder, how her majeſty thus beſieged on all ſides was able to extricate herſelf.

Having thus mentioned the real cauſes, although diſguiſed under ſpecious pretences, which have ſo long continued the war, I muſt beg leave to reaſon a little with thoſe perſons, who are againſt any peace but what they call a *good one*; and explain themſelves, that no peace can be *good* without an entire reſtoration of *Spain* to the houſe of *Auſtria*. It is to be ſuppoſed, that what I am to ſay upon this part of the ſubject will have little influence on thoſe, whoſe particular ends or deſigns of any ſort lead them to wiſh the continuance of the war: I mean the general and our allies abroad, the knot of late favourites at home, the body of ſuch as traffic in ſtocks, and laſtly, that ſett of factious politicians, who were ſo violently bent at leaſt upon *clipping* our conſtitution in church and ſtate. Therefore I ſhall not apply myſelf to any of theſe, but to all others indifferently, whether *whigs* or *tories*, whoſe private intereſt is beſt anſwered by the welfare of their country. And if among theſe there be any, who think we ought to fight on till king *Charles* be quietly ſettled in the monarchy of *Spain*, I believe there are ſeveral points, which they have not thoroughly conſidered.

For firſt it is to be obſerved, that this reſolution againſt any peace without *Spain* is a new incident, grafted

grafted upon the original quarrel by the intrigues of a faction among us, who prevailed to give it the ſanction of a vote in both houſes of parliament, to juſtify thoſe whoſe intereſt lay in perpetuating the war. And as this proceeding was againſt the practice of all princes and ſtates, whoſe intentions were fair and honourable; ſo is it contrary to common prudence as well as juſtice, I might add, that it was impious too, by preſuming to controul events which are only in the hands of God. Ours and the *States* complaint againſt *France* and *Spain* are deduced in each of our declarations of war, and our pretenſions ſpecified in the *eighth article* of the grand alliance; but there is not in any of theſe the leaſt mention of demanding *Spain* for the *houſe* of *Auſtria*, or of refuſing any peace without that condition. Having already made an extract from both declarations of war, I ſhall here give a tranſlation of the *eighth article* in the grand alliance, which will put this matter out of diſpute.

The EIGHTH ARTICLE *of the* GRAND ALLIANCE.

WHEN the war is once undertaken, none of the parties ſhall have the liberty to enter upon a treaty of peace with the enemy, but jointly and in concert with the others. Nor is peace to be made without having firſt obtained a juſt and reaſonable ſatisfaction for his Cæſarean *majeſty, and for his royal majeſty of* Great-Britain, *and a particular ſecurity to the lords the* States-general *of their dominions, provinces, titles, navigation*

navigation and commerce: and a ſufficient proviſion, that the kingdoms of France *and* Spain *be never united, or come under the government of the ſame perſon, or that the ſame man may never be king of both kingdoms; and particularly, that the* French *may never be in poſſeſſion of the* Spaniſh Weſt-Indies; *and that they may not have the liberty of navigation for conveniency of trade, under any pretence whatſoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed, that the ſubjects of* Great-Britain *and* Holland *may have full power to uſe and enjoy all the ſame privileges, rights, immunities, and liberties of commerce by land and ſea in* Spain, *in the* Mediterranean, *and in all the places and countries which the late king of* Spain, *at the time of his death, was in poſſeſſion of, as well in* Europe *as elſewhere, as they did then uſe and enjoy; or which the ſubjects of both, or each nation, could uſe and enjoy, by virtue of any right, obtained before the death of the ſaid king of* Spain, *either by treaties, conventions, cuſtom, or any other way whatſoever.*

Here we ſee the demands intended to be inſiſted on by the allies upon any treaty of peace are, a juſt and reaſonable ſatisfaction for the *Emperor* and king of *Great-Britain*, a ſecurity to the *States-general* for their dominions, *&c.* and a ſufficient proviſion, that *France* and *Spain* be never united under the ſame man as king of both kingdoms. The reſt relates to the liberty of trade and commerce for us and the *Dutch*; but not a ſyllable of engaging to diſpoſſeſs the duke of *Anjou*.

But

But to know how this new language of *no peace without Spain*, was firſt introduced, and at laſt prevailed among us, we muſt begin a great deal higher.

It was the partition treaty, which begot the will in favour of the duke of *Anjou*; for this naturally led the *Spaniards* to receive a prince ſupported by a great power, whoſe intereſt, as well as affection, engaged them to preſerve that monarchy entire, rather than to oppoſe him in favour of another family, who muſt expect aſſiſtance from a number of confederates, whoſe principal members had already diſpoſed of what did not belong to them, and by a previous treaty parcelled out the monarchy of *Spain*.

Thus the duke of *Anjou* got into the full poſſeſſion of all the kingdoms and ſtates belonging to that monarchy, as well in the old world as the new. And whatever the houſe of *Auſtria* pretended, from their memorials, to us and the *States*, it was, at that time, but too apparent, that the inclinations of the *Spaniards* were on the duke's ſide.

However, a war was reſolved; and, in order to carry it on with great vigour, a grand alliance formed, wherein the ends propoſed to be obtained are plainly and diſtinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleaſed God, in the courſe of this war, to bleſs the arms of the allies with remarkable ſucceſſes; by which we were ſoon put into a condition of demanding and expecting ſuch terms of peace, as we propoſed to ourſelves when we

we began the war. But, inſtead of this, our victories only ſerved to lead us on to further viſionary proſpects; advantage was taken of the ſanguine temper, which ſo many ſucceſſes had wrought the nation up to; new romantic views were propoſed, and the old, reaſonable, ſober deſign was forgot.

This was the artifice of thoſe here, who were ſure to grow richer, as the publick became poorer; and who, after the reſolutions which the two houſes were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the war with ſafety to themſelves, till malt and land were mortgaged, till a general exciſe was eſtabliſhed, and the *dizieme denier* raiſed by *collectors in red coats*. And this was juſt the circumſtance, which it ſuited their intereſt to be in.

The houſe of *Auſtria* approved this ſcheme with reaſon; ſince whatever would be obtained by the blood and treaſure of others, was to accrue to that family, while they only lent their name to the cauſe.

The *Dutch* might, perhaps, have grown reſty under their burthen; but care was likewiſe taken of that by a *Barrier-treaty* made with the *States*, which deſerveth ſuch epithets as I care not to beſtow; but may perhaps conſider it, at a proper occaſion, in a [*m*] *diſcourſe* by itſelf.

By this treaty, the condition of the war, with reſpect to the *Dutch*, was wiſely altered; they fought no longer for ſecurity, but for grandeur;

[*m*] Which *diſcourſe* follows next in this volume.

and

and we, inſtead of labouring to make them *ſafe*, muſt beggar ourſelves to make them *formidable*.

Will any one contend, that, if at the treaty of *Gertruydenburgh*, we could have been ſatisfied with ſuch terms of a peace, as we propoſed to ourſelves by the grand alliance, the *French* would not have allowed them? It is plain they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to inſiſt on when the war began; and they had reaſon to grant, as well as we to demand them; ſince conditions of peace do certainly turn upon events of war. But ſurely there is ſome meaſure to be obſerved in this; thoſe, who have defended the proceedings of our negotiators at the treaty of *Gertruydenburgh*, dwell very much upon their zeal and patience in endeavouring to work the *French* up to their demands; but ſay nothing to juſtify thoſe demands, or the probability that *France* would ever accept them. Some of the articles in that treaty were ſo very extravagant, that, in all human probability, we could not have obtained them by a ſucceſsful war of forty years. One of them was inconſiſtent with common reaſon; wherein the confederates reſerved to themſelves full liberty of demanding what further conditions they ſhould think fit; and, in the mean time, *France* was to deliver up ſeveral of their ſtrongeſt towns in a month. Theſe articles were very gravely ſigned by our plenipotentiaries, and thoſe of *Holland*; but not by the *French*, although it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay, they were brought over by

by the ſecretary of the embaſſy; and the miniſters here prevailed on the QUEEN to execute a ratification of articles, which only one part had ſigned. This was an abſurdity in form, as well as in reaſon; becauſe the uſual form of a ratification is with a preamble, ſhewing; *that whereas our miniſters, and thoſe of the allies, and of the enemy, have ſigned*, &c. *We ratify*, &c. The [*n*] perſon, who brought over the articles, ſaid in all companies (and perhaps believed) that it was a pity we had not demanded more; for the *French* were in a diſpoſition to refuſe us nothing we would aſk. One of our plenipotentiaries affected to have the ſame concern; and particularly, that we had not obtained ſome further ſecurity for the empire on the *Upper Rhine*.

What could be the deſign of all this grimace, but to amuſe the people, and to raiſe ſtocks for their friends in the ſecret to ſell to advantage? I have too great a reſpect for the abilities of thoſe, who acted in this negotiation, to believe they hoped for any other iſſue from it, than that we found by the event. Give me leave to ſuppoſe, the continuance of the war was the thing at heart among thoſe in power, both abroad and at home; and then I can eaſily ſhew the conſiſtency of their proceedings; otherwiſe they are wholly unaccountable and abſurd. Did thoſe, who inſiſted on ſuch wild demands, ever ſincerely intend a peace? Did they

[*n*] *Horatio Walpole*, ſecretary to that embaſſy.

really

really think, that going on with the war was more eligible for their country, than the leaſt abatement of thoſe conditions? Was the ſmalleſt of them worth ſix millions a year, and an hundred thouſand men's lives? Was there no way to provide for the ſafety of *Britain*, or the ſecurity of its trade, but by the *French* king's turning his arms to beat his own grandſon out of *Spain?* If theſe able ſtateſmen were ſo truly concerned for our trade, which they made the pretence of the war's beginning, as well as continuance; why did they ſo neglect it in thoſe very preliminaries, where the enemy made ſo many conceſſions, and where all that related to the advantage of *Holland*, or the other confederates, was expreſly ſettled? But whatever concerned us was to be left to a general treaty; no *tariff* agreed on with *France* or the *Low-countries*, only the *Schelde* was to remain ſhut, which muſt have ruined our commerce with *Antwerp*. Our trade with *Spain* was referred the ſame way; but this they will pretend to be of no conſequence, becauſe that kingdom was to be under the houſe of *Auſtria*, and we have already made a treaty with king *Charles*. I have indeed heard of a treaty made, by Mr. *Stanhope*, with that prince, for ſettling our commerce with *Spain:* but whatever it were, there was another between us and *Holland*, which went hand in hand with it, I mean that of *Barrier*, wherein a clauſe was inſerted, by which all advantages propoſed for *Britain* are to be in common with *Holland*.

Another point, which I doubt thoſe have not conſidered, who are againſt any peace without *Spain*, is, that the face of affairs in *Chriſtendom*, ſince the *Emperor's* death, hath been very much changed. By this accident, the views and intereſts of ſeveral princes and ſtates in the alliance have taken a new turn, and, I believe, it will be found that ours ought to do ſo too. We have ſufficiently blundered once already, by changing our meaſures with regard to a peace, while our affairs continued in the ſame poſture; and it will be too much in conſcience to blunder again by *not* changing the firſt, when the others are ſo much altered.

To have a prince of the *Auſtrian* family on the throne of *Spain* is, undoubtedly, more deſirable than one of the houſe of *Bourbon*; but to have the *empire* and *Spaniſh* monarchy united in the ſame perſon is a dreadful conſideration, and directly oppoſite to that wiſe principle on which the eighth article of the alliance is founded.

To this, perhaps, it will be objected, that the indolent character of the *Auſtrian* princes, the wretched œconomy of that government, the want of a naval force, the remote diſtance of their ſeveral territories from each other, would never ſuffer an *emperor*, although at the ſame time king of *Spain*, to become formidable: on the contrary, that his dependance muſt continually be on *Great-Britain*; and the advantages of trade, by a peace founded upon that condition, would ſoon make us amends for all the expences of the war.

In

In anſwer to this, let us conſider the circumſtances we muſt be in, before ſuch a peace could be obtained, if it were at all practicable. We muſt become not only poor for the preſent, but reduced, by further mortgages, to a ſtate of beggary for endleſs years to come. Compare ſuch a weak condition as this with ſo great an acceſſion of ſtrength to *Auſtria*; and then determine how much an *emperor*, in ſuch a ſtate of affairs, would either fear or need *Britain*.

Conſider that the compariſon is not formed between a prince of the houſe of *Auſtria*, Emperor and king of *Spain*, and with a prince of the *Bourbon* family, king of *France* and *Spain*; but between a prince of the latter only king of *Spain*, and one of the former uniting both crowns in his own perſon.

What returns of gratitude can we expect, when we are no longer wanted? Hath all that we have hitherto done for the imperial family been taken as a favour, or only received as the due of the *auguſtiſſima caſa?*

Will the houſe of *Auſtria* yield the leaſt acre of land, the leaſt article of ſtrained and even uſurped prerogative, to reſettle the mind of thoſe princes in the alliance, who are alarmed at the conſequences of this turn of affairs occaſioned by the *Emperor's* death? We are aſſured it never will. Do we then imagine that thoſe princes, who dread the overgrown power of the *Auſtrian* as much as that of the *Bourbon* family, will continue in our alliance upon

a ſyſtem contrary to that which they engaged with us upon? For inſtance: what can the duke of *Savoy* expect in ſuch a caſe? Will he have any choice left him but that of being a ſlave and a frontier to *France*; or a *vaſſal*, in the utmoſt extent of the word, to the imperial court? Will he not therefore of the two evils chuſe the leaſt; by ſubmitting to a maſter who hath no immediate claim upon him, and to whoſe family he is nearly allied; rather than to another, who hath already revived ſeveral claims upon him, and threatens to revive more?

Nor are the *Dutch* more inclined than the reſt of *Europe*, that the *Empire* and *Spain* ſhould be united in king *Charles*, whatever they may now pretend. *On the contrary, it is known to ſeveral perſons, that upon the death of the late emperor* Joſeph, *the* States *reſolved that thoſe two powers ſhould not be joined in the ſame perſon*; and this they determined as a fundamental maxim by which they intended to proceed. So that *Spain* was firſt given up by *them*; and ſince they maintained no troops in that kingdom, it ſhould ſeem that they underſtand the duke of *Anjou* to be lawful monarch.

Thirdly, Thoſe who are againſt any peace without *Spain*, if they be ſuch as no way find their private account by the war, may perhaps change their ſentiments if they will reflect a little upon our preſent condition.

I had two reaſons for not ſooner publiſhing this diſcourſe; the firſt was, becauſe I would give way

to

to others, who might argue very well upon the ſame ſubject from general topicks and reaſon, although they might be ignorant of ſeveral facts which I had the opportunity to know. The ſecond was, becauſe I found it would be neceſſary, in the courſe of this argument, to ſay ſomething of the ſtate to which the war hath reduced us; at the ſame time I knew, that ſuch a diſcovery ought to be made as late as poſſible, and at another juncture would not only be very indiſcreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.

It is the folly of too many to miſtake the echo of a *London* coffee-houſe for the voice of the kingdom. The city coffee-houſes have been for ſome years filled with people, whoſe fortunes depend upon the *Bank*, *Eaſt-India*, or ſome other ſtock. Every new fund to theſe is like a new mortgage to an uſurer, whoſe compaſſion for a young heir is exactly the ſame with that of a ſtock-jobber to the landed gentry. At the court end of the town, the like places of reſort are frequented either by men out of place, and conſequently enemies to the preſent miniſtry, or by officers of the army: no wonder then if the general cry in all ſuch meetings be againſt any peace either *with* Spain or *without*; which, in other words, is no more than this; that diſcontented men deſire another change of the miniſtry; that ſoldiers would be glad to keep their commiſſions; and that the creditors have money ſtill, and would have the debtors borrow on at the

old extorting rate, while they have any ſecurity to give.

Now to give the moſt ignorant reader ſome idea of our preſent circumſtances, without troubling him or myſelf with computations in form; every body knows that our land and malt tax amount annually to about two millions and an half. All other branches of the revenue are mortgaged to pay intereſt for what we have already borrowed. The yearly charge of the war is uſually about ſix millions; to make up which ſum we are forced to take up, on the credit of new funds, about three millions and an half. This laſt year the computed charge of the war came to above a million more than all the funds the parliament could contrive were ſufficient to pay intereſt for; and ſo we have been forced to divide a deficiency of twelve hundred thouſand pounds among the ſeveral branches of our expence. This is a demonſtration that, if the war be to laſt another campaign, it will be impoſſible to find funds for ſupplying it without mortgaging the malt-tax, or taking ſome other method equally deſperate.

If the peace be made this winter, we are then to conſider what circumſtances we ſhall be in towards paying a debt of about fifty millions, which is a ſixth part of the purchaſe of the whole iſland, if it were to be ſold.

Towards clearing ourſelves of this monſtrous incumbrance, ſome of theſe annuities will expire, or pay off the principal in thirty, forty, or an hundred

dred years; the bulk of the debt muſt be leſſened gradually, by the beſt management we can, out of what will remain of the land and malt-taxes, after paying guards and garriſons, and maintaining and ſupplying our fleet in the time of peace. I have not ſkill enough to compute what will be left, after theſe neceſſary charges, towards annually clearing ſo vaſt a debt; but believe it muſt be very little: however, it is plain that both theſe taxes muſt be continued, as well for ſupporting the government as becauſe we have no other means for paying off the principal. And ſo likewiſe muſt all the other funds remain for paying the intereſt. How long a time this muſt require, how ſteddy an adminiſtration, and how undiſturbed a ſtate of affairs, both at home and abroad, let others determine.

However, ſome people think all this very reaſonable; and that, ſince the ſtruggle hath been for peace and ſafety, poſterity, which is to partake the benefit, ought to ſhare in the expence; as if, at the breaking out of this war, there had been ſuch a conjuncture of affairs as never happened before, nor would ever happen again. It is wonderful that our anceſtors, in all their wars, ſhould never fall under ſuch a neceſſity; that we meet no examples of it in *Greece* and *Rome*; that no other nation in *Europe* ever knew any thing like it, except *Spain* about an hundred and twenty years ago, when they drew it upon themſelves by their own folly, and have ſuffered for it ever ſince; no doubt, we ſhall teach poſterity wiſdom, but they will be

apt to think the purchaſe too dear, and I wiſh they may ſtand to the bargain we have made in their names.

It is eaſy to entail debts on ſucceeding ages, and to hope they will be able and willing to pay them; but how to enſure peace for any term of years is difficult enough to apprehend. Will human nature ever ceaſe to have the ſame paſſions, princes to entertain deſigns of intereſt or ambition, and occaſions of quarrel to ariſe? May not we ourſelves, by the variety of events and incidents which happen in the world, be under a neceſſity of recovering towns out of the very hands of thoſe for whom we are now ruining our country to take them? Neither can it be ſaid, that thoſe *ſtates*, with whom we may probably differ, will be in as bad a condition as ourſelves; for, by the circumſtances of our ſituation, and the impoſitions of our allies, we are more exhauſted than either they or the enemy; and, by the nature of our government, the corruption of our manners, and the oppoſition of factions, we ſhall be more ſlow in recovering.

It will, no doubt, be a mighty comfort to our grand-children, when they ſee a few rags hung up in *Weſtminſter-hall*, which coſt an hundred millions, whereof they are paying the arrears, to boaſt, as beggars do, that their grandfathers were rich and great.

I have often reflected on that miſtaken notion of credit, ſo boaſted of by the advocates of the late miniſtry: Was not all that credit built upon funds raiſed

raiſed by the landed men, whom they now ſo much hate and deſpiſe? Is not the greateſt part of thoſe funds raiſed from the growth and product of land? Muſt not the whole debt be entirely paid, and our fleets and garriſons be maintained, by the land and malt-tax after a peace? If they call it credit to run ten millions in debt without parliamentary ſecurity, by which the publick is defrauded of almoſt half; I muſt think ſuch credit to be dangerous, illegal, and perhaps treaſonable. Neither hath any thing gone further to ruin the nation than their boaſted credit. For my own part, when I ſaw this falſe credit ſink, upon the change of the miniſtry, I was ſingular enough to conceive it a good omen. It ſeemed as if the young extravagant heir had got a new ſteward, and was reſolved to look into his eſtate before things grew deſperate, which made the uſurers forbear feeding him with money, as they uſed to do.

Since the monied men are ſo fond of war, I ſhould be glad they would furniſh out one campaign at their own charge: it is not above ſix or ſeven millions; and I dare engage to make it out, that, when they have done this, inſtead of contributing equal to the landed men, they will have their full principal and intereſt at ſix *per cent.* remaining of all the money they ever lent to the government.

Without this reſource, or ſome other equally miraculous, it is impoſſible for us to continue the war upon the ſame foot. I have already obſerved, that

that the laſt funds of intereſt fell ſhort above a million, although the perſons moſt converſant in ways and means employed their utmoſt invention; ſo that, of neceſſity, we muſt be ſtill more defective next campaign. But, perhaps, our allies will make up this deficiency on our ſide by greater efforts on their own. Quite the contrary; both the *Emperor* and *Holland* failed this year in ſeveral articles; and ſignified to us ſome time ago. that they cannot keep up to the ſame proportions in the next. We have gained a noble barrier for the latter, and they have nothing more to demand or deſire. The *Emperor*, however ſanguine he may now affect to appear, will, I ſuppoſe, be ſatisfied with *Naples*, *Sicily*, *Milan*, and his other acquiſitions, rather than engage in a long hopeleſs war, for the recovery of *Spain*, to which his allies the *Dutch* will neither give their aſſiſtance, nor conſent. So that, ſince we have done their buſineſs, ſince they have no further ſervice for our arms, and we have no more money to give them; and laſtly, ſince we neither deſire any recompence, nor expect any thanks, we ought in pity to be diſmiſſed, and have leave to ſhift for ourſelves. They are ripe for a peace, to enjoy and cultivate what we have conquered for them; and ſo are we to recover, if poſſible, the effects of their hardſhips upon us. The firſt overtures from *France* are made to *England* upon ſafe and honourable terms; we, who bore the burthen of the war, ought in reaſon to have the greateſt ſhare in making the peace. If we

do

do not hearken to a peace, others certainly will, and get the advantage of us there, as they have done in the war. We know the *Dutch* have perpetually threatened us, that they would enter into ſeparate meaſures of a peace; and, by the ſtrength of that argument, as well as by *other powerful motives*, prevailed on thoſe who were then at the helm, to comply with them on any terms, rather than put an end to a war, which every year brought them ſuch great acceſſions to their wealth and power. Whoever falls off, a peace will follow; and then we muſt be content with ſuch conditions as our allies, out of their great concern for our ſafety and intereſt, will pleaſe to chuſe. They have no further occaſion for fighting, they have gained their point, and they now tell us it is *our war*; ſo that, in common juſtice, it ought to be *our peace*.

All we can propoſe by the deſperate ſteps of pawning our land or malt-tax, or erecting a general exciſe, is only to raiſe a fund of intereſt for running us annually four millions further in debt, without any proſpect of ending the war ſo well as we can do at preſent. And when we have ſunk the only unengaged revenues we had left, our incumbrances muſt, of neceſſity, remain perpetual.

We have hitherto lived upon expedients, which, in time, will certainly deſtroy any conſtitution, whether civil or natural; and there was no country in *Chriſtendom*, had leſs occaſion for them than ours. We have dieted a healthy body into a conſumption,

ſumption, by plying it with phyſick inſtead of food. Art will help us no longer, and, if we cannot recover by letting the remains of nature work, we muſt inevitably die.

What arts have been uſed to poſſeſs the people with a ſtrong deluſion, that *Britain* muſt infallibly be ruined, without the recovery of *Spain* to the houſe of *Auſtria?* Making the ſafety of a great and powerful kingdom, as ours was then, to depend upon an event, which, even after a war of miraculous ſucceſſes, proves impracticable. As if princes and great miniſters could find no way of ſettling the public tranquillity, without changing the poſſeſſions of kingdoms, and forcing ſovereigns upon a people againſt their inclinations. Is there no ſecurity for the iſland of *Britain*, unleſs a king of *Spain* be dethroned by the hands of his grandfather? Has the enemy no cautionary towns and ſea-ports to give us for ſecuring trade? Can he not deliver us poſſeſſion of ſuch places as would put him in a worſe condition, whenever he ſhould perfidiouſly renew the war? The preſent king of *France* has but few years to live by the courſe of nature, and, doubtleſs, would deſire to end his days in peace. Grandfathers in private families are not obſerved to have great influence on their grandſons; and, I believe, they have much leſs among princes; however, when the authority of a parent is gone, is it likely that *Philip* will be directed by a brother againſt his own intereſt, and that of his ſubjects? Have not thoſe two realms

their

their ſeparate maxims of policy, which muſt operate in times of peace? Theſe at leaſt are probabilities; and cheaper, by ſix millions a year, than recovering *Spain*, or continuing the war, both which ſeem abſolutely impoſſible.

But the common queſtion is, if we muſt now ſurrender *Spain*, what have we been fighting for all this while? The anſwer is ready: we have been fighting for the ruin of the public intereſt, and the advancement of a private. We have been fighting to raiſe the wealth and grandeur of a particular family; to enrich uſurers and ſtock-jobbers, and to cultivate the pernicious deſigns of a faction by deſtroying the landed intereſt. The nation begins now to think theſe *bleſſings* are not worth fighting for any longer, and therefore deſires a peace.

But the advocates on the other ſide cry out, that we might have had a better peace, than is now in agitation, above two years ago. Suppoſing this to be true, I do aſſert, that, by parity of reaſon, we muſt expect one juſt ſo much the worſe about two years hence. If thoſe in power could then have given us a better peace, more is their infamy and guilt, that they did not. Why did they inſiſt upon conditions, which they were certain would never be granted? We allow, it was in their power to have put a good end to the war, and left the nation in ſome hope of recovering itſelf. And this is what we charge them with as anſwerable to God, their country, and poſterity; that the bleeding condition

condition of their fellow-ſubjects was a feather in the balance with their private ends.

When we offer to lament the heavy debts and poverty of the nation, it is pleaſant to hear ſome men anſwer all that can be ſaid, by crying up the power of *England*, the courage of *England*, the inexhauſtible riches of *England*. I have heard a [o] man very ſanguine upon this ſubject, with a good employment for life, and a hundred thouſand pounds in the funds, bidding us *take courage*, and *warranting, that all would go well.* This is the ſtyle of men at eaſe, *who lay heavy burthens upon others, which they would not touch with one of their fingers.* I have known ſome people ſuch ill computers, as to imagine the many millions in ſtocks and annuities are ſo much real wealth in the nation; whereas every farthing of it is entirely loſt to us, ſcattered in *Holland*, *Germany*, and *Spain*; and the landed men, who now pay the intereſt, muſt at laſt pay the principal.

Fourthly, thoſe who are againſt any peace without *Spain*, have, I doubt, been ill informed as to the low condition of *France*, and the mighty conſequences of our ſucceſſes. As to the firſt, it muſt be confeſſed, that, after the battle of *Ramillies*, the *French* were ſo diſcouraged with their frequent loſſes, and ſo impatient for a peace, that their king was reſolved to comply upon any reaſonable terms. But when his ſubjects were informed of our exor-

[o] The late lord *Halifax*.

bitant

bitant demands, they grew jealous of his honour, and were unanimous to aſſiſt him in continuing the war at any hazard, rather than ſubmit. This fully reſtored his authority; and the ſupplies he hath received from the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, which in all are computed, ſince the war, to amount to four hundred millions of livres, and all in *ſpecie*, had enabled him to pay his troops. Beſides, the money is ſpent in his own country; and he hath ſince waged war in the moſt thriſty manner by acting on the defenſive; compounding with us every campaign for a town, which coſts us fifty times more than it is worth, either as to the value or the conſequences. Then he is at no charge for a fleet, further than providing privateers, wherewith his ſubjects carry on a piratical war at their own expence, and he ſhares in the profit; which hath been very conſiderable to *France*, and of infinite diſadvantage to us, not only by the perpetual loſſes we have ſuffered, to an immenſe value, but by the general diſcouragement of trade, on which we ſo much depend. All this conſidered, with the circumſtances of that government, where the prince is maſter of the lives and fortunes of ſo mighty a kingdom, ſhews that monarch not to be ſo ſunk in his affairs as we have imagined, and have long flattered ourſelves with the hopes of.

Thoſe who are againſt *any peace without Spain*, ſeem likewiſe to have been miſtaken in judging our victories, and other ſucceſſes, to have been of greater conſequence than they really were.

When

When our armies take a town in *Flanders*, the *Dutch* are immediately put into *poſſeſſion*, and we at home make *bonfires*. I have ſometimes pitied the deluded people, to ſee them ſquandering away their fewel to ſo little purpoſe. For example: what is it to us that *Bouchain* is taken, about which the warlike politicians of the coffee-houſe make ſuch a clutter? What, though the garriſon ſurrendered priſoners of war, and in ſight of the enemy? We are not now in a condition to be fed with points of honour. What advantage have we, but that of ſpending three or four millions more to get another town for the *States*, which may open them a new country for *contributions*, and increaſe the perquiſites of the general?

In that war of ten years under the late king, when our commanders and ſoldiers were raw and unexperienced, in compariſon of what they are at preſent, we loſt battles and towns, as well as we gained them of late, ſince thoſe gentlemen have better learned their trade; yet we bore up then, as the *French* do now: nor was there any thing deciſive in their ſucceſſes; they grew weary as well as we, and at laſt conſented to a peace, under which we might have been happy enough, if it had not been followed by that wiſe *treaty of partition*, which revived the flame that hath laſted ever ſince. I ſee nothing elſe in the modern way of making war, but that the ſide, which can hold out longeſt, will end it with moſt advantage. In ſuch a cloſe country as *Flanders*, where it is carried on by ſieges,

the army that acts offenſively is at a much greater expence of men and money; and there is hardly a town taken, in the common forms, where the beſiegers have not the worſe of the bargain. I never yet knew a ſoldier, who would not affirm, that any town might be taken, if you were content to be at the charge. If you will count upon ſacrificing ſo much blood and treaſure, the reſt is all a regular, eſtabliſhed method, which cannot fail. When the king of *France*, in the times of his grandeur, ſat down before a town, his generals and engineers would often fix the day when it ſhould ſurrender: the enemy, ſenſible of all this, hath, for ſome years paſt, avoided a battle, where he hath ſo ill ſucceeded, and taken a ſurer way to conſume us, by letting our courage evaporate againſt ſtones and rubbiſh, and ſacrificing a ſingle town to a campaign, which he can ſo much better afford to loſe, than we to take.

Laſtly, thoſe who are ſo violent againſt *any peace*, without *Spain* being reſtored to the houſe of *Auſtria*, have not, I believe, caſt their eye upon a cloud gathering in the north, which we have helped to raiſe, and may quickly break in a ſtorm upon our heads.

The northern war hath been on foot almoſt ever ſince our breach with *France*. The ſucceſs of it is various; but one effect to be apprehended was always the ſame, that ſooner or later it would involve us in its conſequences; and that whenever this happened, let our ſucceſs be never ſo great againſt

France, from that moment *France* would have the advantage.

By our guarantee of the treaty of *Travendall*, we were obliged to hinder the king of *Denmark* from engaging in a war with *Sweden*. It was, at that time, underſtood by all parties, and ſo declared even by the *Britiſh* miniſters, that this engagement ſpecially regarded *Denmark's* not aſſiſting king *Auguſtus*. But however, if this had not been ſo, yet our obligation to *Sweden* ſtood in force, by virtue of former treaties with that crown, which were all revived and confirmed by a ſubſequent one concluded at the *Hague*, by Sir *Joſeph Williamſon* and Monſieur *Lilienroot*, about the latter end of the king's reign.

However, the war in the north proceeded; and our not aſſiſting *Sweden* was at leaſt as well excuſed by the war which we were entangled in, as his not contributing his contingent to the empire, whereof he is a member, was excuſed by the preſſures he lay under, having a confederacy to deal with.

In this war, the king of *Sweden* was victorious; and what dangers were we not then expoſed to? What fears were we not in? He marched into *Saxony*; and, if he had really been in the *French* intereſt, might at once put us under the greateſt difficulties. But the torrent turned another away, and he contented himſelf with impoſing on his enemy the treaty of *Alt Raſtadt*; by which king *Auguſtus* makes an abſolute ceſſion of the crown of *Poland*, renounces any title to it, acknowledges *Staniſlaus*;

Staniſlaus; and then both he and the king of *Sweden* join in deſiring the guarantee of *England* and *Holland*. The QUEEN did not indeed give this guarantee in form; but, as a ſteps towards it, the title of *king* was given to *Staniſlaus* by a letter from her majeſty; and the ſtrongeſt aſſurances were given to the *Swediſh* miniſter, in her majeſty's name, and in a committee of council, that the guarantee ſhould ſpeedily be granted; and that, in the mean while, it was the ſame thing as if the forms were paſſed.

In 1708, king *Auguſtus* made the campaign in *Flanders:* what meaſures he might at that time take, or of what nature the arguments might be that he made uſe of, is not known: but immediately after he breaks through all he had done, marches into *Poland*, and re-aſſumes the crown.

After this we apprehend, that the peace of the empire might be endangered; and therefore entered into an act of guarantee for the neutrality of it. The king of *Sweden* refuſed, upon ſeveral accounts, to ſubmit to the terms of this treaty; particularly becauſe we went out of the empire to cover *Poland* and *Jutland*, but did not go out of it to cover the territories of *Sweden*.

Let us therefore conſider what is our caſe at preſent. If the king of *Sweden* return and get the better, he will think himſelf under no obligation of having any regard to the intereſts of the allies; but will naturally purſue, according to his own expreſſion, *his enemy wherever he finds him*. In

this caſe, the *corps* of the neutrality is obliged to oppoſe him; and ſo we are engaged in a ſecond war, before the firſt be ended.

If the northern confederates ſucceed againſt *Sweden*, how ſhall we be able to preſerve the balance of power in the north, ſo eſſential to our trade, as well as in many other reſpects? What will become of that great ſupport of the *proteſtant intereſt* in *Germany*, which is the footing that the *Swedes* now have in the empire? Or who ſhall anſwer, that theſe princes, after they have ſettled the north to their minds, may not take a fancy to look ſouthward, and make our peace with *France* according to their own ſchemes?

And laſtly, if the king of *Pruſſia*, the elector of *Hanover*, and other princes, whoſe dominions lie contiguous, be forced to draw from thoſe armies which act againſt *France*, we muſt live in hourly expectation of having thoſe troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this recall may happen in the midſt of a ſiege, or on the eve of a battle. Is it therefore our intereſt to toil on in a ruinous war for an impracticable end, till one of theſe caſes ſhall happen, or to get under ſhelter before the ſtorm?

There is no doubt but the preſent miniſtry (provided they could get over the obligations of honour and conſcience) might find their advantage in adviſing the continuance of the war, as well as the laſt did, although not in the ſame degree after the kingdom hath been ſo much exhauſted. They might

might prolong it, till the parliament deſire a peace; and, in the mean time, leave them in full poſſeſſion of power. Therefore it is plain, that their proceedings at preſent are meant to ſerve their country directly againſt their private intereſt; whatever clamour may be raiſed by thoſe, who, for the vileſt ends, would remove heaven and earth to oppoſe their meaſures. But they think it infinitely better to accept ſuch terms as will ſecure our trade, find a ſufficient barrier for the *States*, give *reaſonable ſatisfaction* to the *Emperor*, and reſtore the tranquillity of *Europe*, although without adding *Spain* to the empire; rather than go on in a languiſhing way, upon the vain expectation of ſome improbable turn for the recovery of that monarchy out of the *Bourbon* family; and at laſt be forced to a worſe peace, by ſome of the allies falling off, upon our utter inability to continue the war.

this caſe, the *corps* of the neutrality is obliged to oppoſe him; and ſo we are engaged in a ſecond war, before the firſt be ended.

If the northern confederates ſucceed againſt *Sweden*, how ſhall we be able to preſerve the balance of power in the north, ſo eſſential to our trade, as well as in many other reſpects? What will become of that great ſupport of the *proteſtant intereſt* in *Germany*, which is the footing that the *Swedes* now have in the empire? Or who ſhall anſwer, that theſe princes, after they have ſettled the north to their minds, may not take a fancy to look ſouthward, and make our peace with *France* according to their own ſchemes?

And laſtly, if the king of *Pruſſia*, the elector of *Hanover*, and other princes, whoſe dominions lie contiguous, be forced to draw from thoſe armies which act againſt *France*, we muſt live in hourly expectation of having thoſe troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this recall may happen in the midſt of a ſiege, or on the eve of a battle. Is it therefore our intereſt to toil on in a ruinous war for an impracticable end, till one of theſe caſes ſhall happen, or to get under ſhelter before the ſtorm?

There is no doubt but the preſent miniſtry (provided they could get over the obligations of honour and conſcience) might find their advantage in adviſing the continuance of the war, as well as the laſt did, although not in the ſame degree after the kingdom hath been ſo much exhauſted. They might

might prolong it, till the parliament deſire a peace; and, in the mean time, leave them in full poſſeſſion of power. Therefore it is plain, that their proceedings at preſent are meant to ſerve their country directly againſt their private intereſt; whatever clamour may be raiſed by thoſe, who, for the vileſt ends, would remove heaven and earth to oppoſe their meaſures. But they think it infinitely better to accept ſuch terms as will ſecure our trade, find a ſufficient barrier for the *States*, give *reaſonable ſatisfaction* to the *Emperor*, and reſtore the tranquillity of *Europe*, although without adding *Spain* to the empire; rather than go on in a languiſhing way, upon the vain expectation of ſome improbable turn for the recovery of that monarchy out of the *Bourbon* family; and at laſt be forced to a worſe peace, by ſome of the allies falling off, upon our utter inability to continue the war.

SOME REMARKS ON THE BARRIER TREATY BETWEEN HER MAJESTY AND THE STATES-GENERAL.

To which are added,

The ſaid BARRIER TREATY, with the two ſeparate ARTICLES; part of the Counter-project; the Sentiments of prince EUGENE and count SINZENDORF upon the ſaid treaty; and a Repreſentation of the *Engliſh* merchants at *Bruges*.

Written in the Year 1712.

PREFACE.

WHEN I publiſhed the diſcourſe called *The Conduct of the Allies*, I had thoughts either of inſerting or annexing the *Barrier-treaty* at length, with ſuch obſervations as I conceived might be uſeful for public information: but that diſcourſe taking up more room than I deſigned, after my utmoſt endeavours to abbreviate it, I contented myſelf only with making ſome few reflexions upon that *famous treaty*, ſufficient, as I thought, to anſwer the deſign of my book. I have ſince heard, that my readers in general ſeemed to wiſh I had been more particular, and have diſcovered an impatience to have that treaty made public, eſpecially ſince it hath been laid before the *Houſe of Commons*.

That I may give ſome light to the reader, who is not well verſed in thoſe affairs, he may pleaſe to know that a project for a treaty of *barrier* with the *States* was tranſmitted hither from *Holland*; but being diſapproved of by our court in ſeveral parts, a new project or ſcheme of a treaty was drawn up here with many additions and alterations. This laſt was called *The Counter-project*; and was the meaſure, whereby the duke of *Marlborough* and my lord *Townſhend* were commanded and inſtructed to proceed in negotiating a *treaty of Barrier* with the *States*.

I have

I have added a tranſlation of this *Counter-project* in thoſe articles where it differs from the *Barrier-treaty*, that the reader, by comparing them together, may judge how punctually thoſe negotiators obſerved their inſtructions. I have likewiſe ſubjoined the ſentiments of prince *Eugene* of *Savoy*, and the count *De Sinzendorf*, relating to this treaty, written (I ſuppoſe) while it was negotiating. And laſtly, I have added a copy of the repreſentation of the *Britiſh* merchants at *Bruges*, ſignifying what inconveniencies they already felt, and further apprehended, from this *Barrier-treaty*.

SOME

SOME

REMARKS

ON THE

BARRIER TREATY, &c.

IMAGINE a reaſonable perſon in *China* reading the following treaty, and one who was ignorant of our affairs, or our geography: he would conceive their high mightineſſes the *States-general* to be ſome vaſt powerful commonwealth, like that of *Rome*; and HER MAJESTY to be a petty prince, like one of thoſe to whom that republick would ſometimes ſend a diadem for a preſent, when they behaved themſelves well, otherwiſe could depoſe at pleaſure, and place whom they thought fit in his ſtead. Such a man would ſink, that the *States* had taken our prince and us into their *protection*; and, in return, honoured us ſo far, as to make uſe of our troops as ſome ſmall aſſiſtance in their conqueſts, and the enlargement of their empire, or to prevent the incurſions of *Barbarians* upon ſome of their out-lying provinces. But how muſt it ſound in an *European* ear, that *Great-Britain*, after maintaining a war for ſo many years, with ſo much glory and ſucceſs, and ſuch prodigious expence, after ſaving the *Empire*, *Holland*, and *Portugal*, and almoſt

almoſt recovering *Spain*, ſhould, towards the cloſe of a war, enter into a treaty with ſeven *Dutch* provinces, to ſecure to them a dominion larger than their own, which ſhe had conquered for them; to undertake for a great deal more, without ſtipulating the leaſt advantage for herſelf; and accept, as an equivalent, the mean condition of thoſe *States* aſſiſting to preſerve the QUEEN on the throne, whom, by God's aſſiſtance, ſhe is able to defend againſt all her majeſty's *enemies* and *allies* put together?

Such a wild bargain could never have been made for us, if the *States* had not found it their intereſt to uſe very powerful motives with the chief adviſers (I ſay nothing of the perſon immediately employed); and if a party here at home had not been reſolved, for ends and purpoſes very well known, to continue the war as long as they had any occaſion for it.

The *Counter-project* of this treaty, made here at *London*, was bad enough in all conſcience: I have ſaid ſomething of it in the *preface*; her majeſty's miniſters were inſtructed to proceed by it in their negotiation. There was one point in that project, which would have been of conſequence to *Britain*, and one or two more where the advantages of the *States* were not ſo very exorbitant, and where ſome care was taken of the houſe of *Auſtria*. Is it poſſible, that *our good allies and friends* could not be brought to any terms with us, unleſs by ſtriking out every particular that might do us any good,

and

and adding ſtill more to thoſe whereby ſo much was already granted? For inſtance, the article about demoliſhing *Dunkirk* ſurely might have remained; which was of ſome benefit to the *States*, as well as of mighty advantage to us; and which the *French* king hath lately yielded in one of his preliminaries, although clogged with the demand of an equivalent, which will owe its difficulty only to this treaty.

But let me now conſider the treaty itſelf: Among the one and twenty articles, of which it conſiſts, only two have any relation to us, importing that the *Dutch* are to be guarantees of our ſucceſſion, and are not to enter into any treaty until the QUEEN is acknowledged by *France*. We know very well, that it is in conſequence the intereſt of the *States* as much as ours, that *Britain* ſhould be governed by a *proteſtant* prince. Beſides, what is there more in this guarantee, than in all common leagues offenſive and defenſive between two powers, where each is obliged to defend the other againſt any invader with all there ſtrength? Such was the grand alliance between the *Emperor*, *Britain*, and *Holland*; which was, or ought to have been, as good a guarantee of our ſucceſſion to all intents and purpoſes, as this in the *Barrier-treaty*, and the mutual engagements in ſuch alliances have been always reckoned ſufficient without any ſeparate benefit to either party.

It is, no doubt, for the intereſt of *Britain*, that the *States* ſhould have a ſufficient barrier againſt *France*;

France; but their high mightineſſes, for ſome years paſt, have put a different meaning upon the word *barrier*, from what it formerly uſed to bear when applied to them. When the late king was prince of *Orange*, and commanded their armies againſt *France*, it was never once imagined, that any of the towns taken ſhould belong to the *Dutch*; they were all immediately delivered up to their lawful monarch; and *Flanders* was only a *barrier* to *Holland*, as it was in the hands of *Spain*, rather than *France*. So in the grand alliance of 1701, the ſeveral powers promiſing to endeavour to recover *Flanders* for a barrier, was underſtood to be the recovering thoſe provinces to the king of *Spain*; but in this treaty the ſtyle is wholly changed: here are about twenty towns and forts of great importance, with their chatellanies and dependencies (which dependencies are likewiſe to be enlarged as much as poſſible) and the whole revenues of them to be under the perpetual military government of the *Dutch*, by which that republic will be entirely maſter of the richeſt part of all *Flanders*; and upon any appearance of war, they may put their garriſons into any other place of the *Low-countries*; and farther, the king of *Spain* is to give them a revenue of four hundred thouſand crowns a year to enable them to maintain thoſe garriſons.

Why ſhould we wonder that the *Dutch* are inclined to perpetuate the war, when, by an article in this treaty, the king of *Spain* is *not to poſſeſs one ſingle town in the* Low-countries, *until a peace be*

made? The duke of *Anjou*, at the beginning of this war, maintained ſix and thirty thouſand men out of thoſe *Spaniſh* provinces he then poſſeſſed: to which if we add the many towns ſince taken, which were not in the late king of *Spain's* poſſeſſion at the time of his death, with all their territories and dependencies; it is viſible what forces the *States* may be able to keep, even without any charge to their peculiar dominions.

The towns and chatellanies of this barrier always maintained their garriſons, when they were in the hands of *France*; and, as it is reported, returned a conſiderable ſum of money into the king's coffers; yet the kingdom of *Spain* is obliged, by this treaty (as we have already obſerved), to add over and above a revenue of four hundred thouſand crowns a year. We know likewiſe, that a great part of the revenue of the *Spaniſh Netherlands* is already pawned to the *States*; ſo that, after a peace, nothing will be left to the ſovereign, nor will the people be much eaſed of the taxes they at preſent labour under.

Thus the *States*, by virtue of this *Barrier-treaty*, will, in effect, be abſolute ſovereigns of all *Flanders*, and of the whole revenues of the utmoſt extent.

And here I cannot, without ſome contempt, take notice of a ſort of reaſoning offered by ſeveral people; that the many towns we have taken for the *Dutch* are of no advantage, becauſe the whole revenues of thoſe towns are ſpent in maintaining them. For firſt, the fact is manifeſtly falſe, particularly

cularly as to *Liſle* and ſome others. Secondly, the *States*, after a peace, are to have four hundred thouſand crowns a year out of the remainder of *Flanders*, which is then to be left to *Spain*. And laſtly, ſuppoſe all theſe acquired dominions will not bring a penny into their treaſury, what can be of greater conſequence, than to be able to maintain a mighty army out of their new conqueſts, which before they always did by taxing their natural ſubjects?

How ſhall we be able to anſwer it to king *Charles* II. that, while we pretend to endeavour reſtoring him to the entire monarchy of *Spain*, we join, at the ſame time, with the *Dutch* to deprive him of his natural right to the *Low-countries?*

But ſuppoſe by a *Dutch* barrier muſt now be underſtood only what is to be in poſſeſſion of the *States*; yet, even under this acceptation of the word, nothing was originally meant except a *barrier* againſt *France*; whereas ſeveral towns, demanded by the *Dutch* in this treaty, can be of no uſe at all in ſuch a *barrier*. And this is the ſentiment even of prince *Eugene* himſelf (the preſent oracle and idol of the party here) who ſays, *that* Dendermond, Oſtend, *and the caſtle of* Gand, *do in no ſort belong to the barrier*; *nor can be of other uſe, than to make the* States-general *maſters of the* Low-countries, *and hinder their trade with* England. And further: *that thoſe who are acquainted with the country know very well, that to* fortify Lier *and* Halle *can give no ſecurity to the* States *as a barrier, but only raiſe a jealouſy*

jealouſy in the people, that thoſe places are only fortified in order to block up Bruſſels, *and the other great towns of* Brabant.

In thoſe towns of *Flanders*, where the *Dutch* are to have garriſons, but the eccleſiaſtical and civil power to remain to the king of *Spain* after a peace, the *States* have power to ſend arms, ammunition, and victuals, without paying cuſtoms; under which pretence, they will engroſs the whole trade of thoſe towns, excluſive of all other nations.

This prince *Eugene* likewiſe foreſaw; and, in his obſervations upon this treaty, here annexed, propoſed a remedy for it.

And if the *Dutch* ſhall pleaſe to think, that the whole *Spaniſh Netherlands* are not a ſufficient *barrier* for them, I know no remedy from the words of this treaty, but that we muſt ſtill go on and conquer for them as long as they pleaſe. For the QUEEN is obliged, whenever a peace is treated, to procure for them *whatever ſhall be thought neceſſary* beſides; and where their neceſſity will terminate, is not very eaſy to foreſee.

Could any of her majeſty's ſubjects conceive, that, in thoſe very towns we have taken for the *Dutch*, and given into their poſſeſſion as a *barrier*, either the *States* ſhould demand, or our *miniſters* allow, that the ſubjects of *Britain* ſhould, in reſpect to their trade, be uſed worſe, than they were under the late king of *Spain?* yet this is the fact, as monſtrous as it appears: all goods going to or coming from *Newport*, or *Oſtend*, are to pay the

ſame duties, as thoſe that paſs by the *Scheld* under the *Dutch* forts: and this, in effect, is to ſhut out all other nations from trading to *Flanders*. The *Engliſh* merchants at *Bruges* complain, that, *after they have paid the king of* Spain's *duty for goods imported at* Oſtend, *the ſame goods are made liable to further duties, when they are carried from thence into the towns of the* Dutch *new conqueſts*; and deſire only *the ſame privileges of trade they had before the death of the late king of* Spain, Charles II. And, in conſequence of this treaty, the *Dutch* have already taken off eight *per cent.* from all goods they ſend to the *Spaniſh Flanders*, but left it ſtill upon us.

But what is very ſurprizing, in the very ſame article, where *our good friends and allies* are wholly ſhutting us out from trading in thoſe towns we have conquered for them with ſo much blood and treaſure, the QUEEN is obliged to procure, that the *States* ſhall be uſed as favourably in their trade over all the king of *Spain's* dominions, as her own ſubjects, or *as the people moſt favoured*. This I humbly conceive to be perfect boys play; *croſs I win*, and *pile* [*p*] *you loſe*, or *what's yours is mine, and what's mine is my own*. Now, if it ſhould happen, that in a treaty of peace ſome ports or towns ſhould be yielded us for the ſecurity of our trade, in any part of the *Spaniſh* dominions at how great a diſtance ſoever, I ſuppoſe the *Dutch* would go on

[*p*] The two ſides of our coin were once nominally diſtinguiſhed by *croſs* and *pile*, as they are now by *heads* and *tails*.

with

with their *boys* play, and *challenge half* by virtue of that article: or would they be content with the military government and revenues, and reckon them among *what ſhall be thought neceſſary* for their barrier?

This prodigious article is introduced as ſubſequent to the treaty of *Munſter*, made about the year 1648, at the time when *England* was in the utmoſt confuſion, and very much to our diſadvantage. Thoſe parts in that treaty, ſo unjuſt in themſelves, and ſo prejudicial to our trade, ought, in reaſon, to have been remitted rather than confirmed upon us for the time to come. But this is *Dutch* partnerſhip; to ſhare in all our *beneficial bargains*, and exclude us wholly from theirs, even from thoſe which we have got for them.

In one part of *The Conduct of the Allies*, &c. among other remarks upon this treaty I make it a queſtion, whether it were right, in point of policy or prudence, to call in a foreign power to be a guarantee to our ſucceſſion; becauſe, by that means, *we put it out of the power of our legiſlature to alter the ſucceſſion, how much ſoever the neceſſity of the kingdom may require it* [q]? To comply with the cautions of ſome people, I explained *my meaning in the following editions*. I was aſſured, that my lord chief-juſtice affirmed, that paſſage was treaſon. One of my anſwerers, I think, decides as favourably; and I am told, that paragraph was read very

[q] Pag. 97.

lately, during a debate, with a comment in very injurious terms, which perhaps might have been ſpared. That the legiſlature ſhould have power to change the ſucceſſion, whenever the neceſſities of the kingdom require, is ſo very uſeful towards preſerving our religion and liberty, that I know not how to recant. The worſt of this opinion is, that at firſt ſight it appears to be *whiggiſh*; but the diſtinction is thus: The *whigs* are for changing the ſucceſſion when they think fit, although the entire legiſlature do not conſent; I think it ought never to be done but upon great neceſſity, and that with the ſanction of the whole legiſlature. Do theſe gentlemen of revolution principles think it impoſſible, that we ſhould ever have occaſion again to change our ſucceſſion? And, if ſuch an incident ſhould fall out, muſt we have no remedy until the ſeven provinces will give their conſent? Suppoſe that this virulent party among us were as able, as ſome are willing, to raiſe a rebellion for re-inſtating them in power, and would apply themſelves to the *Dutch*, as guarantees of our ſucceſſion, to aſſiſt them with all their force, under pretence that the QUEEN and miniſtry, a great majority of both houſes, and the bulk of the people, were for bringing over *France*, popery, and the pretender? Their *high mightineſſes* would, as I take it, be ſole judges of the controverſy, and probably decide it ſo well, that, in ſome time, we might have the happineſs of becoming a province to *Holland*. I am humbly of opinion, that there are two qualities neceſſary to a reader before

before his judgment ſhould be allowed; theſe are, common honeſty, and common ſenſe; and that no man could have miſrepreſented that paragraph in my diſcourſe, unleſs he were utterly deſtitute of one, or both.

The preſumptive ſucceſſor, and her immediate heirs, have ſo eſtabliſhed a reputation in the world for their piety, wiſdom, and humanity, that no neceſſity of this kind is like to appear in their days; but I muſt ſtill inſiſt, that it is a diminution to the independency of the imperial crown of *Great-Britain*, to call at every door for help to put our laws in execution. And we ought to conſider, that if, in ages to come, ſuch a prince ſhould happen to be in ſucceſſion to our throne, as ſhould be entirely unable to govern; that very motive might incline our guarantees to ſupport him, the more effectually to bring the rivals of their trade into confuſion and diſorder.

But to return: the QUEEN is here put under the unreaſonable obligation of being guarantee of the whole Barrier-treaty; of the *Dutch* having poſſeſſion of the ſaid barrier, and the revenues thereof before a peace; of the payment of four hundred thouſand crowns by the king of *Spain*; that the *States* ſhall poſſeſs the barrier, even before king *Charles* is in poſſeſſion of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*; although, by the fifth article of the grand alliance, her majeſty is under no obligation to do any thing of this nature, except in a general treaty.

All kings, princes, and ſtates are invited to enter into this treaty, and to be guarantees of its execution. This article, though very frequent in treaties, ſeems to look very oddly in that of the barrier. Popiſh princes are here among others to become guarantees of our proteſtant ſucceſſion; every petty prince in *Germany* muſt be intreated to preſerve the QUEEN of *Great-Britain* upon her throne. The king of *Spain* is invited particularly, and by name, to become guarantee of the execution of a treaty, by which his allies, who pretend to fight his battles and recover his dominions, ſtrip him, in effect, of all his ten provinces; a clear reaſon why they never ſent any forces to *Spain*, and why the obligation, not to enter into a treaty of peace with *France* until that entire monarchy was yielded as a preliminary, was ſtruck out of the counter-project by the *Dutch*. They fought only in *Flanders*, becauſe there they only fought for themſelves. King *Charles* muſt needs accept this invitation very kindly, and ſtand by with great ſatisfaction, while the *Belgic* lion divides the prey, and aſſigns it all to himſelf. I remember there was a parcel of ſoldiers, who robbed a farmer of his poultry, and then made him wait at table, while they devoured his victuals without giving him a morſel; and, upon his expoſtulating, had only for anſwer, Why, ſirrah, are we not come here to protect you? And thus much for his generous invitation to all kings and princes to lend their aſſiſtance, and become guarantees out

of

of pure good-nature for ſecuring *Flanders* to the *Dutch*.

In the treaty of *Ryſwick*, no care was taken to oblige the *French* king to acknowledge the right of ſucceſſion in her preſent majeſty; for want of which point being then ſettled, *France* refuſed to acknowledge her for QUEEN of *Great-Britain* after the late king's death. This unaccountable neglect (if it were a neglect) is here called an omiſſion [*r*], and care is taken to ſupply it in the next general treaty of peace. I mention this occaſionally, becauſe I have ſome ſtubborn doubts within me, whether it were a wilful omiſſion or no. Neither do I herein reflect in the leaſt upon the memory of his late majeſty, whom I entirely acquit of any imputation upon this matter. But when I recollect the behaviour, the language, and the principles of ſome certain perſons in thoſe days, and compare them with that omiſſion; I am tempted to draw ſome concluſions, which a certain party would be more ready to call falſe and malicious, than to prove them ſo.

I muſt here take leave (becauſe it will not otherwiſe fall in my way) to ſay a few words in return to a gentleman, I know not of what character or calling, who hath done me the honour to write three diſcourſes againſt that treatiſe of *The Conduct of the Allies*, &c. and promiſes, for my comfort, to conclude all in a fourth. I pity anſwerers with all

[*r*] Article XX.

my heart, for the many diſadvantages they lie under. My book did a world of miſchief (as he calls it) before his firſt part could poſſibly come out; and ſo went on through the kingdom, while his limped ſlowly after; and, if it arrived at all, it was too late; for people's opinions were already fixed. His manner of anſwering me is thus: of thoſe facts which he pretends to examine, ſome he reſolutely denies, others he endeavours to extenuate, and the reſt he diſtorts with ſuch unnatural turns, that I would engage, by the ſame method, to diſprove any hiſtory either ancient or modern. Then the whole is interlarded with a thouſand injurious epithets and appellations, which heavy writers are forced to make uſe of, as a ſupply for that want of ſpirit and genius they are not born to: yet, after all, he allows a very great point for which I contend, confeſſing in plain words, that the burthen of the war hath chiefly lain upon us; and thinks it ſufficient for the *Dutch*, that, next to *England*, they have borne the greateſt ſhare. And is not this the great grievance of which the whole kingdom complains? I am inclined to think that my intelligence was at leaſt as good as his; and ſome of it, I can aſſure him, came from perſons of his own party, although, perhaps, not altogether ſo inflamed. Hitherto therefore the matter is pretty equal, and the world may believe him or me as they pleaſe. But, I think, the great point of controverſy between us is, whether the effects and conſequences of things follow better from his premiſes or mine?

And there I will not be ſatisfied, unleſs he will allow the whole advantage to be on my ſide. Here is a flouriſhing kingdom brought to the brink of ruin by a moſt ſucceſsful and glorious war of ten years, under an able, diligent, and loyal miniſtry; a moſt faithful, juſt, and generous commander, and in conjunction with the moſt hearty, reaſonable, and ſincere allies. This is the caſe, as that author repreſents it. I have heard a ſtory, I think it was of the duke of **, who playing at hazard at the *groom-porters* in much company, held in a great many hands together, and drew a huge heap of gold; but, in the heat of play, never obſerved a ſharper, who came once or twice under his arm, and ſwept a great deal of it into his hat; the company thought it had been one of his ſervants. When the duke's hand was out, they were talking how much he had won. Yes, ſaid he, I held in very long; yet, methinks I have won but very little. They told him his SERVANT had got the reſt in his hat; and then he found he was cheated.

It hath been my good fortune to ſee the moſt important facts that I have advanced juſtified by the public voice; which, let this author do what he can, will incline the world to believe, that I may be right in the reſt. And I ſolemnly declare, that I have not wilfully committed the leaſt miſtake. I ſtopt the ſecond edition, and made all poſſible enquiries among thoſe who I thought could beſt inform me, in order to correct any error I could hear of; I did the ſame to the third and fourth

fourth editions, and then left the printer to his liberty. This I take for a more effectual anſwer to all cavils, than an hundred pages of controverſy.

But what diſguſts me from having any thing to do with the race of anſwer-jobbers, is, that they have no ſort of conſcience in their dealings: to give one inſtance in this gentleman's third part, which I have been lately looking into. When I talk of the moſt petty princes, he ſays, that I mean crowned heads; when I ſay the ſoldiers of thoſe petty princes are ready to rob or ſtarve at home, he ſays, I call kings and crowned heads robbers and highwaymen. This is what the *whigs* call anſwering a book.

I cannot omit one particular concerning this author, who is ſo poſitive in aſſerting his own facts, and contradicting mine; he affirms, that the buſineſs of *Toulon* was diſcovered by the clerk of a certain great man, who was then ſecretary of ſtate. It is neither wiſe, nor for the credit of his party, to put us in mind of that ſecretary, or of that clerk; however, ſo it happens, that nothing relating to the affair of *Toulon* did ever paſs through that ſecretary's office: which I here affirm with great phlegm, leaving the epithets of falſe, ſcandalous, villainous, and the reſt, to the author and his fellows.

But to leave this author; let us conſider the conſequence of our triumphs, upon which ſome ſet ſo great a value, as to think that nothing leſs than the crown can be a ſufficient reward for the merit

of

of the *general*. We have not enlarged our dominions by one foot of land: our trade, which made us conſiderable in the world, is either given up by treaties, or clogged with duties, which interrupt and daily leſſen it. We ſee the whole nation groaning under exceſſive taxes of all ſorts, to raiſe three millions of money for payment of the intereſt of thoſe debts we have contracted. Let us look upon the reverſe of the medal; we ſhall ſee our neighbours, who, in their utmoſt diſtreſs, called for our aſſiſtance, become, by this treaty, even in time of peace, maſters of a more conſiderable country than their own; in a condition to ſtrike terror into us, with fifty thouſand *veterans* ready to invade us from that country which we have conquered for them; and to commit inſolent hoſtilities upon us in all other parts, as they have lately done in the *Eaſt-Indies*.

THE

THE BARRIER TREATY

BETWEEN

Her MAJESTY and the STATES-GENERAL.

HER majeſty the QUEEN *of* Great-Britain *and the lords the* States-general *of the United provinces, having conſidered how much it concerns the quiet and ſecurity of their kingdoms and ſtates, and the public tranquillity, to maintain and to ſecure on one ſide, the ſucceſſion to the crown of* Great-Britain *in ſuch manner as it is now eſtabliſhed by the laws of the kingdom; and on the other ſide, that the* States-general *of the United provinces ſhould have a ſtrong and ſufficient barrier againſt* France, *and others who would ſurprize or attack them: and her majeſty and the* States-general *apprehending, with juſt reaſon, the troubles and the miſchiefs which may happen in relation to this ſucceſſion, if at any time there ſhould be any perſon, or any power, who ſhould call it in queſtion; and that the countries and ſtates of the ſaid lords the* States-general *were not furniſhed with ſuch a barrier: For theſe ſaid reaſons her ſaid majeſty the* QUEEN *of* Great-Britain, *although in the vigour of her age, and enjoying perfect health (in which may* God *preſerve her many years) out of an effect of her uſual prudence and piety, has thought fit to enter with the* States-general *of the United provinces into a particular*

ticular alliance and confederacy; the principal end and only aim of which ſhall be the public quiet and tranquillity; and to prevent, by meaſures taken in time, all the events which might one day excite new war. It is with this view, that her Britiſh *majeſty has given her full power to agree upon ſome articles of a treaty, in addition to the treaties and alliances that ſhe hath already with the lords the* States-general *of the United provinces, to her ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary,* Charles, *viſcount* Townſhend, *baron of* Lyme-Regis, *privy counſellor to her* Britiſh *majeſty, captain of her majeſty's yeomen of the guard, and her lieutenant in the county of* Norfolk; *and the lords the* States-general *of the United provinces, the* ſieur John de Welderen, *lord of* Valburgh, *great bailiff of the* Lower Betewe, *of the body of the nobility of the province of* Guelder; Frederick, *baron of* Reede, *lord of* Lier, St. Anthony, *and* T'er Lee, *of the order of the nobility of the province of* Holland *and* Weſt-Friezeland; Anthony Heinſius, *counſellor-penſionary of the province of* Holland *and* Weſt-Friezeland, *keeper of the great ſeal, and ſuper-intendant of the fiefs of the ſame province;* Cornelius Van Gheet, *lord of* Spranbrook, Bulkeſtyen, *&c.* Gedeon Hoeuſt, *canon of the chapter of the church of* St. Peter *at* Utrecht, *and elected counſellor in the ſtates of the province of* Utrecht; Haſſel Van Sminia, *ſecretary of the chamber of the accounts of the province of* Friezeland; Erneſt Itterſum, *lord of* Oſterbof, *of the body of the nobility of the province of* Overyſſel; *and* Wicher Wichers, *ſenator of the city of* Groningen;

all

all deputies to the aſſembly of the ſaid lords the States-general *on the one part, reſpectively of the province of* Guelder, Holland, Weſt-Friezeland, Zeland, Utrecht, Friezeland, Overyſſel *and* Groningen, *and* Ommelands, *who, by virtue of their full powers, have agreed upon the following articles:*

ARTICLE I.

THE treaties of peace, friendſhip, alliance, and confederacy between her *Britannic* majeſty and the *States-general* of the United provinces ſhall be approved and confirmed by the preſent treaty, and ſhall remain in their former force and vigour as if they were inſerted word for word.

ARTICLE II.

The ſucceſſion to the crown of *England* having been ſettled by an act of parliament, paſſed the twelfth year of the reign of his late majeſty king *William* III. the title of which is, *An act for the further limitation of the crown, and better ſecuring the rights and liberties of the ſubject*; and lately, in the ſixth year of the reign of her preſent majeſty, this ſucceſſion having been again eſtabliſhed and confirmed, by another act made for the greater ſecurity of her majeſty's perſon and government, and the ſucceſſion to the crown of *Great-Britain*, &c. in the line of the moſt ſerene houſe of *Hanover*, and in the perſon of the princeſs *Sophia*, and of her heirs, ſucceſſors, and deſcendants, male and female, already born or to be born: and although no power

hath

hath any right to oppoſe the laws made upon this ſubject by the crown and parliament of *Great-Britain*; if it ſhall happen, nevertheleſs, that, under any pretence, or by any cauſe whatever, any perſon or any power or ſtate may pretend to diſpute the eſtabliſhment which the parliament hath made of the aforeſaid ſucceſſion, in the moſt ſerene houſe of *Hanover*, to oppoſe the ſaid ſucceſſion, to aſſiſt or favour thoſe who may oppoſe it, whether directly or indirectly, by open war, or by fomenting ſeditions and conſpiracies againſt her or him to whom the crown of *Great-Britain* ſhall deſcend, according to the acts aforeſaid; the *States-general* engage and promiſe to aſſiſt and maintain, in the ſaid ſucceſſion, her or him to whom it ſhall belong, by virtue of the ſaid acts of parliament, to aſſiſt them in taking poſſeſſion, if they ſhould not be in actual poſſeſſion, and to oppoſe thoſe who would diſturb them in the taking of ſuch poſſeſſion, or in the actual poſſeſſion of the aforeſaid ſucceſſion.

ARTICLE III.

Her ſaid majeſty and the *States-general*, in conſequence of the fifth article of the alliance concluded between the *Emperor*, the late king of *Great-Britain*, and the *States-general*, the ſeventh of *September* 1701, will employ all their force to recover the reſt of the *Spaniſh Low-countries*.

ARTI-

ARTICLE IV.

And further, they will endeavour to conquer as many towns and forts as they can, in order to their being a barrier and ſecurity to the ſaid *States*.

ARTICLE V.

And whereas, according to the ninth article of the ſaid alliance, it is to be agreed, amongſt other matters, how and in what manner the *States* ſhall be made ſafe by means of this barrier, the QUEEN of *Great-Britain* will uſe her endeavours to procure that, in the treaty of peace, it may be agreed, that all the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, and what elſe may be found neceſſary, whether conquered or unconquered places, ſhall ſerve as a barrier to the *States*.

ARTICLE VI.

That, to this end, their high mightineſſes ſhall have the liberty to put and keep garriſon, to change, augment, and diminiſh it as they ſhall judge proper, in the places following: namely, *Newport*, *Furnes*, with the fort of *Knocke*, *Ypres*, *Menin*, the town and citadel of *Liſle*, *Tournay*, and its citadel, *Conde*, *Valenciennes*; and the places which ſhall from hence forward be conquered from *France*, *Maubeuge*, *Charleroy*, *Namur*, and its citadel, *Lier*, *Halle*, to fortify the ports of *Perle*, *Philippe*, *Damme*, the caſtle of *Gand*, and *Dendermonde*. The fort of *St. Donas*, being joined to the fortification of the *Sluce*, and being entirely incorporated with it,

it, ſhall remain and be yielded in property to the *States*. The fort of *Rodenhuyſe*, on this ſide *Gand*, ſhall be demoliſhed.

ARTICLE VII.

The ſaid *States-general* may, in caſe of an apparent attack, or war, put as many troops as they ſhall think neceſſary in all the towns, places, and forts in the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, where the reaſon of war ſhall require it.

ARTICLE VIII.

They may likewiſe ſend into the towns, forts, and places, where they ſhall have their garriſons (without any hindrance, and without paying any duties), proviſions, ammunitions of war, arms, and artillery, materials for the fortifications, and all that ſhall be found convenient and neceſſary for the ſaid garriſons and fortifications.

ARTICLE IX.

The ſaid *States-general* ſhall alſo have liberty to appoint, in the towns, forts, and places, of their barrier mentioned in the foregoing ſixth article, where they may have garriſons, ſuch governors and commanders, majors, and other officers, as they ſhall find proper, who ſhall not be ſubject to any other orders, whatſoever they may be, or from whence ſoever they may come, relating to the ſecurity and military government of the ſaid places, but only to thoſe of their high mightineſſes (excluſive of all

others); ſtill preſerving the rights and privileges, as well eccleſiaſtical as political, of king *Charles* the third.

ARTICLE X.

That, beſides, the *States* ſhall have liberty to fortify the ſaid towns, places, and forts, which belong to them, and repair the fortifications of them in ſuch manner as they ſhall judge neceſſary; and further to do whatever ſhall be uſeful for their defence.

ARTICLE XI.

It is agreed, that the *States-general* ſhall have all the revenues of the towns, places, juriſdictions, and their dependencies, which they ſhall have for their barrier from *France*, which were not in the poſſeſſion of the crown of *Spain* at the time of the death of the late king *Charles* II; and beſides, a million of livres ſhall be ſettled for the payment of one hundred thouſand crowns every three months out of the cleareſt revenues of the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, which the ſaid king was then in poſſeſſion of; both which are for maintaining the garriſons of the *States*, and for ſupplying the fortifications, as alſo the magazines, and other neceſſary expences, in the towns and places above-mentioned. And that the ſaid revenues may be ſufficient to ſupport theſe expences, endeavours ſhall be uſed for enlarging the dependencies and juriſdictions aforeſaid as much as poſſible; and particularly for including, with the juriſdiction of *Ypres*, that of *Caſſel*, and the foreſt of *Neipe*;

and

with the juriſdiction of *Liſle*, the juriſdiction of *Douay*, both having been ſo joined before the preſent war.

ARTICLE XII.

That no town, fort, place, or country of the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, ſhall be granted, transferred, or given, or deſcend to the crown of *France*, or any of the line of *France*, neither by virtue of any gift, ſale, exchange, marriage, agreement, inheritance, ſucceſſion by will, or through want of will, from no title whatſoever, nor in any other manner whatſoever, nor be put into the power, or under the authority, of the moſt Chriſtian king, or any one of the line of *France*.

ARTICLE XIII.

And whereas the ſaid *States-general*, in conſequence of the ninth article of the ſaid alliance, are to make a convention or treaty with king *Charles* the third, for putting the *States* in a condition of ſafety by means of the ſaid barrier, the QUEEN of *Great Britain* will do what depends upon her, that all the foregoing particulars, relating to the barrier of the *States*, may be inſerted in the aforeſaid treaty or convention; and that her ſaid majeſty will continue her good offices, until the above-mentioned convention, between the *States* and the ſaid king *Charles* the third, be concluded, agreeably to what is before mentioned; and that her majeſty will be guarantee of the ſaid treaty or convention.

ARTICLE XIV.

And that the ſaid *States* may enjoy, from henceforward, as much as poſſible, a barrier for the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, they ſhall be permitted to put their garriſons in the towns already taken, and which may hereafter be ſo, before the peace be concluded and ratified. And in the mean time, the ſaid king *Charles* the third ſhall not be allowed to enter into poſſeſſion of the ſaid *Spaniſh Low-countries*, neither entirely nor in part; and, during that time, the QUEEN ſhall aſſiſt their high mightineſſes to maintain them in the enjoyment of the revenues, and to find the million of livres a year abovementioned.

ARTICLE XV.

And whereas their high mightineſſes have ſtipulated, by the treaty of *Munſter*, in the fourteenth article, that the river *Scheld*, as alſo the canals of *Sas*, *Swan*, and other mouths of the ſea bordering thereupon, ſhould be kept ſhut on the ſide of the *States*:

And in the fifteenth article, that the ſhips and commodities, going in and coming out of the harbours of *Flanders*, ſhall be and remain charged with all ſuch impoſts and other duties as are raiſed upon commodities going and coming along the *Scheld*, and the other canals abovementioned:

The QUEEN of *Great Britain* promiſes and engages, that their high mightineſſes ſhall never be diſturbed in their right and poſſeſſion in that reſpect, neither

neither directly nor indirectly; as alſo, that the commerce ſhall not, in prejudice of the ſaid treaty, be made more eaſy by the ſea-ports than by the rivers, canals, and mouths of the ſea, on the ſide of the *States* of the United provinces, neither directly nor indirectly.

And whereas, by the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth articles of the ſame treaty of *Munſter*, his majeſty the king of *Spain* is obliged to treat the ſubjects of their high mightineſſes as favourably as the ſubjects of *Great Britain* and *Hans* towns, who were then the people moſt favourably treated; her *Britannic* majeſty and their high mightineſſes promiſe likewiſe to take care, that the ſubjects of *Great Britain* and of their high mightineſſes ſhall be treated in the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, as well as in *Spain*, the kingdoms and ſtates belonging to it, equally, and as well the one as the other, as the people moſt favoured.

ARTICLE XVI.

The ſaid QUEEN and *States-general* oblige themſelves to furniſh, by ſea and land, the ſuccours and aſſiſtance neceſſary to maintain, by force, her ſaid majeſty in the quiet poſſeſſion of her kingdoms, and the moſt ſerene houſe of *Hanover* in the ſaid ſucceſſion, in the manner it is ſettled by the acts of parliament beforementioned; and to maintain the ſaid *States-general* in the poſſeſſion of the ſaid barrier.

ARTICLE XVII.

After the ratifications of the treaty, a particular convention ſhall be made of the conditions, by which the ſaid QUEEN and the ſaid lords the *States-general* will engage themſelves to furniſh the ſuccours which ſhall be thought neceſſary, as well by ſea as by land.

ARTICLE XVIII.

If her *Britiſh* majeſty, or the *States-general* of the United provinces, be attacked by any body whatſoever by reaſon of this convention, they ſhall mutually aſſiſt one another with all their forces, and become guarantees of the execution of the ſaid convention.

ARTICLE XIX.

There ſhall be invited and admitted into the preſent treaty, as ſoon as poſſible, all the kings, princes, and ſtates, who ſhall be willing to enter into the ſame, particularly his *Imperial* majeſty, the kings of *Spain* and *Pruſſia*, and the elector of *Hanover*. And her *Britiſh* majeſty and the *States-general* of the United provinces, and each of them in particular, ſhall be permitted to require and invite thoſe, whom they ſhall think fit to require and invite, to enter into this treaty, and to be guarantees of its execution.

ARTICLE XX.

And as time hath ſhewn the omiſſion, which was made in the treaty ſigned at *Ryſwick* in the year

1697, between *England* and *France*, in reſpect of the right of the ſucceſſion of *England* in the perſon of her majeſty the QUEEN of *Great Britain*, now reigning; and that, for want of having ſettled in that treaty this indiſputable right of her majeſty, *France* refuſed to acknowledge her for QUEEN of *Great Britain* after the death of the late king *William* the third of glorious memory: her majeſty the QUEEN of *Great Britain* and the lords the *States-general* of the United provinces do agree, and engage themſelves, likewiſe not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with *France*, before the title of her majeſty to the crown of *Great Britain*, as alſo the right of ſucceſſion of the moſt ſerene houſe of *Hanover* to the aforeſaid crown, in the manner it is ſettled and eſtabliſhed by the beforementioned acts of parliament, be fully acknowledged as a preliminary by *France*; and that *France* hath promiſed, at the ſame time, to remove, out of its dominions, the perſon who pretends to be king of *Great Britain*; and that no negotiation, or formal diſcuſſion of the articles of the ſaid treaty of peace, ſhall be entered into, but jointly, and at the ſame time, with the ſaid QUEEN, or with her miniſters.

ARTICLE XXI.

Her *Britiſh* majeſty, and the lords the *States-general* of the United provinces, ſhall ratify and confirm all that is contained in the preſent treaty within the ſpace of four weeks, to be reckoned from the day of the ſigning. In teſtimony whereof the un-

derwritten ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her *Britiſh* majeſty, and the deputies of the lords the *States-general*, have ſigned this preſent treaty, and have affixed their ſeals thereunto.

At the Hague *the* 29*th of* October, *in the year* 1709.

(L. S.) Townſhend.
(L. S.) J. B. Van Reede.
(L. S.) G. Hoeuft.
(L. S.) E. V. Itterſum.
(L. S.) J. V. Welderen.
(L. S.) A. Heinſius.
(L. S.) H. Sminia.
(L. S.) W. Wichers.

THE SEPARATE ARTICLE.

AS in the preliminary articles ſigned here at the Hague *the* 28*th of* May 1709, *by the plenipotentiaries of his* Imperial *majeſty, of her majeſty the* QUEEN *of* Great Britain, *and of the lords the* States-general *of the United provinces, it is ſtipulated, amongſt other things, that the lords the* States-general *ſhall have, with entire property and ſovereignty, the upper quarter of* Guelder, *according to the fifty-ſecond article of the treaty of* Munſter *of the year* 1648; *as alſo, that the garriſons which are, or hereafter ſhall be, on the part of the lords the* States-general, *in the town of* Huy, *the citadel of* Liege, *and in the town of* Bonne, *ſhall remain there, until it ſhall be otherwiſe agreed upon with his* Imperial *majeſty and the empire: and as the barrier, which is this day agreed upon, in the principal*

pal treaty for the mutual guarantee, between her British *majeſty and the lords the* States-general, *cannot give, to the United provinces, the ſafety for which it is eſtabliſhed, unleſs it be well ſecured from one end to the other, and that the communication of it be well joined together, for which the upper quarter of* Guelder, *and the garriſons in the citadel of* Liege, Huy, *and* Bonne *are abſolutely neceſſary (experience having thrice ſhewn, that* France, *having a deſign to attack the United provinces, has made uſe of the places abovementioned, in order to come at them, and to penetrate into the ſaid provinces). And further, as in reſpect to the equivalent for which the upper quarter of* Guelder *is to be yielded to the United provinces, according to the fifty-ſecond article of the treaty of* Munſter *abovementioned, his majeſty king* Charles III, *will be much more gratified and advantaged in other places, than that equivalent can avail. To the end therefore that the lords the* States-general *may have the upper quarter of* Guelder, *with entire property and ſovereignty; and that the ſaid upper quarter of* Guelder *may be yielded, in this manner, to the ſaid lords the* States-general, *in the convention, or the treaty that they are to make with his majeſty king* Charles III, *according to the thirteenth article of the treaty concluded this day; as alſo that their garriſons in the citadel of* Liege, *in that of* Huy, *and in* Bonne, *may remain there, until it be otherwiſe agreed upon with his* Imperial *majeſty and the empire; her majeſty the* QUEEN *of* Great Britain *engages herſelf, and promiſes, by this ſeparate article, which ſhall have the ſame force as if it were inſerted in the principal*

cipal treaty, to make the ſame efforts for all this, as ſhe hath engaged herſelf to make for the obtaining the barrier in the Spaniſh Low-countries. *In teſtimony whereof the underwritten ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her* Britiſh *majeſty, and deputies of the lords the* States-general, *have ſigned the preſent ſeparate article, and have affixed their ſeals thereunto.*

At the *Hague*, the 29th of *October*, 1709.

(L. S.) Townſhend.
(L. S.) J. B. Van Reede.
(L. S.) G. Hoeuft.
(L. S.) E. V. Itterſum.
(L. S.) J. V. Welderen.
(L. S.) A. Heinſius.
(L. S.) H. Sminia.
(L. S.) W. Wichers.

The Second Separate Article.

AS the lords the States-general *have repreſented, that in* Flanders *the limits, between* Spaniſh Flanders *and that of the* States, *are ſettled in ſuch a manner, as that the land, belonging to the* States, *is extremely narrow there; ſo that, in ſome places, the territory of* Spaniſh Flanders *extends itſelf to the fortifications, and under the cannon, of the places, towns, and forts of the* States, *which occaſions many inconveniencies, as hath been ſeen, by an example, a little before the beginning of the preſent war, when a fort was deſigned to have been built under the cannon of the* Sas Van Gand, *under pretence that it was upon the territory*

tory of Spain: *and as it is neceſſary, for avoiding theſe and other ſorts of inconveniencies, that the land of the* States, *upon the confines of* Flanders, *ſhould be inlarged, and that the places, towns, and forts ſhould, by that means, be better covered: her* Britiſh *majeſty, entering into the juſt motives of the ſaid lords the* States-general *in this reſpect, promiſes and engages herſelf, by this ſeparate article, that, in the convention which the ſaid lords the* States-general *are to make with his majeſty king* Charles III, *ſhe will aſſiſt them, as that it may be agreed, that, by the ceſſion to the ſaid lords the* States-general *of the property of an extent of land neceſſary to obviate ſuch like and other inconveniencies, their limits in* Flanders *ſhall be enlarged more conveniently for their ſecurity; and thoſe of the* Spaniſh Flanders *removed further from their towns, places, and forts, to the end that theſe may not be ſo expoſed any more. In teſtimony whereof the under-written ambaſſador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her* Britiſh *majeſty, and deputies of the lords the* States general, *have ſigned the preſent ſeparate article, and have affixed their ſeals thereunto.*

At the *Hague*, the 29th of *October*, 1709.

(L. S.) Townſhend.
(L. S.) J. B. Van Reede.
(L. S.) A. Heinſius.
(L. S.) G. Hoeuft.
(L. S.) H. Sminia.
(L. S.) E. V. Itterſum.

The

The articles of the Counter-project, *which were ſtruck out, or altered, by the* Dutch *in the* Barrier treaty; *with ſome* Remarks.

ARTICLE VI.

TO this end their mightineſſes ſhall have power to put and keep garriſons in the following places, *viz. Newport*, *Knocke*, *Menin*, the citadel of *Liſle*, *Tournay*, *Conde*, *Valenciennes*, *Namur*, and its citadel, *Lier*, *Halle*, to fortify the fort of *Perle*, *Damme*, and the caſtle of *Gand*.

REMARKS.

In the Barrier treaty, the *States* added the following places to thoſe mentioned in this article, *viz. Furnes*, *Ypres*, towns of *Liſle*, *Maubeuge*, *Charleroy*, *Philippe*, fort of *St. Donas* (which is to be in property to the *States*), and the fort of *Rhodenhuyſen* to be demoliſhed. To ſay nothing of the other places, *Dendermonde* is the key of all *Brabant*; and the demoliſhing of the fort of *Rhodenhuyſen*, ſituate between *Gand* and *Sas vas Gand*, can only ſerve to defraud the king of *Spain* of the duties upon goods imported and exported there.

ARTICLE VII.

The ſaid *States* may put into the ſaid towns, forts, and places, and, in caſe of open war with *France*, into all the other towns, places, and forts, whatever troops the reaſon of war ſhall require.

REMARKS.

But, in the Barrier treaty, it is ſaid: *In caſe of an apparent attack, or war*, without ſpecifying againſt *France:* neither is the number of troops limited to what the reaſon of war ſhall require, but what the *States* ſhall think neceſſary.

ARTICLE IX.

Beſides ſome ſmaller differences, ends with a ſalvo, not only for the eccleſiaſtical and civil rights of the king of *Spain*, but likewiſe for his revenues in the ſaid towns; which revenues, in the Barrier treaty, are all given to the *States*.

ARTICLE XI.

The revenues of the chatellanies and dependencies of the towns and places, which the *States* ſhall have for their barrier againſt *France*, and which were not in the poſſeſſion of the crown of *Spain* at the late king of *Spain's* death, ſhall be ſettled to be a fund for maintaining garriſons, and providing for the fortifications and magazines, and other neceſſary charges, of the ſaid towns of the barrier.

REMARKS.

I deſire the reader to compare this with the eleventh article of the Barrier treaty, where he will ſee how prodigiouſly it is enlarged.

ARTI-

ARTICLE XIV.

All this to be without prejudice to ſuch other treaties and conventions as the QUEEN of *Great Britain*, and their high mightineſſes may think fit to make for the future with the ſaid king *Charles* III, relating to the ſaid *Spaniſh Netherlands*, or to the ſaid barrier.

ARTICLE XV.

And to the end, that the ſaid *States* may enjoy at preſent, as much as it is poſſible, a barrier in the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, they ſhall be permitted to put their garriſons in the chief towns already taken, or that may be taken before a peace be made.

REMARKS.

Theſe two articles are not in the barrier treaty, but two others in their ſtead; to which I refer the reader. And indeed it was highly neceſſary for the *Dutch* to ſtrike out the former of theſe articles, when ſo great a part of the treaty is ſo highly and manifeſtly prejudicial to *Great Britain*, as well as to the king of *Spain*; eſpecially in the two articles inſerted in the place of theſe, which I deſire the reader will examine.

ARTICLE XX.

And whereas, by the fifth and ninth articles ſo the alliance between the *Emperor*, the late king of *Great Britain*, and the *States-general*, concluded the ſeventh

ſeventh of *September* 1701, it is agreed and ſtipulated, that the kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, with all the dependencies of the crown of *Spain* in *Italy*, ſhall be recovered from the poſſeſſion of *France*, as being of the laſt conſequence to the trade of both nations, as well as the *Spaniſh Netherlands* for a barrier for the *States-general*; therefore the ſaid QUEEN of *Great Britain* and the *States-general* agree and oblige themſelves not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with *France*, before the reſtitution of the ſaid kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, with all the dependencies of the crown of *Spain* in *Italy*, as well as the *Spaniſh Low-countries*, with the other towns and places in the poſſeſſion of *France* abovementioned in this treaty; and alſo after the manner ſpecified in this treaty; as likewiſe all the reſt of the entire monarchy of *Spain* be yielded by *France* as a preliminary.

ARTICLE XXII.

And whereas experience hath ſhewn of what importance it is to *Great Britain* and the *United provinces*, that the fortreſs and port of *Dunkirk* ſhould not be in the poſſeſſion of *France* in the condition they are at preſent; the ſubjects of both nations having undergone ſuch great loſſes, and ſuffered ſo much in their trade, by the prizes taken from them by privateers ſet out from that port; inſomuch that *France*, by her unmeaſurable ambition, may be always tempted to make ſome enterprizes upon the territories of the QUEEN of *Great Britain* and their high

high mightineſſes, and interrupt the public repoſe and tranquillity; for the preſervation of which, and the balance of *Europe* againſt the exorbitant power of *France*, the allies engaged themſelves in this long and burthenſome war; therefore the ſaid QNEEN of *Great Britain* and their high mightineſſes agree and oblige themſelves not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with *France*, before it ſhall be yielded and ſtipulated by *France* as a preliminary, that all the fortifications of the ſaid town of *Dunkirk*, and the forts that depend upon it, be entirely demoliſhed and razed, and that the port be entirely ruined and rendered impracticable.

REMARKS.

Theſe two articles are likewiſe omitted in the Barrier treaty; whereof the firſt regards particularly the intereſt of the houſe of *Auſtria*; and the other, about demoliſhing *Dunkirk*, thoſe of *Great Britain*. It is ſomething ſtrange, that the late miniſtry, whoſe advocates raiſe ſuch a clamour about the neceſſity of recovering *Spain* from the houſe of *Bourbon*, ſhould ſuffer the *Dutch* to ſtrike out this article, which, I think, clearly ſhews the reaſon why the *States* never troubled themſelves with the thoughts of reducing *Spain* or even recovering *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*, to the *Emperor*; but were wholly fixed upon the conqueſt of *Flanders*, becauſe they had determined thoſe provinces as a property for themſelves.

As for the article about demoliſhing of *Dunkirk*, I am not at all ſurprized to find it ſtruck out; the deſtruction of that place, although it would be uſeful to the *States*, doth more nearly import *Britain*, and was therefore a point that ſuch miniſters could more eaſily get over.

The ſentiments of prince EUGENE *of* SAVOY, *and of the count* DE SINZENDORF, *relating to the barrier of the* States-general, *to the upper quarter of* Guelder, *and to the towns of the electorate of* Cologn, *and of the biſhoprick of* Liege.

ALTHOUGH the orders and inſtructions of the courts of *Vienna* and *Barcelona*, upon the matters above-mentioned, do not go ſo far as to give directions for what follows; notwithſtanding the PRINCE and COUNT above-mentioned, conſidering the preſent ſtate of affairs, are of the following opinion:

Firſt, that the counter-project of *England*, relating to the places where the *States-general* may put and keep garriſons, ought to be followed, except *Lier*, *Halle* to fortify, and the caſtle of *Gand*. Provided likewiſe, that the ſentiments of *England* be particularly conformed to, relating to *Dendermond* and *Oſtend*, as places in no wiſe belonging to the barrier; and which, as well as the caſtle of *Gand*, can only ſerve to make the *States general* maſters of the *Low-countries*, and hinder trade with *England*. And as to *Lier* and *Halle*, thoſe who are

acquainted with the country know that theſe towns cannot give any ſecurity to the *States-general*; but can only make people believe, that theſe places being fortifyed, would rather ſerve to block up *Bruſſels* and the other great cities of *Brabant*.

Secondly, as to what is ſaid in the ſeventh article of the counter-project of *England*, relating to the augmentation of garriſons, in the towns of the barrier, in caſe of an open war: This is agreeable to the opinions of the ſaid *prince* and *count*; who think likewiſe, that there ought to be added to the eighth article, that no goods nor merchandize ſhould be ſent into the towns where the *States-general* ſhall have garriſons, nor be comprehended under the name of ſuch things as the ſaid garriſons and fortifications ſhall have need of. And that to this end, the ſaid things ſhall be inſpected in thoſe places where they are to paſs; as likewiſe the quantity ſhall be ſettled that the garriſons may want.

Thirdly, as to the ninth article, relating to the governours and commanders of thoſe towns, forts, and places where the *States-general* ſhall have their garriſons; the ſaid *prince* and *count* are of opinion, that the ſaid governours and commanders ought to take an oath as well to the king of *Spain*, as to the *States-general:* but they may take a particular oath to the latter, that they will not admit foreign troops without their conſent; and that they will depend excluſively upon the ſaid *States*, in whatever regards the military power. But, at the ſame time, they ought excluſively to promiſe the king of *Spain*, that they

they will not intermeddle in the affairs of law, civil power, revenues, or any other matters, eccleſiaſtical or civil, unleſs at the deſire of the king's officers to aſſiſt them in the execution; in which caſe, the ſaid commanders ſhould be obliged not to refuſe them.

Fourthly, as to the tenth article, there is nothing to be added, unleſs that the *States-general* may repair and encreaſe the fortifications of the towns, places, and forts, where they ſhall have their garriſons; but this at their own expence. Otherwiſe, under that pretext, they might ſeize all the revenues of the country.

Fifthly, as to the eleventh article, they think the *States* ought not to have the revenues of the chatellanies and dependencies of theſe towns and places, which are to be their barrier againſt *France*; this being a ſort of ſovereignty, and very prejudicial to the eccleſiaſtical and civil œconomy of the country. But the ſaid *prince* and *count* are of opinion, that the *States-general* ought to have, for the maintenance of their garriſons and fortifications, a ſum of money of a million and a half, or two millions of florins, which they to ought receive from the king's officers, who ſhall be ordered to pay that ſum before any other payment.

Sixthly, And the convention, which ſhall be made on this affair, between his *Catholic* majeſty and the *States-general*, ſhall be for a limited time.

Theſe are the utmoſt conditions to which the ſaid *prince* and *count* think it poſſible for his *Catho-*

lick majeſty to be brought; and they declare at the ſame time, that their *Imperial* and *Catholic* majeſties will ſooner abandon the *Low-countries*, than take them upon other conditions, which would be equally expenſive, ſhameful, and unacceptable to them.

On the other ſide, the ſaid *prince* and *count* are perſuaded that the advantages, at this time, yielded to the *States-general*, may hereafter be very prejudicial to themſelves; foraſmuch, as they may put the people of the *Spaniſh Netherlands* to ſome dangerous extremity, conſidering the antipathy between the two nations; and that extending of frontiers is entirely contrary to the maxims of their government.

As to the upper quarter of *Guelder*, the ſaid *prince* and *count* are of opinion, that the *States-general* may be allowed the power of putting in garriſons into *Venlo*, *Ruremond*, and *Steffenſwaert*, with orders to furniſh the ſaid *States* with the revenues of the country, which amount to one hundred thouſand florins.

As to *Bonne*, belonging to the electorate of *Cologn*, *Liege*, and *Huy* to the biſhoprick of *Liege*, it is to be underſtood, that theſe being *imperial* towns, it doth not depend upon the *Emperor* to conſent that foreign garriſons ſhould be placed in them upon any pretence whatſoever. But whereas the *States-general* demand them not only for their ſecurity, it is propoſed to place, in thoſe towns, a garriſon of

imperial troops, of whom the *States* may be in no ſuſpicion, as they might be of a garriſon of an elector, who might poſſibly have views oppoſite to their intereſts. But this is propoſed only in caſe that it ſhall not be thought more proper to raze one or other of the ſaid towns.

The repreſentation of the Engliſh *merchants at* Bruges, *relating to the* Barrier treaty.

DAVID WHITE *and other merchants, her majeſty's ſubjects, reſiding at* Bruges *and other towns in* Flanders, *crave leave humbly to repreſent*:

THAT, whereas the cities of *Liſle*, *Tournay*, *Menin*, and other new conqueſts in *Flanders* and *Artois*, taken from the *French* this war, by the united forces of her majeſty and her allies, are now become entirely under the government of the *States-general*; and that we, her majeſty's ſubjects, may be made liable to ſuch duties and impoſitions on trade as the ſaid *States-general* ſhall think fit to impoſe on us: we humbly hope and conceive, that it is her majeſty's intention and deſign, that the trade of her dominions and ſubjects, which is carried on with theſe new conqueſts, may be on an equal foot with that of the ſubjects and dominions of the *States-general*, and not be liable to any new duty, when tranſported from the *Spaniſh Netherlands* to the ſaid new conqueſts, as, to our great ſurprize, is exacted from us on the following goods, *viz.* butter, tallow,

ſalmon, hides, beef, and all other product of her majeſty's dominions, which we import at *Oſtend*, and there pay the duty of entry to the king of *Spain*; and, conſequently, ought not to be liable to any new duty, when they carry the ſame goods and all others from their dominions, by a free paſs or *tranſire* to the ſaid new conqueſts; and we are under apprehenſion, that, if the ſaid new conqueſts be ſettled, or given entirely into the poſſeſſion of the *States-general* for their barrier (as we are made believe, by a treaty lately made by her majeſty's ambaſſador, the lord viſcount *Townſhend*, at the *Hague*) that the *States-general* may alſo ſoon declare all goods and merchandizes, which are contraband in their provinces, to be alſo contraband or prohibited in theſe new conqueſts, or new barrier; by which her majeſty's ſubjects will be deprived of the ſale and conſumption of the following products of her majeſty's dominions, which are, and have long been, declared contraband in the United provinces, ſuch as *Engliſh* and *Scotch* ſalt, malt ſpirits or corn brandy, and all other ſorts of diſtilled *Engliſh* ſpirits, whale and rape oil, *etc.*

It is therefore humbly conceived, that her majeſty, out of her great care and gracious concern for the benefit of her ſubjects and dominions, may be pleaſed to direct, by a treaty of commerce, or ſome other way, that their trade may be put on an equal foot in all the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, and the new conqueſts of barrier, with the ſubjects of *Holland*, by paying no other duty than that of importation

tation to the king of *Spain*; and, by a proviſion, that no product of her majeſty's dominions ſhall ever be declared contraband in theſe new conqueſts, except ſuch goods as were eſteemed contraband before the death of *Charles* II, king of *Spain*. And it is alſo humbly prayed, that the product and manufacture of the new conqueſts may be alſo exported without paying any new duty, beſides that of exportation at *Oſtend*, which was always paid to the king of *Spain*; it being impoſſible for any nation in *Europe* to aſſort an entire cargoe for the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, without a conſiderable quantity of ſeveral of the manufactures of *Liſle*; ſuch as caradoros, cajant, picoſes, boratten, and many other goods.

The chief things to be demanded of *France* are, to be exempted from tonnage, to have a liberty of importing herrings and all other fiſh to *France*, on the ſame terms as the *Dutch* do, and as was agreed by them at the treaty of commerce immediately after the treaty of peace at *Ryſwick*. The enlarging her majeſty's plantations in *America*, &c. is naturally recommended.

A

PREFACE

To the RIGHT REVEREND

Dr. BURNET, Biſhop of SARUM's

INTRODUCTION

To the THIRD VOLUME of the

HISTORY of the REFORMATION

OF THE

CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

Spargere voces
In vulgum ambiguas, & quærere conſcius arma.

Written in the Year 1712.

TO THE

BOOKSELLER.

Mr. MORPHEW,

YOUR care in putting an advertiſement in the *Examiner* hath been of very great uſe to me. I now ſend you my preface to the biſhop of *Sarum's introduction* to his third volume, which I deſire you to print in ſuch a form as, in the bookſeller's phraſe, will make a *ſix-penny touch:* hoping it will give ſuch a public notice of my deſign, that it may come into the hands of thoſe, who, perhaps, look not into the biſhop's *introduction* (*s*). I deſire you will prefix to this a paſſage out of *Virgil*, which doth ſo perfectly agree with my preſent thoughts of his lordſhip, that I cannot expreſs them better, nor more truly, than thoſe words do.

I am,

SIR,

Your humble Servant.

[*s*] The biſhop's introduction is prefaced with a letter to his bookſeller, of which this is a burleſque.

A PRE-

PREFACE.

To the RIGHT REVEREND

Dr. BURNET, Biſhop of *Sarum's*

INTRODUCTION, &c.

THIS way of publiſhing introductions to books that are, God knows when, to come out, is either wholly new, or ſo long unpractiſed, that my ſmall reading cannot trace it. However, we are to ſuppoſe, that a perſon of his lordſhip's great age and experience would hardly act ſuch a piece of ſingularity without ſome extraordinary motives. I cannot but obſerve, that his fellow labourer, the author of the paper called [*t*] *The Engliſhman*, ſeems, in ſome of his late performances, to have almoſt tranſcribed the notions of the biſhop: theſe notions I take to have been dictated by the ſame maſters, leaving to each writer that peculiar manner of expreſſing himſelf, which the poverty of our language forceth me to call their ſtyle. When the *Guardian* changed his title, and profeſſed to engage in faction I was ſure the word was given; that grand preparations were making againſt next ſeſſion; that all advantages would be taken of the little diſſenſions reported to be among thoſe in power; and that the

[*t*] Mr. *Steele.*

Guardian

Guardian would ſoon be ſeconded by ſome other *piquers* from the ſame camp. But I will confeſs my ſuſpicions did not carry me ſo far as to conjecture, that this venerable champion would be in ſuch a mighty haſte to come into the field, and ſerve in the quality of an *enfant* [*u*] *perdu* armed only with a *pocket-piſtol*, before his great *blunderbuſs* could be got ready, his old ruſty *breaſt-plate* ſcoured, and his cracked *head-piece* mended.

I was debating with myſelf, whether this hint of producing a ſmall pamphlet, to give notice of a large folio, was not borrowed from the ceremonial in *Spaniſh* romances, where a *dwarf* is ſent out upon the battlements to ſignify to all paſſengers what a mighty *giant* there is in the caſtle; or whether the biſhop copied this proceeding from the *fanfaronnade* [*w*] of monſieur *Bouffleurs*, when the earl of *Portland* and that general had an interview. Several men were appointed, at certain periods, to ride in great haſte towards the *Engliſh* camp, and cry out, *Monſeigneur vient*, *Monſeigneur vient* [*x*]: then ſmall parties advanced with the ſame ſpeed, and the ſame cry; and this foppery held for many hours, until the *mareſchal* himſelf arrived. So here the biſhop (as we find by his dedication to Mr. *Churchill* the bookſeller) hath, for a long time,

[*u*] *Enfant perdu*, one of the forlorn hope; the forlorn hope is a number of men ſelected for any deſperate enterprize, or appointed for the firſt onſet in a battle.

[*w*] *Fanfaronnade*, vain oſtentation.

[*x*] My lord is coming, my lord is coming.

ſent

ſent warning of his arrival by advertiſements in *gazettes*; and now his *introduction* advanceth to tell us again, *Monſeigneur vient:* in the mean time we muſt gape, and wait, and gaze, the lord knows how long, and keep our ſpirits in ſome reaſonable agitation, until his lordſhip's real ſelf ſhall think fit to appear in the habit of a folio.

I have ſeen the ſame ſort of management at a puppet-ſhow. Some puppets of little or no conſequence appeared ſeveral times at a window to allure the boys and the rabble; the trumpeter ſounded often, and the door-keeper cried an hundred times, until he was hoarſe, that they were *juſt going to begin*; yet after all we were forced ſometimes to wait an hour before *punch* himſelf in perſon made his entry.

But why this ceremony among old acquaintance? The world and he have long known one another: let him appoint his hour, and make his viſit, without troubling us all day with a ſucceſſion of meſſages from his lacquies and pages.

With ſubmiſſion, theſe little arts of getting off an edition do ill become any author above the ſize of *Marten* the ſurgeon. My lord tells us, that *many thouſands of the two former parts of his hiſtory are in the kingdom*; and now he perpetually *adverti ſeth in the gazette*, that he intends to publiſh the third. This is exactly in the method and ſtyle of *Marten: the ſeventh edition* (*many thouſands of the former editions having been ſold off in a ſmall time*) *of Mr.* Marten's *book concerning ſecret diſeaſes*, &c.

Doth

Doth his lordſhip intend to publiſh his great volume by ſubſcription, and is this introduction only by way of *ſpecimen?* I was inclined to think ſo, becauſe in the prefixed letter to Mr. *Churchill*, which *introduces* this *introduction*, there are ſome dubious expreſſions; he ſays, *the advertiſements he publiſhed were in order to move people to furniſh him with* materials, *which might help him to finiſh his work* with great *advantage*. If he means half-a-guinea upon the ſubſcription, and the other half at the delivery, why doth he not tell us ſo in plain terms?

I am wondering how it came to paſs, that this diminutive letter to Mr. *Churchill* ſhould underſtand the buſineſs of *introducing* better than the *introduction* itſelf; or why the biſhop did not take it into his head to ſend the former into the world ſome months before the latter, which would have been yet a greater improvement upon the ſolemnity of the proceſſion?

Since I write theſe laſt lines, I have peruſed the whole pamphlet (which I had only dipt in before) and found I have been hunting upon a wrong ſcent; for the author hath, in ſeveral parts of his piece, diſcovered the true motives, which put him upon ſending it abroad at this juncture. I ſhall therefore conſider them as they come in my way.

My lord begins his *introduction* with an account of the reaſons, why he was guilty of ſo many miſtakes in the firſt volume of his *hiſtory of the reformation:* his excuſes are juſt, rational, and extremely conſiſtent. He ſays, *he wrote in haſte*, which he con-

firms by adding, *that it lay a year after he wrote it before it was put into the* preſs. At the ſame time, he mentions a paſſage extremely to the honour of that pious and excellent prelate, archbiſhop *Sancroft*, which demonſtrates his grace to have been a perſon of great ſagacity, and almoſt a prophet. Doctor *Burnet*, then a private divine, *deſired admittance to the* Cotton *library, but was prevented* [*y*] *by the archbiſhop, who told Sir* John Cotton, *that the ſaid doctor was no friend to the prerogative of the crown, or to the conſtitution of the kingdom.* This judgment was the more extraordinary, becauſe the doctor had not long before publiſhed a book in *Scotland* with his name prefixed, which carries the

[*y*] It is ſomewhat remarkable to ſee the progreſs of this ſtory. In the firſt edition of this *introduction* it ſhould ſeem, "he was PRE-"VENTED by the archbiſhop," *&c.* When the *introduction* was reprinted a year after with the *hiſtory*, it ſtands: "A GREAT PRELATE "had been before-hand, and poſſeſſed him (Sir *John Cotton*) againſt "me—That unleſs the archbiſhop of *Canterbury* would recommend "me—he deſired to be excuſed—The biſhop of *Worceſter* could "not prevail on the archbiſhop to INTERPOSE." This is ſome-"what leſs than PREVENTING; unleſs the archbiſhop be meant by the GREAT PRELATE; which is not very probable, 1. Becauſe, in the preface to this very 3d volume, p. 4. he ſays, "It was by "archbiſhop *Sancroft's* order he had the free uſe of every thing "that lay in the *Lambeth* library." 2. Becauſe the author of *Speculum Sarisburianum*, p. 6. tells us, "His acceſs to the library "was owing SOLELY to the recommendation of archbiſhop *Sancroft*. "as I have been informed (ſays the author) by ſome of the family." 3. Becauſe biſhop *Burnet*, in his *Hiſtory of his own times*, vol. i. p. 396, ſays it was "DOLBEN, biſhop of *Rocheſter*, [at the inſtiga-"tion of the duke of *Lauderdale*,] that diverted Sir *John Cotton* "from ſuffering him to ſearch his library."

regal

regal prerogative higher than any writer of the age: however, the good archbiſhop lived to ſee his opinion become univerſal in the kingdom.

The biſhop goes on, for many pages, with an account of certain facts relating to the publiſhing his two former volumes of the *Reformation*; the great ſucceſs of that work, and the adverſaries who appeared againſt it. Theſe are matters out of the way of my reading; only I obſerve that poor Mr. *Henry Wharton*, who hath deſerved ſo well of the commonwealth of learning, and who gave himſelf the trouble of detecting ſome hundreds of the biſhop's miſtakes, meets with very ill quarter from his lordſhip; upon which I cannot avoid mentioning a peculiar method, which this prelate takes to revenge himſelf upon thoſe who preſume to differ from him in print. The biſhop of *Rocheſter* [z] happened, ſome years ago, to be of this number. My lord of *Sarum*, in his reply, ventured to tell the world, that the gentleman, who had writ againſt him, meaning Dr. *Atterbury*, was one upon whom he had conferred great obligations; which was a very generous Chriſtian contrivance of charging his adverſary with ingratitude. But it ſeems the truth happed to be on the other ſide, which the doctor made appear in ſuch a manner as would have ſilenced his lordſhip for ever, if he had not been writing-proof. Poor Mr. *Wharton*, in his grave, is charged with the ſame accuſation, but with circumſtances the moſt aggravating that malice and

[z] Dr. *Atterbury*.

ſome-

ſomething elſe could invent: and which I will no more believe than five hundred paſſages in a certain book of travels [*a*]. See the character he gives of a divine and a ſcholar, who ſhortened his life in the ſervice of God and the church. *Mr.* Wharton *deſired me to intercede with* Tillotſon *for a prebend of* Canterbury. *I did ſo*; *but* Wharton *would not believe it*; *ſaid, he would be revenged, and ſo writ againſt me. Soon after, he was convinced I had ſpoke for him*; *ſaid, he was ſet on to do what he did, and, if I would procure any thing for him, he would diſcover every thing to me.* What a ſpirit of candour, charity and good-nature, generoſity and truth, ſhines through this ſtory, told of a moſt excellent and pious divine, twenty years after his death, without one ſingle voucher!

Come we now to the reaſons, which moved his lordſhip to ſet about this work at this time. *He could delay it no longer, becauſe the reaſons of his engaging in it at firſt ſeemed to return upon him.* He was then frightened with *the danger of a popiſh ſucceſſor in view, and the dreadful apprehenſions of the power of* France. England *hath forgot theſe dangers*, and yet is *nearer to them than ever*; and therefore he is reſolved to *awaken them* with his third volume; but, in the mean time, ſends this *introduction* to let them know they are aſleep. He then goes on in deſcribing the condition of the kingdom after ſuch a manner, as if deſtruction hung over us by a ſin-

[*a*] *Burnet's* Travels.

gle hair; as if the *pope*, the *devil*, the *pretender*, and *France* were juſt at our doors.

When the biſhop publiſhed his hiſtory, there was a *popiſh* plot on foot: the duke of *York*, a known *papiſt*, was preſumptive heir to the crown: the houſe of commons would not hear of any expedient for ſecuring their religion under a *popiſh* prince, nor would the king, or lords, conſent to a bill of excluſion: the *French* king was in the height of his grandeur, and the vigour of his age. At this day, the preſumptive heir, with that whole illuſtrious family, are *proteſtants*; the *popiſh pretender* excluded for ever by ſeveral acts of parliament; and every perſon in the ſmalleſt employment, as well as the members of both houſes, obliged to *abjure* him. The *French* king is at the loweſt ebb of life; his armies have been conquered, and his towns won from him for ten years together; and his kingdom is in danger of being torn, by diviſions, during a long minority. Are theſe caſes parallel? Or are we now in more danger of *France* and *popery*, than we were thirty years ago? What can be the motive for advancing ſuch falſe, ſuch deteſtable aſſertions? What concluſions would his lordſhip draw from ſuch premiſſes as theſe? If injurious appellations were of any advantage to a cauſe (as the ſtyle of our adverſaries would make us believe) what appellations would thoſe deſerve, who thus endeavour to ſow the ſeeds of ſedition, and are impatient to ſee the fruits? *But*, ſaith he, *the deaf adder ſtoppeth her ears, let the charmer charm never*

never ſo wiſely. True, my lord, there are, indeed, too many *adders* in this nation's boſom; *adders* in all ſhapes and in all habits, whom neither the QUEEN nor parliament can *charm* to loyalty, truth, religion, or honour.

Among other inſtances, produced by him, of the diſmal condition we are in, he offers one which could not eaſily be gueſſed. It is this, *that the little factious pamphlets, written about the end of king* Charles *the* ſecond's *reign, lie dead in ſhops, are looked on as waſte paper, and turned to paſteboard.* How many are there of his lordſhip's writing, which could otherwiſe never have been of any real ſervice to the publick? Hath he, indeed, ſo mean an opinion of our taſte to ſend us, at this time of day, into all the corners of *Holborn*, *Duck-lane*, and *Moorfields*, in queſt after the factious traſh publiſhed in thoſe days, by *Julian Johnſon*, *Hickeringil*, Dr. *Oates*, and himſelf?

His lordſhip, taking it for a *poſtulatum*, that the QUEEN and miniſtry, both houſes of parliament, and a vaſt majority of the landed gentlemen throughout *England*, are running headlong into *popery*, layeth hold on the occaſion to deſcribe *the cruelties in queen* Mary's *reign: an inquiſition ſetting up faggots in* Smithfield, *and executions all over the kingdom. Here is that*, ſays he, *which thoſe, that look towards a popiſh ſucceſſor, muſt look for.* And he inſinuates through his whole pamphlet, that all, who are not of his party, *look towards a popiſh ſucceſſor.* Theſe he divides into two parts, the *tory*

laity, and the *tory clergy*. He tells the former: *although they have no religion at all, but reſolve to change with every wind and tide; yet they ought to have compaſſion on their countrymen and kindred.* Then he applies himſelf to the *tory* clergy, aſſures them, that *the fires revived in* Smithfield, *and all over the nation, will have no amiable view, but leaſt of all to them, who, if they have any principles at all, muſt be turned out of their livings, leave their families, be hunted from place to place into parts beyond the ſeas, and meet with that contempt with which they treated foreigners, who took ſanctuary among us.*

This requires a recapitulation, with ſome remarks. Firſt, I do affirm, that in every hundred of profeſſed *atheiſts*, *deiſts*, and *ſocinians* in the kingdom, ninety-nine, at leaſt, are ſtaunch thorough-paced *whigs*, entirely agreeing with his lordſhip in politicks and diſcipline; and therefore will venture all the fires of hell, rather than ſinge one hair of their beards in *Smithfield*. Secondly, I do likewiſe affirm, that thoſe whom we uſually underſtand by the appellation of *tory*, or high-church clergy, were the greateſt ſticklers againſt the exorbitant proceedings of king *James* the ſecond, the beſt writers againſt *popery*, and the moſt exemplary ſufferers for the eſtabliſhed religion. Thirdly, I do pronounce it to be a moſt falſe and infamous ſcandal upon the nation in general, and on the clergy in particular, to reproach them for *treating foreigners with haughtineſs and contempt*. The *French Hugonots* are many thouſand witneſſes to the contrary; and I wiſh they deſerved

deſerved the thouſandth part of the good treatment they have received.

Laſtly, I obſerve, that the author of a paper called *The Engliſhman* hath run into the ſame cant, gravely adviſing the whole body of the clergy not to bring in *popery*; becauſe that will put them under a neceſſity of parting with their wives, or loſing their livings.

The bulk of the kingdom, both clergy and laity, happen to differ extremely from this prelate in many principles both of politicks and religion. Now I aſk, whether, if any man of them had ſigned his name to a ſyſtem of *atheiſm*, or *popery*, he could have argued with them otherwiſe than he doth? Or, if I ſhould write a grave letter to his lordſhip with the ſame advice, taking it for granted, that he was half an *atheiſt* and half a *papiſt*, and conjuring him, by all he held dear, to have compaſſion upon all thoſe who believed a God; *not to* revive the fires *in* Smithfield; *that he muſt either forfeit his biſhoprick, or not marry a fourth wife*; I aſk, whether he would not think I intended him the higheſt injury and affront?

But as to the *tory* laity, he gives them up in a lump for abandoned atheiſts: they are a ſett of men *ſo impiouſly corrupted in the point of religion, that no ſcene of cruelty can fright them from leaping into it* [popery], *and, perhaps, acting ſuch a part in it as may be aſſigned them.* He therefore deſpairs of influencing them by any topicks drawn from religion or compaſſion, and advances the conſideration of

intereſt, as the only powerful argument to perſuade them againſt *popery*.

What he offers upon this head is ſo very amazing from a *Chriſtian*, a *clergyman*, and a *prelate* of the *church* of *England*, that I muſt, in my own imagination, ſtrip him of thoſe three capacities, and put him among the number of *that ſett of men* he mentions in the paragraph before; or elſe it will be impoſſible to ſhape out an anſwer.

His lordſhip, in order to diſſuade the *tories* from their deſign of bringing in *popery*, tells them, *how valuable a part of the whole ſoil of* England, *the abby lands, the eſtates of the biſhops, of the cathedrals, and the tithes are:* how *difficult* ſuch a reſumption would be to many families; *yet all theſe muſt be thrown up; for* ſacrilege *in the church of* Rome *is a mortal ſin.* I deſire it may be obſerved, what a jumble here is made of eccleſiaſtical revenues, as if they were all upon the ſame foot, were alienated with equal juſtice, and the clergy had no more reaſon to complain of one than the other; whereas the four branches mentioned by him are of very different conſideration. If I might venture to gueſs the opinion of the clergy upon this matter, I believe they could wiſh, that ſome ſmall part of the *abby lands* had been applied to the augmentation of poor biſhopricks; and a very few acres to ſerve for glebes in thoſe pariſhes, where there are none; after which, I think, they would not repine that the laity ſhould poſſeſs the reſt. If the eſtates of ſome biſhops and cathedrals were exorbitant before

th

the Reformation, I believe the preſent clergy's wiſhes reach no further, than that ſome reaſonable temper had been uſed, inſtead of paring them to the quick. But as to the *tithes*, without examining whether they be of divine inſtitution, I conceive there is hardly one of that ſacred order in *England*, and very few even among the *laity* who love the *church*, who will not allow the miſapplying thoſe revenues to ſecular perſons to have been at firſt a moſt flagrant act of injuſtice and oppreſſion; although, at the ſame time, God forbid they ſhould be reſtored any other way than by gradual purchaſe, by the conſent of thoſe who are now the lawful poſſeſſors, or by the piety and generoſity of ſuch worthy ſpirits as this nation ſometimes produceth. The biſhop knows very well, that the application of *tithes* to the maintenance of monaſteries was a ſcandalous uſurpation, even in *popiſh* times: that the monks uſually ſent out ſome of their fraternity to ſupply the cures; and that when the monaſteries were granted away by *Henry* VIII. the pariſhes were left deſtitute, or very meanly provided, of any maintenance for a paſtor. So that, in many places, the whole eccleſiaſtical dues, even to *mortuaries*, *Eaſter-offerings*, and the like, are in lay hands, and the incumbent lies wholly at the mercy of his patron for his daily bread. By theſe means there are ſeveral hundred pariſhes in *England* under twenty pounds a year, and many under ten. I take his lordſhip's biſhoprick to be worth near 2500*l.* annual income; and I will engage, at half a year's

warning, to find him above an hundred beneficial clergymen, who have not ſo much among them all to ſupport themſelves and their families: moſt of them orthodox, of good life and converſation: as loth to ſee the fires kindled in *Smithfield* as his lordſhip; and at leaſt as ready to face them under a *popiſh* perſecution. But nothing is ſo hard for thoſe, who abound in riches, as to conceive how others can be in want. How can the neighbouring vicar feel cold or hunger, while my lord is ſeated by a good fire, in the warmeſt room of his palace, with a dozen diſhes before him? I remember one other prelate much of the ſame ſtamp, who, when his clergy would mention their wiſhes that ſome act of parliament might be thought of for the good of the church, would ſay: *Gentlemen, we are very well as we are; if they would let us alone, we ſhould aſk no more.*

Sacrilege (ſays my lord) *in the church of* Rome *is a mortal ſin:* and is it only ſo in the *church* of *Rome?* or, is it but a venial ſin in the church of *England?* Our litany calls *fornication a deadly ſin*; and I would appeal to his lordſhip, for fifty years paſt, whether he thought that or *ſacrilege* the *deadlieſt?* To make light of ſuch a ſin, at the ſame moment that he is frightening us from an idolatrous religion, ſhould ſeem not very conſiſtent. *Thou that ſayeſt a man ſhould not commit adultery, doſt thou commit adultery? Thou that abhorreſt idols, doſt thou commit ſacrilege?*

To

To ſmooth the way for the return of popery in queen *Mary's* time, the grantees were confirmed by the *pope* in the poſſeſſion of the abby lands. But the biſhop tells us, that *this confirmation was fraudulent and invalid.* I ſhall believe it to be ſo, although I happen to read it in his lordſhip's hiſtory. But he adds, *that although the confirmation had been good, the prieſts would have got their land again by theſe two methods:* Firſt, *The ſtatute of* Mortmain *was repealed for twenty years; in which time, no doubt, they reckoned they would recover the beſt part of what they had loſt: beſides that, engaging the clergy to renew no leaſes was a thing entirely in their own power; and this, in forty years time, would raiſe their revenues to be about ten times their preſent value.* Theſe two expedients, for increaſing the revenues of the *church*, he repreſents as pernicious deſigns, fit only to be practiſed in times of *popery*, and ſuch as the *laity* ought never to conſent to: from whence, and from what he ſaid before about tithes, his lordſhip hath freely declared his opinion, that the clergy are rich enough, and that the leaſt addition to their ſubſiſtence would be a ſtep towards *popery.* Now it happens, that the two only methods, which could be thought on, with any probability of ſucceſs, towards ſome reaſonable augmentation of eccleſiaſtical revenues, are here rejected by a biſhop as a means for introducing *popery*, and the nation publicly warned againſt them: whereas the continuance of the ſtatute of *Mortmain* in full force, after the church had been

ſo

ſo terribly ſtripped, appeared to her majeſty and the kingdom a very unneceſſary hardſhip; upon which account it was, at ſeveral times, *relaxed* by the legiſlature. Now, as the relaxation of that ſtatute is manifeſtly one of the reaſons, which gives the biſhop thoſe terrible apprehenſions of *popery* coming on us; ſo I conceive another ground of his fears is the remiſſion of the *firſt-fruits* and *tenths*. But where the inclination of *popery* lay, whether in her majeſty, who propoſed this benefaction, the parliament which confirmed, or the clergy who accepted it, his lordſhip hath not thought fit to determine.

The other *popiſh* expedient for augmenting church revenues is, *engaging the clergy to renew no leaſes*. Several of the moſt eminent clergymen have aſſured me, that nothing has been more wiſhed for, by good men, than a law to prevent (at leaſt) biſhops from letting leaſes for lives. I could name ten biſhopricks in *England*, whoſe revenues, one with another, do not amount to 600 pounds a year for each: and if his lordſhip's, for inſtance, would be above ten times the value when the lives are expired, I ſhould think the overplus would not be ill diſpoſed towards an augmentation of ſuch as are now ſhamefully poor. But I do aſſert, that ſuch an expedient was not always thought *popiſh* and dangerous by this right reverend hiſtorian. I have had the honour formerly to converſe with him; and he hath told me ſeveral years ago, that he lamented extremely the power which biſhops had of letting

letting leaſes for lives; whereby, as he ſaid, they were utterly deprived of raiſing their revenues, whatever alterations might happen in the value of money by length of time. I think the reproach of betraying private converſation will not, upon this account, be laid to my charge. Neither do I believe he would have changed his opinion upon any ſcore, but to take up another more agreeable to the maxims of his party, *That the leaſt addition of property to the church is one ſtep towards* popery.

The biſhop goes on with much earneſtneſs and prolixity to prove, That the *pope's* confirmation of the *church lands*, to thoſe who held them by king *Henry's* donation, was null and fraudulent; which is a point that, I believe, no *proteſtant* in *England* would give three-pence to have his choice, whether it ſhould be true or falſe. It might, indeed, ſerve as a paſſage in his hiſtory, among a thouſand other inſtances, to detect the knavery of the court of *Rome:* but I aſk, Where could be the uſe of it in this *introduction?* or why all this haſte in publiſhing it at this juncture; and ſo out of all method, apart, and before the work itſelf? He gives his reaſons in very plain terms: We are now, it ſeems, *in more danger of* popery *than towards the end of king* Charles *the* ſecond's *reign. That ſett of men* (the tories) *is ſo impiouſly corrupted in the point of religion, that no ſcene of cruelty can frighten them from leaping into it; and, perhaps, from acting ſuch a part in it as may be aſſigned them.* He doubts whether the high-church clergy have any principles; and there-

fore

fore will be ready to turn off their wives, and look on the fires kindled in *Smithfield* as an *amiable view*. Theſe are the facts he all along takes for granted, and argues accordingly. Therefore, in deſpair of diſſuading the nobility and gentry of the land from introducing *popery* by any motives of honour, religion, alliance, or mercy, he aſſures them, *That the* pope *hath not duly confirmed their titles to the church lands in their poſſeſſion:* which therefore muſt be infallibly reſtored as ſoon as that religion is eſtabliſhed among us.

Thus, in his lordſhip's opinion, there is nothing wanting to make the majority of the kingdom, both for number, quality, and poſſeſſion, immediately embrace *popery*, except a *firm bull from the pope* to ſecure the abby and other church lands and tithes to the preſent proprietors and their heirs. If this only difficulty could now be adjuſted, the *pretender* would be reſtored next ſeſſion, the two houſes reconciled to the church of *Rome* againſt *Eaſter* term, and the fires lighted in *Smithfield* by *Midſummer*. Such horrible calumnies againſt a nation are not the leſs injurious to decency, goodnature, truth, honour, and religion, becauſe they may be vented with ſafety; and I will appeal to any reader of common underſtanding, whether this be not the moſt natural and neceſſary deduction from the paſſages I have cited and referred to.

Yet all this is but friendly dealing, in compariſon with what he affords the clergy upon the ſame article. He ſuppoſes that whole reverend body, who

differ from him in principles of *church* or *ſtate*, ſo far from diſliking *popery* upon the abovementioned motives of *perjury*, *quitting their wives*, *or burning their relations*; that the hopes of *enjoying the abby lands* would ſoon bear down all ſuch conſiderations, and be an effectual incitement to their perverſion: and ſo he goes gravely on, as with the only argument which he thinks can have any force, to aſſure them, that the *parochial prieſts in* Roman *catholic countries*, *are much poorer than in ours*; *the ſeveral orders of regulars*, *and the magnificence of their church*, *devouring all their treaſure*; and, by conſequence, *their hopes are vain of expecting to be richer after the introduction of* popery.

But after all, his lordſhip deſpairs that even this argument will have any force with our abominable clergy, becauſe, to uſe his own words, *They are an inſenſible and degenerate race*, *who are thinking of nothing but their preſent advantages*; *and*, *ſo that they may now ſupport a luxurious and brutal courſe of irregular and voluptuous practices*, *they are eaſily hired to betray their religion*, *to ſell their country*, *and give up that liberty and thoſe properties*, *which are the preſent felicities and glories of this nation.*

He ſeems to reckon all theſe evils as matters fully determined on, and therefore falls into the laſt uſual form of deſpair, by threatening the authors of theſe miſeries with *laſting infamy*, *and the curſes of poſterity upon perfidious betrayers of their truſt.*

Let

Let me turn this paragraph into vulgar language *for the uſe of the poor*; and ſtrictly adhere to the ſenſe of the words. I believe, it may be faithfully tranſlated in the following manner: *The bulk of the clergy, and one third of the biſhops, are ſtupid ſons of whores, who think of nothing but getting money as ſoon as they can; if they may but procure enough to ſupply them in gluttony, drunkenneſs, and whoring, they are ready to turn traitors to* God *and their country, and make their fellow-ſubjects ſlaves.* The reſt of the period, about threatening infamy and the curſes of poſterity upon ſuch dogs and villains, may ſtand as it doth in the biſhop's own phraſe; and ſo make the paragraph all of a piece.

I will engage, on the other ſide, to paraphraſe all the *rogues* and *raſcals* in the *Engliſhman*, ſo as to bring them up exactly to his lordſhip's ſtyle: but, for my own part, I much prefer the plain *Billingsgate* way of calling names, becauſe it expreſſeth our meaning full as well, and would ſave abundance of time, which is loſt by circumlocution: So, for inſtance, *John Dunton*, who is retained on the ſame ſide with the biſhop, calls my *lord Treaſurer* and *lord Bolingbroke* traitors, whoremongers, and jacobites; which three words coſt our right reverend author thrice as many lines to define them; and I hope his lordſhip doth not think there is any difference in point of morality, whether a man calls me *traitor* in one word, or ſays I am one *hired to betray my religion, and ſell my country.*

I am

I am not ſurprized to ſee the biſhop mention, with contempt, all convocations of the clergy; for *Toland*, *Aſgil*, *Monmouth*, *Collins*, *Tindal*, and others of the fraternity, talk the very ſame language. His lordſhip confeſſeth he is *not* inclined *to expect much from the aſſemblies of clergymen.* There lies the misfortune; for, if he and ſome more of his order would correct their *inclinations*, a great deal of good might be expected from ſuch aſſemblies; as much as they are now cramped by that ſubmiſſion, which a corrupt clergy brought upon their innocent ſucceſſors. He *will not deny that his copiouſneſs in theſe matters is, in his own opinion, one of the meaneſt parts of his new work.* I will agree with him, unleſs he happens to be more *copious* in any thing elſe. However, it is not eaſy to conceive, why he ſhould be ſo *copious* upon a ſubject he ſo much deſpiſeth, unleſs it were to gratify his talent of railing at the *clergy*, in the number of whom he diſdains to be reckoned, becauſe he is a *biſhop*; for it is a ſtyle I obſerve ſome prelates have fallen into of late years, to talk of the clergymen as if themſelves were not of the number. You will read, in many of their ſpeeches at Dr. *Sacheverel's* trial, expreſſions to this or the like effect: *My lords, if clergymen be ſuffered*, &c. wherein they ſeem to have reaſon; and I am pretty confident, that a great majority of the clergy were heartily inclined to diſown any relation they had to the *managers in lawn.* However, it was a confounding argument againſt *preſbytery*, that thoſe prelates, who are moſt ſuſpected to lean that way

way, treated their inferior brethren with *haughtineſs*, *rigour*, and *contempt*; although, to ſay the truth, nothing better could be hoped for; becauſe, I believe, it may paſs for an univerſal rule, that, in every dioceſe governed by biſhops of the *whig* ſpecies, the clergy (eſpecially the poorer ſort) are under double diſcipline; and the *laity* left to themſelves. The opinion of Sir *Thomas More*, which he produceth to prove the ill conſequences or inſignificancy of convocations, advanceth no ſuch thing; but ſays, *if the clergy aſſembled often, and might act as other aſſemblies of clergy in* Chriſtendom, *much good might have come*; but the misfortune lay *in their long diſuſe, and that, in his own and a good part of his father's time, they never came together, except at the command of the prince.*

I ſuppoſe, his lordſhip thinks there is ſome original impediment in the ſtudy of divinity, or ſecret incapacity in a gown and caſſock *without lawn*, which diſqualifies all inferior clergymen from debating upon ſubjects of doctrine or diſcipline in the church. It is a famous ſaying of his, *That he lookt upon every layman to be an honeſt man, until he is, by experience, convinced to the contrary; and on every clergymen as a knave, until he finds him to be an honeſt man.* What opinion then muſt we have of a lower houſe of convocation; where, I am confident, he will hardly find three perſons that ever convinced him of their honeſty, or will ever be at the pains to do it? Nay, I am afraid they would think ſuch a conviction might be no very advantageous bargain,

gain, to gain the character of an honeſt man with his lordſhip, and loſe it with the reſt of the world.

In the famous *concordate* that was made between *Francis* I. of *France* and pope *Leo* X. the biſhop tells us, that *the king and pope came to a bargain, by which they divided the liberties of the* Gallican *church between them, and indeed quite enſlaved it.* He intends, in the third part of his hiſtory, which he is going to publiſh, *to open this whole matter to the world.* In the mean time, he mentions ſome ill conſequences to the *Gallican* church from that *concordate*, which are worthy to be obſerved: *The church of* France *became a ſlave; and this change in their conſtitution put an end not only to national, but even to provincial ſynods in that kingdom. The aſſemblies of the clergy there meet now only to give ſubſidies*, &c. and he ſays, *our nation may ſee, by that proceeding, what it is to deliver up the eſſential liberties of a free conſtitution to a court.*

All I can gather from this matter is, that our king *Henry* made a better bargain than his contemporary *Francis*, who divided the liberties of the church between himſelf and the pope, while the king of *England* ſeized them all to himſelf. But how comes he to number the want of ſynods in the *Gallican* church among the grievances of that *concordate*, and as a mark of their ſlavery, ſince he reckons all convocations of the clergy in *England* to be uſeleſs and dangerous? Or what difference, in point of liberty, was there between the *Gallican* church under *Francis*, and the *Engliſh* under *Harry?*

For the latter was as much a *papiſt* as the former, unleſs in the point of obedience to the ſee of *Rome*; and in every quality of a good man or a good prince (except perſonal courage, wherein both were equal) the *French* monarch had the advantage by as many degrees as is poſſible for one man to have over another.

Henry the eighth had no manner of intention to change religion in his kingdom; he continued to perſecute and burn *proteſtants*, after he had caſt off the *pope's* ſupremacy; and, I ſuppoſe, his ſeizure of eccleſiaſtical revenues (which *Francis* never attempted) cannot be reckoned as a mark of the church's *liberty*. By the quotation the biſhop ſets down to ſhew the ſlavery of the *French* church, he repreſents it as a grievance, that *biſhops are not now elected there as formerly, but wholly appointed by the prince; and that thoſe made by the court have been ordinarily the chief advancers of ſchiſms, hereſies, and oppreſſions of the church.* He cites another paſſage from a *Greek* writer, and plainly inſinuates, that it is juſtly applicable to her majeſty's reign: *princes chuſe ſuch men to that charge* (of a biſhop) *who may be their ſlaves, and in all things obſequious to what they preſcribe, and may lie at their feet, and have not ſo much as a thought contrary to their commands.*

Theſe are very ſingular paſſages for his lordſhip to ſet down, in order to ſhew the diſmal conſequences of the *French concordate*, by the ſlavery of the *Gallican* church compared with the freedom of ours. I ſhall not enter into a long diſpute, whether

ther it were better for religion, that biſhops ſhould be choſen by the clergy, or people, or both together: I believe, our author would give his vote for the ſecond (which, however, would not have been of much advantage to himſelf, and ſome others that I could name); but I aſk, whether biſhops are any more elected in *England* than in *France?* And the want of ſynods are, in his own opinion, rather a bleſſing than a grievance, unleſs he will affirm, that more good can be expected from a *popiſh* ſynod than an *Engliſh convocation*. Did the *French* clergy ever receive a greater blow to their liberties than the ſubmiſſion made to *Henry* the eighth; or ſo great a one as the ſeizure of their lands? The Reformation owed nothing to the good intentions of king *Henry:* he was only an inſtrument of it (as the logicians ſpeak) by accident; nor doth he appear, throughout his whole reign, to have had any other views than thoſe of gratifying his inſatiable love of power, cruelty, oppreſſion, and other irregular appetites. But this kingdom, as well as many other parts of *Europe*, was, at that time, generally weary of the corruptions and impoſitions of the *Roman* court and church; and diſpoſed to receive thoſe doctrines, which *Luther* and his followers had univerſally ſpread. *Cranmer* the archbiſhop, *Cromwell*, and others of the court, did ſecretly embrace the Reformation; and the king's abrogating the *pope's* ſupremacy made the people in general run into the new doctrine with greater freedom, becauſe they hoped to be ſupported in it by the *au-*

thority and *example* of their *prince*; who diſappointed them ſo far, that he made no other ſtep, than rejecting the *pope's* ſupremacy as a clog upon his own power and paſſions; but retained every corruption beſides, and became a cruel perſecutor, as well of thoſe who denied his own ſupremacy, as of all others who profeſſed any *proteſtant* doctrine. Neither hath any thing diſguſted me more in reading the hiſtories of thoſe times, than to ſee one of the worſt princes of any age or country celebrated as an inſtrument in that glorious work of the Reformation.

The biſhop, having gone over all the matters that properly fall within his *introduction*, proceeds to expoſtulate with ſeveral ſorts of people: firſt with *proteſtants*, who are no *Chriſtians*, ſuch as *atheiſts*, *deiſts*, *freethinkers*, and the like enemies to Chriſtianity: but theſe he treats with the tenderneſs of a friend, becauſe they are all of them of ſound *whig* principles in church and ſtate. However, to do him juſtice, he lightly toucheth ſome old topicks for the truth of the goſpel; and concludes, by *wiſhing that the* freethinkers *would conſider well, if* (anglice, *whether*) *they think it is poſſible to bring a nation to be without any religion at all; and what the conſequences of that may prove*; and in caſe they allow the negative, he gives it clearly for Chriſtianity.

Secondly, he applieth himſelf (if I take his meaning right) to Chriſtian papiſts, *who have a taſte of liberty*; and deſires them to *compare the abſurdity of*

of their own religion with the reaſonableneſs of the reformed: againſt which, as good luck would have it, I have nothing to object.

Thirdly, he is ſomewhat rough againſt his own party, *who, having taſted the ſweets of* proteſtant *liberty, can look back ſo tamely on* popery *coming on them*; it looks as if they were bewitched, or that the devil were in them, to be ſo negligent. *It is not enough, that they reſolve not to turn* papiſts *themſelves; they ought to awaken all about them, even the moſt ignorant and ſtupid, to apprehend their danger, and to exert themſelves with their utmoſt induſtry to guard againſt it, and to reſiſt it. If, after all their endeavours to prevent it, the corruption of the age, and the art and power of our enemies, prove too hard for us; then, and not until then, we muſt ſubmit to the will of* God, *and be ſilent; and prepare ourſelves for all the extremities of ſuffering and of miſery,* with a great deal more of the ſame ſtrain.

With due ſubmiſſion to the profound ſagacity of this prelate, who can ſmell *popery* at five hundred miles diſtance, better than *fanaticiſm* juſt under his noſe, I take leave to tell him, that this reproof to his friends, for want of zeal and clamour againſt *popery, ſlavery,* and the *pretender*, is what they have not deſerved. Are the pamphlets and papers, daily publiſhed by the ſublime authors of his party, full of any thing elſe? Are not the QUEEN, the miniſters, the majority of lords and commons, loudly taxed, in print, with this charge againſt them at full length? Is it not the perpetual echo of every

whig coffee-houſe and club? Have they not quartered *popery* and the *pretender* upon the peace and treaty of commerce; upon the poſſeſſing, and quitting, and keeping, and demoliſhing of *Dunkirk?* Have they not clamoured, becauſe the *pretender* continued in *France*, and becauſe he left it? Have they not reported that the town ſwarmed with many thouſand *papiſts*; when, upon ſearch, there were never found ſo few of that religion in it before? If a clergyman preacheth obedience to the higher powers, is he not immediately traduced as a *papiſt?* Can mortal man do more? To deal plainly, my lord, your friends are not ſtrong enough *yet* to make an inſurrection; and it is unreaſonable to expect one from them, until their neighbours be ready.

My lord, I have a little ſerioufneſs at heart upon this *point*, where your lordſhip *affects* to ſhew ſo much. When you can prove, that one ſingle word hath ever dropt from any miniſter of ſtate, in *public* or *private*, in favour of the *pretender*, or his cauſe; when you can make it appear, that, in the courſe of this adminiſtration, ſince the QUEEN thought fit to change her ſervants, there hath one ſtep been made towards weakening the *Hanover* title, or giving the leaſt countenance to any other whatſoever; then, and not until then, go dry your *chaff* and *ſtubble*, give fire to the zeal of your faction, and reproach them with lukewarmneſs.

Fourthly, the biſhop applies himſelf to the *tories* in general; taking it for granted, after his charitable

able manner, that they are all ready prepared to introduce *popery*. He puts an excuſe into their mouths, by which they would endeavour to juſtify their change of religion: *Popery is not what it was before the Reformation: things are now much mended, and further corrections might be expected, if we would enter into a treaty with them: in particular, they ſee the error of proceeding ſeverely with hereticks; ſo that there is no reaſon to apprehend the returns of ſuch cruelties, as were practiſed an age and a half ago.*

This, he aſſures us, is a plea offered by the *tories*, in defence of themſelves, for going about, at this juncture, to eſtabliſh the *popiſh* religion among us: what argument doth he bring to prove the fact itſelf?

Quibus indiciis, quo teſte probavit?
Nil horum: verboſa et grandis epiſtola venit.

Nothing but this tedious *Introduction*, wherein he ſuppoſeth it all along as a thing granted. That there might be a perfect union in the whole Chriſtian church, is a bleſſing which every good man wiſheth, but no reaſonable man can hope. That the more polite *Roman* catholicks have, in ſeveral places, given up ſome of their ſuperſtitious fopperies, particularly concerning *legends*, *relicks*, and the like, is what no body denies. But the material points in difference between us and them are univerſally retained and aſſerted in all their controverſial writings. And if his lordſhip really thinks that every man, who differs from him under the name of a *tory* in ſome church and ſtate opinions,

is ready to believe *tranſubſtantiation*, *purgatory*, the *infallibility* of pope or councils, to *worſhip ſaints* and *angels*, and the like; I can only pray God to enlighten his underſtanding, or graft in his heart the firſt principles of charity; a virtue, which ſome *people* ought not, by any means, wholly to renounce, *becauſe it covereth a multitude of ſins.*

Fifthly, the biſhop applies himſelf to his own party in both houſes of parliament, whom he exhorts to *guard their religion and liberty againſt all danger, at what diſtance ſoever it may appear. If they are abſent and remiſs on critical occaſions*; that is to ſay, if they do not attend cloſe next ſeſſion, to vote upon all occaſions whatever againſt the proceedings of the QUEEN and her miniſtry, *or if any views of advantage to themſelves prevail on them:* in other words, if any of them vote for the bill of commerce, in hopes of a place or a penſion, a title or a garter; God *may work a deliverance for us another way* (that is to ſay, by inviting the Dutch); *but they and their families*, i. e. thoſe who are negligent, or revolters, *ſhall periſh*; by which is meant, they ſhall be hanged, as well as the preſent miniſtry and their abettors, as ſoon as we recover our power; *becauſe they let in idolatry, ſuperſtition and tyranny*; becauſe they ſtood by and ſuffered the peace to be made, the bill of commerce to paſs, and *Dunkirk* to lie undemoliſhed longer than we expected, without raiſing a rebellion?

His laſt application is to the *tory* clergy, a parcel of *blind, ignorant, dumb, ſleeping, greedy drunken dogs,*

dogs. A pretty artful epiſcopal method is this, of calling his brethren as many injurious names as he pleaſeth. It is but quoting a text of ſcripture, where the characters of evil men are deſcribed, and the thing is done; and, at the ſame time, the appearances of piety and devotion preſerved. I would engage, with the help of a good *concordance*, and the liberty of perverting holy writ, to find out as many injurious appellations, as the *Engliſhman* throws out in any of his politic papers, and apply them to thoſe perſons *who call good evil, and evil good*; to thoſe who cry without cauſe, *Every man to his tent*, O Iſrael! *and to thoſe who curſe the* QUEEN *in their hearts!*

Theſe decent words, he tells us, make up a *lively deſcription of ſuch paſtors as will not ſtudy controverſy, nor know the depths of Satan.* He means, I ſuppoſe, the controverſy between us and the *papiſts*; for as to the *freethinkers* and *diſſenters* of every denomination, they are ſome of the beſt friends to the cauſe. Now I have been told, there is a body of that kind of controverſy publiſhed by the *London* divines, which is not to be matched in the world. I believe likewiſe, there is a good number of the clergy at preſent thoroughly verſed in that ſtudy; after which I cannot but give my judgment, that it would be a very idle thing for paſtors in general to buſy themſelves much in diſputes againſt *popery*; it being a dry heavy employment of the mind at beſt, eſpecially when, God be thanked, there is ſo little occaſion for it, in the generality of pariſhes, throughout

out the kingdom, and muſt be daily leſs and leſs, by the juſt ſeverity of the laws, and the utter averſion of our people from that idolatrous ſuperſtition.

If I might be ſo bold to name thoſe who have the honour to be of his lordſhip's party, I would venture to tell him, that *paſtors* have much more occaſion to ſtudy *controverſies* againſt the ſeveral claſſes of *freethinkers* and *diſſenters:* the former (I beg his lordſhip's pardon for ſaying ſo) being a little worſe than *papiſts*, and both of them more dangerous *at preſent* to our conſtitution both in church and ſtate. Not that I think *preſbytery* ſo corrupt a ſyſtem of Chriſtian religion as *popery*; I believe it is not above one third as bad: but I think the *preſbyterians*, and their clans of other *fanaticks*, of *freethinkers* and *atheiſts* that dangle after them, are as well inclined to pull down the preſent eſtabliſhment of monarchy and religion, as any ſett of *papiſts* in Chriſtendom; and therefore that our danger, as things now ſtand, is infinitely greater from our *proteſtant* enemies; becauſe they are much more able to ruin us, and full as willing. There is no doubt, but preſbytery and a commonwealth are leſs formidable evils than *popery*, *ſlavery*, and the *pretender*; for if the *fanaticks* were in power, I ſhould be in more apprehenſion of being ſtarved than burned. But there are, probably, in *England* forty *diſſenters* of all kinds, including their brethren the *freethinkers*, for one *papiſt*; and allowing one *papiſt* to be as *terrible* as three *diſſenters*, it will appear, by arithmetick, that we are thirteen times and one third

third more in danger of being ruined by the latter than the former.

The other qualification, neceſſary for all paſtors, if they will not be *blind*, *ignorant*, *greedy*, *drunken dogs*, &c. is *to know the depths of Satan*. This is harder than the former; that a poor gentleman ought not to be parſon, vicar, or curate of a pariſh, except he be cunninger than the devil. I am afraid it will be difficult to remedy this defect, for one manifeſt reaſon, becauſe whoever had only half the cunning of the devil, would never take up with a vicarage of ten pounds a year *to live on at his eaſe*, as my lord expreſſeth it; but ſeek out for ſome better livelihood. His lordſhip is of a nation very much diſtinguiſhed for that quality of *cunning* (although they have a great many better); and, I think, he was never accuſed for wanting his ſhare. However, upon a trial of ſkill, I would venture to lay ſix to four on the *devil's* ſide, who muſt be allowed to be at leaſt the older *practitioner*. *Telling truth* ſhames him, and *reſiſtance* makes him fly; but to attempt outwitting him, is to fight him at his own weapon, and, conſequently, no cunning at all. Another thing I would obſerve is, that a man may be *in the depths of Satan* without knowing them all; and ſuch a man may be ſo far in *Satan's depths*, as to be out of his own. One of the *depths of Satan* is to *counterfeit an angel of light*. Another, I believe, is to ſtir up the people againſt their governors by falſe ſuggeſtions of danger. A third, is to be a *prompter to falſe brethren*, and to ſend *wolves* about

about in *ſheep's cloathing*. Sometimes he ſends *Jeſuits* about *England* in the habit and cant of *fanaticks*; at other times he hath *fanatic* miſſionaries in the habits of——. I ſhall mention but one more of *Satan's depths*; for I confeſs I know not the hundredth part of them; and that is, to employ his emiſſaries in crying out againſt remote imaginary dangers, by which we may be taken off from defending ourſelves againſt thoſe which are really juſt at our elbows.

But his lordſhip draws towards a concluſion, and bids us *look about, to conſider the danger we are in before it is too late*; for he aſſures us, we are already *going into ſome of the worſt parts of popery*; like the man, who was ſo much in haſte for his new coat, that he put it on the wrong ſide out. *Auricular confeſſion, prieſtly abſolution, and the ſacrifice of the maſs*, have made great progreſs in *England*, and nobody hath obſerved it: ſeveral other *popiſh* points *are carried higher with us, than by the prieſts themſelves:* and ſomebody, it ſeems, had the *impudence to propoſe an union with the* Gallican *church*. I have, indeed, heard that Mr. *Leſlie* publiſhed a diſcourſe to that purpoſe, which I have never ſeen; nor do I perceive the evil in *propoſing an union* between any two churches in *Chriſtendom*. Without doubt, Mr. *Leſlie* is moſt unhappily miſled in his politicks; but, if he be the author of the late [*b*] tract againſt *popery*, he hath given the world ſuch

[*b*] The Caſe ſtated.

a proof

a proof of his ſoundneſs in religion, as *many a biſhop* ought to be proud of. I never ſaw the gentleman in my life: I know he is the ſon of a great and excellent prelate, who, upon ſeveral accounts, was one of the moſt extraordinary men of his age. Mr. *Leſlie* hath written many uſeful diſcourſes upon ſeveral ſubjects, and hath ſo well deſerved of the Chriſtian religion, and the church of *England* in particular, that to accuſe him of *impudence for propoſing an union* in two very different faiths, is a ſtyle which, I hope, few will imitate. I deteſt Mr. *Leſlie's* political principles as much as his lordſhip can do for his heart; but I verily believe he acts from a miſtaken conſcience, and therefore I diſtinguiſh between the principles and the perſon. However, it is ſome mortification to me, when I ſee an *avowed nonjuror* contribute more to the confounding of *popery*, than could ever be done by a hundred thouſand ſuch *introductions* as this.

His lordſhip ends with diſcovering a ſmall ray of comfort. *God be thanked, there are many among us that ſtand upon the watch-tower, and that give faithful warning; that ſtand in the breach, and make themſelves a wall for their church and country; that cry to* God *day and night, and lie in the duſt mourning before him, to avert thoſe judgments that ſeem to haſten towards us. They ſearch into the myſtery of iniquity that is working among us, and acquaint themſelves with that maſs of corruption that is in popery.* He prays, *That the number of theſe may increaſe, and that he may be of that number, ready either to die in peace, or to*

ſeal that doctrine he *hath been preaching above fifty years with his blood.* This being his laſt paragraph, I have made bold to tranſcribe the moſt important parts of it. His deſign is to end after the manner of orators, with leaving the ſtrongeſt impreſſion poſſible upon the minds of his hearers. A great *breach* is made, *the myſtery of popiſh iniquity is working among us*; may God avert thoſe *judgments that are haſtening towards us*; I am an old man, *a preacher above fifty years*, and I now expect, and am ready, to die a martyr for the doctrines I have preached. What an amiable idea doth he here leave upon our minds of her majeſty and her government! he hath been poring ſo long upon *Fox's* book of martyrs, that he imagines himſelf living in the reign of queen *Mary*, and is reſolved to ſet up for a *knight-errant* againſt *popery*. Upon the ſuppoſition of his being in earneſt (which I am ſure he is not), it would require but a very little more heat of imagination to make a hiſtory of ſuch a knight's adventures. What would he ſay to behold the *fires kindled in* Smithfield, *and all over the town*, on the ſeventeenth of *November*? to behold the *pope* borne in triumph on the ſhoulders of the people, with a *cardinal on one ſide, and the pretender on the other?* He would never believe it was queen *Elizabeth's* day, but that of her perſecuting ſiſter: In ſhort, how eaſily might a *windmill be taken for* the whore *of* Babylon, and a *puppet-ſhow* for a popiſh proceſſion?

But *Enthuſiaſm* is none of his lordſhip's faculty: I am inclined to believe, he might be melancholy enough, when he writ this *Introduction:* the deſpair, at his age, of ſeeing a faction reſtored, to which he hath ſacrifiſed ſo great a part of his life: the little ſucceſs he can hope for in caſe he ſhould reſume thoſe high-church principles in defence of which he firſt employed his pen: no viſible expectation of removing to *Farnham*, or *Lambeth:* and laſtly, the misfortune of being hated by every one, who either wears the habit, or values the profeſſion, of a clergyman. No wonder ſuch a ſpirit, in ſuch a ſituation, is provoked beyond the regards of truth, decency, religion, or ſelf-conviction. To do him juſtice, he ſeems to have nothing elſe left, but to cry out *halters*, *gibbets*, *faggots*, *inquiſition*, *popery*, *ſlavery*, and the *pretender*. But in the mean time, he little conſiders what a world of miſchief he doth to his cauſe. It is very convenient for the preſent deſigns of that faction, to ſpread the opinion of our immediate danger from *popery* and the *pretender*. His directors therefore ought, in my humble opinion, to have employed his lordſhip in publiſhing a book, wherein he ſhould have affirmed, by the moſt ſolemn aſſeverations, that all things were ſafe and well; for the world hath contracted ſo ſtrong a habit of believing him backwards, that I am confident nine parts in ten of thoſe, who have read or heard of his *Introduction*, have ſlept in greater ſecurity ever ſince. It is like the melancholy tone of a watchman at midnight, who thumps

thumps with his pole as if ſome thief were breaking in; but you know, by the noiſe, that the door is faſt.

However, he *thanks* God *there are many among us who ſtand in the breach.* I believe there may; it is a *breach* of their own making, and they deſign to come forward, and ſtorm and plunder, if they be not driven back. *They make themſelves a wall for their church and country.* A *ſouth* wall, I ſuppoſe, for all the beſt fruits of the *church and country* to be nailed on. Let us examine this metaphor. The *wall of our church and country* is built of thoſe, who love the conſtitution in both: our domeſtic enemies undermine ſome parts of the *wall*, and place themſelves in the *breach*, and then they cry, *We are the wall.* We do not like ſuch patch-work; they build with untempered mortar; nor can they ever cement with us, till they get better materials and better workmen. God keep us from having our *breaches* made up with ſuch rubbiſh. *They ſtand upon the watch-tower!* they are, indeed, pragmatical enough to do ſo; but who aſſigned them that poſt, to give us falſe intelligence, to alarm us with falſe dangers, and ſend us to defend one gate, while their accomplices are breaking in at another? *They cry to* God *day and night to avert the judgment of popery, which ſeems to haſten towards us.* Then I affirm, they are *hypocrites by day, and filthy dreamers by night: when they cry unto him, he will not hear them*; for they cry againſt the plaineſt dictates of their own conſcience, reaſon, and belief.

But,

But, laſtly, *they lie in the duſt mourning before him.* Hang me if I believe that, unleſs it be figuratively ſpoken. But ſuppoſe it to be true, why do *they lie in the duſt?* Becauſe they love to *raiſe* it. For what do *they mourn?* Why, for power, wealth, and places. There let the enemies of the QUEEN and monarchy of the church *lie* and *mourn*, and *lick the duſt* like *ſerpents*, till they are truly ſenſible of their ingratitude, falſhood, diſobedience, ſlander, blaſphemy, ſedition, *and every evil work.*

I cannot find in my heart to conclude, without offering his lordſhip a little humble advice upon ſome certain points.

Firſt, I would adviſe him, if it be not too late in his life, to endeavour a little at mending his ſtyle, which is mighty defective in the *circumſtances* of grammar, propriety, politeneſs, and ſmoothneſs. I fancied at firſt it might be owing to the prevalence of his paſſion, as people ſputter out nonſenſe for haſte, when they are in a rage. And, indeed, I believe this before me hath received ſome additional imperfections from that occaſion. But whoever hath heard his ſermons, or read his other tracts, will find him very unhappy in the choice and diſpoſition of his words; and, for want of variety, repeating them, eſpecially the particles, in a manner very grating to an *Engliſh* ear. But I confine myſelf to this *Introduction*, as his laſt work, where, endeavouring at rhetorical *flowers*, he gives us only bunches of *thiſtles*; of which I could pre-

ſent the reader with a plentiful crop; but I refer him to every page and line of the pamphlet itſelf.

Secondly, I would moſt humbly adviſe his lordſhip to examine a little into the nature of *Truth*, and ſometimes to hear what *ſhe* ſays. I ſhall produce two inſtances among an hundred. When he aſſerts, that we are *now in more danger of* popery *than towards the end of king* Charles *the* ſecond's *reign*; and gives the broadeſt hints, that the QUEEN, the miniſtry, the parliament, and the clergy, are juſt going to introduce it; I deſire to know whether he really thinks *Truth* is of his ſide, or whether he be not ſure *ſhe* is againſt him? If the latter, then *Truth* and he will be found in two different ſtories, and which are we to believe? Again, when he gravely adviſes the *tories* not to *light the fires in Smithfield*, and goes on, in twenty places already quoted, as if the bargain was made for *popery* and *ſlavery* to enter; I aſk again, whether he hath rightly conſidered the nature of *Truth?* I deſire to put a parallel caſe. Suppoſe his lordſhip ſhould take it into his fancy to write and publiſh a letter to any gentleman of no infamous character for his religion or morals; and there adviſe him with great earneſtneſs not to rob or fire churches, raviſh his daughter, or murder his father; ſhew him the ſin and danger of theſe enormities; that, if he flattered himſelf he could eſcape in diſguiſe, or bribe his jury, he was grievouſly miſtaken; that he muſt, in all probability, forfeit his goods and chattels, die an ignominous death, and be curſt by poſterity:

poſterity: would not ſuch a gentleman juſtly think himſelf highly injured, although his lordſhip did not affirm, that the ſaid gentleman had picklocks or combuſtibles ready; that he had attempted his daughter, and drawn his ſword againſt his father in order to ſtab him? whereas, in the other caſe, this writer affirms over and over, that all attempts for introducing *popery* and *ſlavery* are already made, the whole buſineſs concerted, and that little leſs than a miracle can prevent our ruin.

Thirdly, I could heartily wiſh his lordſhip would not undertake to charge the opinions of one or two, and thoſe probably *nonjurors*, upon the whole body of the nation that differs from him. Mr. *Leſlie* writ a *propoſal for an union with the* Gallican *church*: ſomebody elſe hath *carried the neceſſity of prieſthood in the point of baptiſm farther than popery*: a third hath *aſſerted the independency of the church on the ſtate, and in many things arraigned the ſupremacy of the crown*. Then he ſpeaks in a dubious inſinuating way, as if ſome other *popiſh* tenets had been already advanced, and at laſt concludes in this affected ſtrain of deſpondency; *What will all theſe things end in? And on what deſign are they driven? Alas, it is too viſible!* It is as clear as the ſun, that theſe authors are encouraged, by the *miniſtry*, with a deſign to bring in *popery*; and in *popery* all theſe things will end.

I never was ſo uncharitable to believe that the whole *party*, of which his lordſhip profeſſeth himſelf a member, had a real formed deſign of eſtabliſh-

ing *atheiſm* among us. The reaſon why the *whigs* have taken the *atheiſts* or *freethinkers* into their body is, becauſe they wholly agree in their political ſchemes, and differ very little in church power and diſcipline. However, I could turn the argument againſt his lordſhip with very great advantage by quoting paſſages from fifty pamphlets wholly made up of *whiggiſm* and *atheiſm*, and then conclude, *What will all theſe things end in? And on what deſign are they driven? Alas, it is too viſible!*

Laſtly, I would beg his lordſhip not to be ſo exceedingly outrageous upon the memory of the dead; becauſe it is highly probable, that, in a very ſhort time, he will be one of the number. He hath, in plain words, given Mr. *Wharton* the character of a moſt malicious, revengeful, treacherous, lying, mercenary villain. To which I ſhall only ſay, that the direct reverſe of this amiable deſcription is what appears from the works of that moſt learned divine, and from the accounts given me by thoſe, who knew him much better than the biſhop ſeems to have done. I meddle not with the moral part of this treatment. God Almighty forgive his lordſhip this manner of revenging himſelf; and then there will be but little conſequence from an accuſation, which the *dead* cannot *feel*, and which none of the *living* will *believe*.

SOME

SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENLARGING THE POWER OF BISHOPS IN LETTING LEASES.

Mihi credite, major hæreditas venit unicuique veſtrûm in iiſdem bonis a jure et a legibus, quam ab iis a quibus illa ipſa bona relicta ſunt. Cicero *pro* A. Cœcina.

SOME

ARGUMENTS

Againſt ENLARGING the

POWER OF BISHOPS, &c.

Written in the Year 1723 [c].

IN handling this ſubject, I ſhall proceed wholly upon the ſuppoſition, that thoſe of *our party*, who profeſs themſelves members of the church eſtabliſhed, and under the apoſtolical government of biſhops, do deſire the continuance and tranſmiſſion of it to poſterity, at leaſt in as good a condition as it is at preſent: becauſe, as this diſcourſe is not calculated for diſſenters of any kind, ſo neither will it ſuit the talk or ſentiments of thoſe perſons, who, with the denomination of churchmen, are oppreſſors of the inferior clergy, and perpetually quarrelling at the great incomes of the biſhops; which is a traditional cant delivered down from former times, and continued with great reaſon, although it be now near two hundred years ſince almoſt three parts

[c] The general ſubject of this pamphlet leads me to recollect a circumſtance much to the dean's honour; he could never be induced to take fines for any of the chapter lands; he always choſe to raiſe the rents, as the method leaſt oppreſſive to the preſent tenant, and moſt advantageous to all future tenants and landlords. ORRERY.

in four of the church revenues have been taken from the clergy, beſides the ſpoils that have been gradually made ever ſince of glebes and other lands, by the confuſion of times, the fraud of encroaching neighbours, or the power of oppreſſors too great to be encountered.

About the time of the Reformation, many *popiſh* biſhops of this kingdom, knowing they muſt have been ſoon rejected if they would not change their religion, made long leaſes and fee-farms of great part of their lands, reſerving very inconſiderable rents, ſometimes only a chiefry, by a power they aſſumed directly contrary to many ancient canons, yet conſiſtent enough with the common law. This trade held on for many years after the biſhops became proteſtants; and ſome of their names are ſtill remembered with infamy, on account of enriching their families by ſuch ſacrilegious alienations. By theſe means epiſcopal revenues were ſo low reduced, that three or four ſees were often united to make a tolerable competency. For ſome remedy to this evil, king *James* the firſt, by a bounty, that became a good Chriſtian prince, beſtowed ſeveral forfeited lands on the *northern* biſhopricks: but, in all other parts of the kingdom, the church continued ſtill in the ſame diſtreſs and poverty; ſome of the ſees hardly poſſeſſing enough to maintain a country vicar. About the middle of king *Charles* the firſt's reign, the legiſlature here thought fit to put a ſtop at leaſt to any farther alienations; and ſo a law was enacted, prohibiting all biſhops and other

other eccleſiaſtical corporations from ſetting their lands for above the term of twenty-one years; the rent reſerved to be one half of the real value of ſuch lands at the time they were ſet, without which condition the leaſe to be void.

Soon after the Reſtoration of king *Charles* the ſecond, the parliament taking into conſideration the miſerable eſtate of the church, certain lands, by way of augmentation, were granted to eight biſhops in the act of ſettlement, and confirmed in the act of explanation; of which bounty, as I remember, three ſees were, in a great meaſure defeated; but by what accidents, it is not here of any importance to relate.

This, at preſent, is the condition of the church in *Ireland* with regard to epiſcopal revenues: which I have thus briefly (and perhaps imperfectly) deduced for ſome information to thoſe, whoſe thoughts do not lead them to ſuch conſiderations.

By virtue of the ſtatute already mentioned, under king *Charles* the firſt, limiting eccleſiaſtical bodies to the term of twenty-one years under the reſerved rent of half real value, the biſhops have had ſome ſhare in the gradual riſe of lands, without which they could not have been ſupported with any common decency that might become their ſtation. It is above eighty years ſince the paſſing of that act: the ſee of *Meath*, one of the beſt in the kingdom, was then worth about 400*l. per annum*; the poorer ones in the ſame proportion. If this were their preſent condition, I cannot conceive how they would

would have been able to pay for their patents, or buy their robes; but this will certainly be the condition of their ſucceſſors, if ſuch a bill ſhould paſs, as they ſay is now intended, which I will ſuppoſe; and believe many perſons, who may give a vote for it, are not aware of.

However, this is the act which is now attempted to be repealed, or at leaſt eluded; ſome are for giving biſhops leave to lett fee-farms, others would allow them to lett leaſes for lives; and the moſt moderate would repeal that clauſe, by which the biſhops are bound to lett their lands at half value.

The reaſons for the riſe of value in lands are of two kinds. Of the firſt kind, are long peace and ſettlement after the devaſtations of war; plantations, improvements of bad ſoil, recovery of bogs and marſhes, advancement of trade and manufactures, increaſe of inhabitants, encouragement of agriculture, and the like.

But there is another reaſon for the riſe of land, more gradual, conſtant and certain; which will have its effects in countries that are very far from flouriſhing in any of the advantages I have juſt mentioned: I mean *the perpetual decreaſe in the value of gold and ſilver.* I ſhall diſcourſe upon theſe two different heads with a view towards the bill now attempted.

As to the firſt: I cannot ſee how this kingdom is at any heighth of improvement, while four parts in five of the plantations for thirty years paſt have been real diſ-improvements; nine in ten of the quickſet-

quickſet-hedges being ruined for want of care or ſkill. And as to foreſt trees, they being often taken out of woods, and planted in ſingle rows on the tops of ditches, it is impoſſible they ſhould grow to be of uſe, beauty, or ſhelter. Neither can it be ſaid, that the ſoil of *Ireland* is improved to its full heighth, while ſo much lies all winter under water, and the bogs made almoſt deſperate by the ill cutting of the turf. There hath indeed been ſome little improvement in the manufactures of linen and woollen, although very ſhort of perfection; but our trade was never in ſo low a condition; and as to agriculture, of which all wiſe nations have been ſo tender, the deſolation made in the country, by engroſſing graziers, and the great yearly importation of corn from *England*, are lamentable inſtances under what diſcouragement it lies.

But, notwithſtanding all theſe mortifications, I ſuppoſe there is no well-wiſher to his country without a little hope, that in time the kingdom may be on a better foot in ſome of the articles above-mentioned. But it would be hard, if eccleſiaſtical bodies ſhould be the only perſons excluded from any ſhare in public advantages, which yet can never happen, without a greater ſhare of profit to their tenants. If God *ſends rain equally upon the juſt and the unjuſt*, why ſhould thoſe, who wait at his altars, and are inſtructors of the people, be cut off from partaking in the general benefits of law, or of nature?

But,

But, as this way of reaſoning may ſeem to bear a more favourable eye to the clergy than perhaps will ſuit with the preſent diſpoſition or faſhion of the age; I ſhall therefore dwell more largely upon the ſecond reaſon for the riſe of land, which is *the perpetual decreaſe of the value of gold and ſilver*.

This may be obſerved from the courſe of the *Roman* hiſtory above two thouſand years before thoſe inexhauſtible ſilver mines of *Potoſi* were known. The value of an *obolus*, and of every other coin, between the time of *Romulus* and that of *Auguſtus*, gradually ſunk above five parts in ſix, as appears by ſeveral paſſages out of the beſt authors. And yet the prodigious wealth of that ſtate did not ariſe from the increaſe of bullion in the world by the diſcovery of new mines, but from a much more accidental cauſe, which was the ſpreading of their conqueſts, and thereby importing into *Rome* and *Italy* the riches of the *eaſt* and *weſt*.

When the ſeat of empire was removed to *Conſtantinople*, the tide of money flowed that way without ever returning; and was ſcattered in *Aſia*. But when that mighty empire was overthrown by the *northern* people, ſuch a ſtop was put to all trade and commerce, that vaſt ſums of money were buried to eſcape the plundering of the conquerors; and what remained was carried off by thoſe ravagers.

It were no difficult matter to compute the value of money in *England* during the *Saxon* reigns; but the monkiſh, and other writers, ſince the Conqueſt,

queſt, have put that matter in a clearer light, by the ſeveral accounts they have given us of the value of corn and cattle in years of dearth and plenty. Every one knows that king *John's* whole portion, before he came to the crown, was but five thouſand pounds, without a foot of land.

I have likewiſe ſeen the ſteward's account of an ancient noble family in *England*, written in *Latin* between three and four hundred years ago, with the ſeveral prices of wine and victuals, to confirm my obſervations.

I have been at the trouble of computing (as others have done) the different values of money for about four hundred years paſt. *Henry* duke of *Lancaſter*, who lived about that period, founded an hoſpital in *Leiceſter* for a certain number of old men, charging his lands with a groat a week to each for their maintenance, which is to this day duly paid them. In thoſe times, a penny was equal to ten pence half-penny, and ſomewhat more than half a farthing in ours; which makes about eight ninths difference.

This is plain alſo from the old cuſtom upon many eſtates in *England* to lett for leaſes of lives (renewable at pleaſure) where the reſerved rent is uſually about twelve pence a pound, which then was near the half real value: and, although the fines be not fixed, yet the landlord gets altogether not above three ſhillings in the pound of the worth of his land: and the tenants are ſo wedded to this cuſtom,

cuſtom, that, if the owner ſuffer three lives to expire, none of them will take a leaſe on other conditions; or, if he brings in a foreigner who will agree to pay a reaſonable rent, the other tenants, by all manner of injuries, will make that foreigner ſo uneaſy, that he muſt be forced to quit the farm; as the late earl of *Bath* felt by the experience of above ten thouſand pounds loſs.

The gradual decreaſe, for about two hundred years after, was not conſiderable; and therefore I do not rely on the account given by ſome hiſtorians, that *Harry* the ſeventh left behind him eighteen hundred thouſand pounds; for, although the *Weſt-Indies* were diſcovered before his death, and altho' he had the beſt talents and inſtruments for exacting of money ever poſſeſſed by any prince ſince the time of *Veſpaſian* (whom he reſembled in many particulars), yet, I conceive, that in his days the whole coin of *England* could hardly amount to ſuch a ſum. For, in the reign of *Philip* and *Mary*, Sir —— *Cockain* of *Derbyſhire*, the beſt houſe-keeper of his quality in the county, allowed his lady fifty pounds a year for maintaining the family, one pound a year wages to each ſervant, and two pounds to the ſteward; as I was told by a perſon of quality, who had ſeen the original account of his oeconomy. Now, this ſum of fifty pounds, added to the advantages of a large domain, might be equal to about five hundred pounds a year at preſent, or ſomewhat more than four *fifths*.

The

The great plenty of ſilver in *England* began in queen *Elizabeth's* reign, when *Drake* and others took vaſt quantities of coin and bullion from the *Spaniards*, either upon their own *American* coaſts, or in their return to *Spain*. However, ſo much hath been imported annually from that time to this, that the value of money in *England*, and moſt parts of *Europe*, is ſunk above one half within the ſpace of an hundred years, notwithſtanding the great export of ſilver, for above eight years paſt, to the *Eaſt-Indies*, from whence it never returns. But gold, not being liable to the ſame accident, and by new diſcoveries growing every day more plentiful, ſeems in danger of becoming a drug.

This hath been the progreſs of the value of money in former ages; and muſt, of neceſſity, continue ſo for the future, without ſome new invaſion of *Goths* and *Vandals*, to deſtroy law, property, and religion, alter the very face of nature, and turn the world upſide down.

I muſt repeat, that what I am to ſay upon the ſubject is intended only for the conviction of thoſe among our *own party*, who are true lovers of the church, and would be glad it ſhould continue in a tolerable degree of proſperity to the end of the world.

The church is ſuppoſed to laſt for ever both in its diſcipline and doctrine; which is a privilege common to every petty corporation, who muſt likewiſe obſerve the laws of their foundation. If a gentleman's

gentleman's eſtate, which now yields him a thouſand pounds a year, had been ſet for ever at the higheſt value even in the flouriſhing days of king *Charles* the ſecond, would it now amount to above four or five hundred at moſt? What if this had happened two or three hundred years ago; would the reſerved rent at this day be any more than a ſmall chiefry? Suppoſe the revenues of a biſhop to have been under the ſame circumſtances; could he now be able to perform works of hoſpitality and charity? Thus, if the revenues of a biſhop be limited to a thouſand pounds a year; how will his ſucceſſor be in a condition to ſupport his ſtation with decency, when the ſame denomination of money ſhall not anſwer an half, a quarter, or an eighth part of that ſum? Which muſt, unavoidably, be the conſequence of any bill to elude the limiting act, whereby the church was preſerved from utter ruin.

The ſame reaſon holds good in all corporations whatſoever, who cannot follow a more pernicious practice than that of granting perpetuities, for which many of them ſmart to this day; although the leaders among them are often ſo ſtupid as not to perceive it, or ſometimes ſo knaviſh as to find their private account in cheating the community.

Several colleges in *Oxford* were aware of this growing evil about an hundred years ago; and, inſtead of limiting their rents to a certain ſum of money, prevailed with their tenants to pay the price of

of ſo many barrels of corn to be valued as the market went at two ſeaſons (as I remember) in the year. For a barrel of corn is of a real intrinſic value, which gold and ſilver are not: and, by this invention, theſe colleges have preſerved a tolerable ſubſiſtence for their fellows and ſtudents to this day.

The preſent biſhops will, indeed, be no ſufferers by ſuch a bill; becauſe, their ages conſidered, they cannot expect to ſee any great decreaſe in the value of money; or at worſt they can make it up in the fines, which will, probably, be greater than uſual upon the change of leaſes into fee-farms or lives; or without the power of obliging their tenants to a real half value. And, as I cannot well blame them for taking ſuch advantages (conſidering the nature of human kind) when the queſtion is only, whether the money ſhall be put into their own or another man's pocket: ſo they will never be excuſable before God or man, if they do not, to their death, oppoſe, declare, and proteſt againſt any ſuch bill, as muſt, in its conſequences, complete the ruin of the church, and of their own order in this kingdom.

If the fortune of a private perſon be diminiſhed by the weakneſs or inadvertency of his anceſtors, in letting leaſes for ever at low rents, the world lies open to his induſtry for purchaſing of more; but the church is barred by a *dead hand*; or, if it were otherwiſe, yet the cuſtom of making bequeſts to it hath been out of practice for almoſt two hun-

dred years, and *a great deal directly contrary* hath been its fortune.

I have been aſſured by a perſon of ſome conſequence, to whom I am likewiſe obliged for the account of ſome other facts already related, that the late [*d*] biſhop of *Saliſbury* (the greateſt *whig* of that bench in his days) confeſſed to him, that the liberty which biſhops in *England* have of letting leaſes for lives, would, in his opinion, be one day the ruin of epiſcopacy there; and thought the church, in this kingdom, happy by the limitation act.

And have we not already found the effect of this different proceeding in both kingdoms? Have not two *Engliſh* prelates quitted their peerage and ſeats in parliament, in a *nation of freedom*, for the ſake of a more ample revenue even in this unhappy kingdom, rather than lie under the mortification of living below their dignity at home? For which, however, they cannot be juſtly cenſured. I know, indeed, ſome perſons, who offer as an argument for repealing the limiting bill, that it may, in future ages, prevent the practice of providing this kingdom with biſhops from *England*, when the only temptation will be removed. And they alledge, that, as things have gone for ſome years paſt, gentlemen will grow diſcouraged from ſending their ſons to the univerſity, and from ſuffering them to enter into holy orders, when they are likely to languiſh under a curacy or ſmall vicarage to the

[*d*] Dr. *Burnet*.

end of their lives: But this is all a vain imagination; for the decreaſe, in the value of money, will equally affect both kingdoms: and beſides, when biſhopricks here grow too ſmall to invite over men of credit and conſequence, they will be left more fully to the diſpoſal of a chief governor, who can never fail of ſome worthleſs illiterate chaplain, fond of a title and precedence. Thus will that whole bench, in an age or two, be compoſed of mean, ignorant, fawning gownmen, humble ſuppliants and dependents upon the *court* for a morſel of bread, and ready to ſerve every turn that ſhall be demanded from them in hopes of getting ſome *commendam* tacked to their ſees; which muſt then be the trade, as it is now too much in *England*, to the great diſcouragement of the inferior clergy. Neither is that practice without example among us.

It is now about eighty-five years ſince the paſſing of that limiting act, and there is but one inſtance, in the memory of man, of a biſhop's leaſe broken upon the plea of not being ſtatutable; which, in every body's opinion, could have been loſt by no other perſon than he, who was then tenant, and happened to be very ungracious in his country. In the preſent [*e*] biſhop of *Meath's* caſe that plea did not avail, although the leaſe were notoriouſly unſtatutable; the rent reſerved being, as I have been told, not a ſeventh part of the real value; yet the jury, upon their oaths, *very gravely* found it to

[*e*] Dr. *Evans*, a *Welſhman*.

be according to the ſtatute; and one of them was heard to ſay, that he would *eat his ſhoes*, before he would give a verdict for the biſhop. A very few more have made the ſame attempt with as little ſucceſs. Every biſhop and other eccleſiaſtical body reckon forty pounds in an hundred to be a reaſonable half value; or, if it be only a third part, it ſeldom or never breeds any difference between landlord and tenant. But when the rent is from five to nine, or ten parts, leſs than the worth, the biſhop, if he conſults the good of his ſee, will be apt to expoſtulate; and the tenant, if he be an honeſt man, will have ſome regard to the reaſonableneſs and juſtice of the demand, ſo as to yield to a moderate advancement, rather than engage in a ſuit, where law and equity are directly againſt him. By theſe means, the biſhops have been ſo true to their truſts, as to procure ſome ſmall ſhare in the advancement of rents; although it be notorious, that they do not receive the third penny (fines included) of the real value of their lands throughout the kingdom.

I was never able to imagine what inconvenience could acrue to the publick by one or two thouſand pounds a year in the hands of a proteſtant biſhop, any more than of a lay perſon [*f*]. The former, generally ſpeaking, liveth as piouſly and hoſpitably as the other; pays his debts as honeſtly, and ſpends

[*f*] This part of the paragraph is to be applied to the period when the whole was written, which was in 1723, when ſeveral of queen *Anne*'s biſhops were living.

as

as much of his revenue among his tenants: beſides, if they be his immediate tenants, you may diſtinguiſh them at firſt ſight by their habits and horſes; or, if you go to their houſes, by their comfortable way of living. But the misfortune is, that ſuch immediate tenants, generally ſpeaking, have others under them, and ſo a third and fourth in ſubordination, till it comes to the *welder* (as they call him) who ſits at a rack-rent, and lives as miſerably as an *Iriſh* farmer upon a new leaſe from a lay landlord. But ſuppoſe a biſhop happens to be avaricious (as being compoſed of the ſame ſtuff with other men) the conſequence to the publick is no worſe than if he were a ſquire; for he leaves his fortune to his ſon, or near relation, who, if he be rich enough, will never think of entering into the church.

And as there can be no diſadvantage to the publick in a proteſtant country, that a man ſhould hold lands as a *biſhop*, any more than if he were a *temporal* perſon; ſo it is of great advantage to the community, where a biſhop lives as he ought to do. He is bound in conſcience to reſide in his dioceſe, and, by a ſolemn promiſe, to keep hoſpitality; his eſtate is ſpent in the kingdom, not remitted to *England*; he keeps the clergy to their duty, and is an example of virtue both to them and the people. Suppoſe him an ill man; yet his very character will with-hold him from any great or open exorbitancies. But in fact it muſt be allowed, that ſome biſhops of this kingdom, within twenty years paſt, have done very ſignal and laſting acts of public

charity; great inſtances whereof are the [g] late and [h] preſent primate, and the lord [i] archbiſhop of *Dublin* that now is, who hath left memorials of his bounty in many parts of his province. I might add the biſhop of [k] *Raphoe*, and ſeveral others: not forgetting the late dean of *Down*, Dr. *Pratt*, who beſtowed one thouſand pounds upon the univerſity; which foundation (that I may obſerve by the way) if the bill propoſed ſhould paſs, would be in the ſame circumſtances with the biſhops, nor ever able again to advance the ſtipends of the fellows and ſtudents, as lately they found it neceſſary to do; the determinate ſum appointed by the ſtatutes for commons being not half ſufficient, by the fall of money, to afford neceſſary ſuſtenance. But the paſſing of ſuch a bill muſt put an end to all eccleſiaſtical beneficence for the time to come; and whether this will be ſupplied by thoſe who are to reap the benefit, better than it hath been done by the grantees of impropriate tithes, who received them upon the old church conditions of keeping hoſpitality, it will be eaſy to conjecture.

To alledge, that paſſing ſuch a bill would be a good encouragement to improve biſhops lands, is a great error. Is it not the general method of landlords to wait the expiration of a leaſe, and then cant their lands to the higheſt bidder? and what ſhould hinder the ſame courſe to be taken in church leaſes, when the limitation is removed of paying half the

[g] Dr. *Marſh*. [h] Dr. *Lindſay*.
[i] Dr. *King*. [k] Dr. *Foſter*.

real

real value to the biſhop? In riding through the country, how few improvements do we ſee upon the eſtates of laymen, farther than about their own domains? To ſay the truth, it is a great misfortune as well to the publick, as to the biſhops themſelves, that their lands are generally let to lords and great ſquires, who, in reaſon, were never deſigned to be tenants; and therefore may naturally murmur at the payment of rent, as a ſubſerviency they were not born to. If the tenants to the church were honeſt farmers, they would pay their fines and rents with chearfulneſs, improve their lands, and thank God they were to give but a moderate half value for what they held. I have heard a man, of a thouſand pounds a year, talk with great contempt of biſhops leaſes, as being on a worſe foot than the reſt of his eſtate; and he had certainly reaſon: My anſwer was, that ſuch leaſes were originally intended only for the benefit of induſtrious huſbandmen, who would think it a great bleſſing to be ſo provided for, inſtead of having his farm ſcrewed up to the heighth, not eating one comfortable meal in a year, nor able to find ſhoes for his children.

I know not any advantage that can accrue by ſuch a bill, except the preventing perjury in jurymen, and falſe dealing in tenants; which is a remedy like that of giving my money to an highwayman, before he attempts to take it by force; and ſo I ſhall be ſure to prevent the ſin of robbery.

I had wrote thus far, and thought to have made an end; when a bookſeller ſent me a ſmall pamphlet,

entitled, *The caſe of laity, with ſome queries*; full of the ſtrongeſt malice againſt the clergy, that I have any where met with ſince the reign of *Toland*, and others of that tribe. Theſe kinds of advocates do infinite miſchief to OUR GOOD CAUSE, by giving grounds to the unjuſt reproaches of TORIES and JACOBITES, who charge us with being enemies to the church. If I bear an hearty unfeigned loyalty to his majeſty king *GEORGE* and the houſe of *Hanover*, not ſhaken in the leaſt by the hardſhips we lie under, which never can be imputable to ſo gracious a prince; if I ſincerely adjure the PRETENDER, and all POPISH SUCCESSORS; if I bear a due veneration to the glorious memory of the late king *WILLIAM*, who preſerved theſe kingdoms from POPERY and SLAVERY with the expence of his blood, and hazard of his life; and laſtly, if I am for a proper indulgence to all *diſſenters*, I think nothing more can be reaſonably demanded of *me* as a WHIG, and that my political catechiſm is full and complete. But whoever, under the ſhelter of that party denomination, and of many great profeſſions of loyalty, would deſtroy, or undermine, or injure the CHURCH eſtabliſhed; I utterly diſown him, and think he ought to chuſe another name of diſtinction for himſelf and his adherents. I came into the cauſe upon other principles, which, by the grace of God, I mean to preſerve as long as I live. Shall we juſtify the accuſations of our adverſaries? *Hoc Ithacus velit.*—The TORIES and JACOBITES will behold us, with a malicious pleaſure, determined upon the ruin

of

of our *friends*. For is not the preſent ſett of biſhops almoſt intirely of that number, as well as a great majority of the principal clergy? And a ſhort time will reduce the whole by vacancies upon death.

An impartial reader, if he pleaſes to examine what I have already ſaid, will eaſily anſwer the bold *queries* in the pamphlet I mentioned; he will be convinced, that *the reaſon ſtill ſtrongly exiſts, for which* that limiting law was enacted. A reaſonable man will wonder, where can be *the inſufferable grievance*, that an *eccleſiaſtical* landlord ſhould expect a moderate or a third part value in rent for his lands, when his title is *at leaſt* as ancient and as legal as that of a layman; who is yet but ſeldom guilty of giving ſuch beneficial bargains. Has *the nation been thrown into confuſion?* and have *many poor families been ruined* by rack-rents paid for the lands of the church? does *the nation cry out* to have a law that muſt, in time, ſend their biſhops a begging? But, God be thanked, the clamours of enemies to the church is not yet the *cry*, and, I hope, will never prove the *voice* of the nation. The clergy, I conceive, will hardly allow *that the people maintain them*, any more than in the ſenſe that all landlords whatſoever are maintained by the people. Such aſſertions as theſe, and the inſinuations they carry along with them, proceed from principles which cannot be avowed by thoſe, who are for preſerving the happy *conſtitution* in *church* and *ſtate*. Whoever were the propoſers of ſuch *queries*, it might have provoked a bold writer to retaliate, perhaps with

with more juſtice than prudence, by ſhewing at whoſe door the grievance lies, and that the biſhops *at leaſt* are not to anſwer for the poverty of tenants.

To gratify this great reformer, who enlarges the *epiſcopal* rent-roll almoſt one half, let me ſuppoſe that all the church lands in the kingdom were thrown up to the laity; would the tenants, in ſuch a caſe, ſit eaſier in their rents than they do now? or would the money be equally ſpent in the kingdom? No; the farmer would be ſcrewed up to the utmoſt penny by the agents and ſtewards of *abſentees*, and the revenues employed in making a figure at *London*; to which city a full third part of the whole *income* of *Ireland* is annually returned, to anſwer that ſingle *article* of *maintenance* for *Iriſh* landlords.

Another of his quarrels is againſt *pluralities* and *non-reſidence*. As to the former, it is a word of ill name, but not well underſtood. The clergy having been ſtripped of the greateſt part of their revenues, the *glebes* being generally loſt, the *tithes* in the hands of laymen, the churches demoliſhed, and the country depopulated; in order to preſerve a face of *Chriſtianity*, it was neceſſary to unite ſmall *vicarages* ſufficient to make a tolerable maintenance for a *miniſter*. The profit of ten or a dozen of theſe *unions*, ſeldom amounts to above eighty or an hundred pounds a year. If there be a very few *dignitaries*, whoſe preferments are, perhaps, more liable to this accuſation, it is to be ſuppoſed, they may

may be *favorites of the times*; or perſons of *ſuperior* merit, for whom there hath ever been ſome indulgence in all governments.

As to *non-reſidence*, I believe there is no Chriſtian country upon earth, where the clergy have leſs to anſwer for upon that *article*. I am confident there are not ten clergymen in the kingdom, who, properly ſpeaking, can be termed *non-reſidents*: for ſurely we are not to reckon in that number thoſe, who, for want of *glebes*, are forced to retire to the neareſt nighbouring village for a *cabbin* to put their heads in; the leading man of the pariſh, when he makes the greateſt clamour, being leaſt diſpoſed to accommodate the *miniſter* with an acre of ground. And, indeed, conſidering the *difficulties* the clergy lie under upon this head, it hath been frequent matter of wonder to *me*, how they are able to perform that part of their duty ſo well as they do.

There is a [*l*] noble author, who hath lately addreſſed to the houſe of COMMONS an excellent diſcourſe for the *encouragement of agriculture*; full of moſt uſeful *hints*, which, I hope, that honourable aſſembly will conſider as they deſerve. I am not a ſtranger to his lordſhip; and, excepting in what relates to the church, there are few perſons with whoſe opinions I am better pleaſed to agree; and am therefore grieved when I find him charging the inconveniencies in the payment of *tithes* upon the *clergy* and their *proctors*. His lordſhip is above con-

[*l*] *The late lord* Moleſworth.

ſidering

ſidering a very known and vulgar truth, that the meaneſt farmer hath all manner of advantages againſt the moſt *powerful* clergyman, by whom it is impoſſible he can be wronged, although the *miniſter* were ever ſo evil diſpoſed; the whole ſyſtem of *teizing*, *perplexing*, and *defrauding* the *proctor*, or his *maſter*, being as well known to every *plowman*, as the reaping or ſowing of his corn, and much more artfully practiſed. Beſides, the leading man in the pariſh muſt have his *tithes* at his own rate, which is hardly ever above one quarter of the value. And I have heard it computed by many ſkilful obſervers, whoſe intereſt was not concerned, that the clergy did not receive, throughout the kingdom, one half of what the laws have made their due.

As to his lordſhip's diſcontent againſt the *biſhop's court*, I ſhall not interpoſe farther than in venturing my private opinion, that the clergy would be very glad to recover their juſt *dues* by a more *ſhort*, *deciſive*, and *compulſive* method, than ſuch a cramped and limited juriſdiction will allow.

His lordſhip is not the only perſon diſpoſed to give the clergy the honour of being the *ſole* encouragers of all new improvements. If *hops*, *hemp*, *flax*, and twenty *things* more are to be planted, the clergy *alone* muſt reward the induſtrious farmer by abatement of the *tithe*. What if the owner of nine parts in ten would pleaſe to abate proportionably in his rent for every acre thus improved? Would not a man juſt dropt from the clouds, upon a full

full hearing, judge the demand to be at leaſt as reaſonable?

I believe no man will diſpute his lordſhip's title to his eſtate; nor will I the *jus divinum* of *tithes*, which he mentions with ſome emotion. I ſuppoſe the affirmative would be of little advantage to the clergy, for the ſame reaſon, that a *maxim* in *law* hath more weight in the world, than an *article* of *faith*. And yet, I think, there may be ſuch a thing as *ſacrilege*; becauſe it is frequently mentioned by *Greek* and *Roman* authors, as well as deſcribed in *Holy-writ*. This I am ſure of; that his lordſhip would, at any time, excuſe a PARLIAMENT for not concerning itſelf in his properties without his own conſent.

The obſervations I have made upon his lordſhip's diſcourſe, have not, I confeſs, been altogether proper to my ſubject: however, ſince he hath been pleaſed therein to offer ſome propoſals to the houſe of commons with relation to the clergy, I hope he will excuſe me for differing from him; which proceeds from his own principle, the deſire of defending *liberty* and *property*, that he hath ſo ſtrenuouſly and conſtantly maintained.

But the other writer openly declares for a law impowering the biſhops to ſet *fee-farms*; and ſays, *Whoever intimates that they will deny their conſent to ſuch a reaſonable law, which the whole nation cries for, are enemies to them and the church.* Whether this be his real opinion, or only a ſtrain of mirth and irony, the matter is not much. However, my ſentiments

are

are ſo directly contrary to his, that, I think, whoever impartially reads and conſiders what I have written upon this argument, hath either no regard for the church eſtabliſhed under the hierarchy of biſhops, or will never conſent to any law, that ſhall repeal or elude the limiting clauſe relating to the real half value, contained in the act of parliament *decimo Caroli*, *For the preſervation of the inheritance, rights, and profits of lands belonging to the church and perſons eccleſiaſtical*; which was grounded upon reaſons that do ſtill and muſt for ever ſubſiſt.

October 21,
1723.

THE

THE PRESBYTERIANS PLEA OF MERIT

In order to take off

THE TEST IMPARTIALLY EXAMINED.

Written in the Year 1731 [*m*].

WE have been told, in the common news papers, that all attempts are to be made this ſeſſion by the *preſbyterians* and their abettors for taking off the teſt; as a kind of preparatory ſtep to make it go down ſmoother in *England*. For, if once *their light would ſo ſhine*, the *papiſts*, delighted with the blaze, would all come in and dance about it. This I take to be a prudent method; like that of a diſcreet phyſician, who firſt gives a new medicine to a *dog*, before he preſcribes it to a human creature.

The *preſbyterians* have, ever ſince the Revolution, directed their learned caſuiſts to employ their pens on this ſubject, by ſhewing the merits and preten-

[*m*] See a letter on this ſubject, vol. iii. which was re-printed in *Ireland* on the ſame occaſion that produced this and the three following tracts.

ſions,

ſions, upon which they claim this *juſtice*, as founded upon the ſervices they did towards the Reſtoration of king *Charles* the ſecond, and at the *Revolution* under the prince of *Orange:* which pleas I take to be the moſt ſingular in their kind, that ever were offered in the face of the ſun againſt the moſt glaring lights of truth, and againſt a continuation of public facts known to all *Europe* for twenty years together. I ſhall therefore impartially examine the merits and conduct of the *presbyterians* upon thoſe two great events; and the pretenſions to favour, which they challenge upon them.

Soon after the Reformation of the church in *England*, under *Edward* the ſixth, upon queen *Mary's* ſucceeding to the crown (who reſtored *popery*), many *proteſtants* fled out of *England*, to eſcape the perſecution raiſed againſt the church, as her brother had left it eſtabliſhed. Some of theſe exiles went to *Geneva*; which city had received the doctrine of *Calvin*, and rejected the government of biſhops; with many other refinements. Theſe *Engliſh* exiles readily embraced the *Geneva* ſyſtem; and having added further improvements of their own, upon queen *Mary's* death, returned to *England*; where they preached up their new opinions, inveighing bitterly againſt *epiſcopacy*, and all rites and ceremonies, however innocent and ancient in the church: building upon this foundation; to run as far as poſſible from *popery*, even in the moſt minute and indifferent circumſtances. This faction, under the name of *puritan*, became very turbulent

during the whole reign of queen *Elizabeth*, and were always diſcouraged by that wiſe queen, as well as by her two ſucceſſors. However, their numbers, as well as their inſolence and perverſeneſs, ſo far increaſed, that ſoon after the death of king *James* the firſt, many inſtances of their petulancy and ſcurrility are to be ſeen in their pamphlets written for ſome years after (which was a trade they began in the days of queen *Elizabeth*) particularly with great rancour againſt the biſhops, the habits, and the ceremonies: ſuch were thoſe ſcurrilous libels under the title of *Martin Marprelate*, and ſeveral others. And although the earl of *Clarendon* tells us, until the year 1640 (as I remember) the kingdom was in a ſtate of perfect peace and happineſs, without the leaſt appearance of thought or deſign towards making any alterations in religion and government; yet I have found, by often rummaging for old books in *Little-Britain* and *Duck-Lane*, a great number of pamphlets, printed from the year 1630, to 1640, full of as bold and impious railing expreſſions againſt the lawful power of the crown, and the order of biſhops, as ever were uttered during the rebellion, or the whole ſubſequent tyranny of that fanatic anarchy. However, I find it manifeſt, that *puritaniſm* did not erect itſelf into a new ſeparate ſpecies of religion till ſome time after the rebellion began. For, in the latter times of king *James* the firſt, and the former part of his ſon, there were ſeveral *puritan* biſhops, and many *puritan* private clergymen;

men; while people went, as there inclinations led them, to hear preachers of each party in the pariſh churches, for the *puritan* clergy had received epiſcopal orders as well as the reſt. But ſoon after the rebellion broke out, the term *puritan* gradually dropt, and that of *preſbyterian* ſucceeded; which ſect was, in two or three years, eſtabliſhed in all its forms, by what they called an ordinance of the lords and commons, without conſulting the king, who was then at war againſt his rebels. And from this period the church continued under perſecution, until monarchy was reſtored in the year 1660.

In a year or two after, we began to hear of a new party riſen, and growing in the parliament as well as the army, under the name of *independent*: it ſpread, indeed, ſomewhat more in the latter; but not equal with the *preſbyterians* either in weight or number, until the very time the king was murdered.

When the king, who was then a priſoner in the Iſle of *Wight*, had made his laſt conceſſions for a peace to the commiſſioners of the parliament, who attended him there; upon their return to *London*, they reported his majeſty's anſwer in the houſe. Whereupon a number of moderate members, who, as *Ludlow* ſays, had ſecured their own terms with that prince, managed with ſo much art as to obtain a majority in a thin houſe for paſſing a vote, that *the king's conceſſions were a ground for a future ſettlement*. But the great officers of the army, joining

ing with the diſcontented members, came to a reſolution of excluding all thoſe, who had conſented to that vote; which they executed in a military way. *Ireton* told *Fairfax* the general, a rigid *preſbyterian*, of this reſolution; who thereupon iſſued his orders for drawing out the army the next morning, and placing guards in *Weſtminſter-hall*, the *court of requeſts*, and the *lobby*; who, in obedience to the general in conjunction with thoſe members who had oppoſed the vote, would let no member enter the houſe, except thoſe of their own party. Upon which the queſtion, for bringing the king to juſtice, was, immediately, put and carried, without oppoſition, that I can find. Then an order was made for his trial; the time and place appointed; the judges named, of whom *Fairfax* himſelf was one; although, by the advice or threats of his wife, he declined ſitting among them. However, by freſh orders under his own hand, which I have ſeen in print, he appointed guards to attend the judges at the trial, and to keep the city in quiet; as he did likewiſe to prevent any oppoſition from the people upon the day of execution.

From what I have already deduced, it appears manifeſt, that the differences between thoſe two ſects, *preſbyterian* and *independent*, did not then amount to half ſo much as what there is between a *whig* and *tory* at preſent among us. The deſign of utterly extirpating monarchy and epiſcopacy was equally the ſame in both; evidently the conſequence of the very ſame principles, upon which the

preſbyterians alone began, continued, and would have ended in the ſame events; if, towards the concluſion, they had not been bearded by that new party, with whom they could not agree about dividing the ſpoil. However, they held a good ſhare of civil and military employments during the whole time of the uſurpation, and their names, actions, and preferments are frequent in the accounts of thoſe times. For I make no doubt, that all the prudent *preſbyterians* complied in proper ſeaſons, falling in with the ſtream; and thereby got that ſhare in employments, which many of them held to the reſtoration; and, perhaps, too many of them after. In the ſame manner we find our wiſeſt *tories* in both kingdoms, upon the change of hands and meaſures at the queen's death, have endeavoured for ſeveral years, by due compliances, to recover the time they had loſt by a temporary obſtinacy; wherein they have well ſucceeded, according to their degrees of merit; of whoſe names I could here make honourable mention, if I did not fear it might offend their modeſty. As to what is alledged, that ſome of the *preſbyterians* declared openly againſt the king's murder; I allow it to be true. But from what motives? No other can poſſibly be aſſigned than perfect ſpight, rage, and envy, to find themſelves wormed out of all power by a new infant ſpawn of *independents* ſprung from their own bowels. It is true, the differences in religious tenets between them are very few and trifling; the chief quarrel, as far as I remember, relating to congre-

congregational and national aſſemblies. But wherever intereſt or power think fit to interfere, it little imports what principles the oppoſite parties think fit to charge upon each other: for we ſee, at this day, that the *tories* are more hated by the whole ſett of zealous *whigs*, than the very *papiſts* themſelves; and, in effect, as much unqualified for the ſmalleſt office: although both theſe parties aſſert themſelves to be of the ſame religion in all its branches of doctrine and diſcipline; and profeſs the ſame loyalty to the ſame *proteſtant* king and his heirs.

If the reader would know what became of this *independent* party, upon whom all the miſchief is charged by their *preſbyterian* brethren, he may pleaſe to obſerve, that, during the whole uſurpation, they contended, by degrees, with their parent ſect, and, as I have already ſaid, ſhared in employments; and gradually, after the Reſtoration, mingled with the maſs of *preſbyterians*; lying ever ſince undiſtinguiſhed in the herd of *diſſenters*.

The *preſbyterian* merit is of as little weight when they alledge themſelves inſtrumental towards the king's Reſtoration. The kingdom grew tired with thoſe ridiculous models of government: firſt, by a houſe of lords and commons without a king; then without biſhops; afterwards by a rump [*n*] and

[*n*] This name was given to that part of the houſe of commons, which remained after the moderate men had been expelled by military force.

lords temporal; then by a rump alone; next by a ſingle perſon for life, in conjunction with a council; by agitators; by major-generals; by a new kind of repreſentatives from the three kingdoms; by the keepers of the liberties of *England*; with other ſchemes that have ſlipt out of my memory. *Cromwell* was dead; his ſon *Richard*, a weak ignorant wretch, who gave up his monarchy much in the ſame manner with the two uſurping kings of *Brentford* [o]; the people haraſſed with taxes, and other oppreſſions. The king's party, then called the *Cavaliers*, began to recover their ſpirits. The few nobility ſcattered through the kingdom, who lived in a moſt retired manner, obſerving the confuſion of things, could no longer endure to be ridden by bakers, coblers, brewers, and the like, at the head of armies, and plundering every where like *French* dragoons. The *rump* aſſembly grew deſpicable to thoſe, who had raiſed them: the city of *London* exhauſted, by almoſt twenty years contributing to their own ruin, declared againſt them. The *rump*, after many deaths and reſurrections, was, in the moſt contemptuous manner, kicked out, and burnt in effigy. The excluded members were let in: a free parliament called in as legal a manner as the times would allow; and the king reſtored.

The ſecond claim of *preſbyterian* merit is founded upon their ſervices againſt the dangerous deſigns of

[o] In the *Rehearſal*.

king

king *James* the ſecond; while that prince was uſing all his endeavours to introduce *popery*, which he openly profeſſed upon his coming to the crown: to this they add their eminent ſervices at the Revolution under the prince of *Orange*.

Now the *quantum* of *preſbyterian* merit, during the four years reign of that weak, bigotted, and ill-adviſed prince, as well as at the time of the Revolution, will eaſily be computed by a recourſe to a great number of hiſtories, pamphlets, and public papers, printed in thoſe times and ſome afterwards; beſides the verbal teſtimonies of many perſons yet alive, who are old enough to have known and obſerved the *diſſenters* conduct in that critical period.

It is agreed, that, upon king *Charles* the ſecond's death, ſoon after his ſucceſſor had publickly owned himſelf a *Roman catholick*, he began with his firſt careſſes to the church party; from whom, having received very cold diſcouraging anſwers, he applied to the *presbyterian* leaders and teachers: being adviſed, by his prieſts and *popiſh* courtiers, that the ſafeſt method towards introducing his own religion would be by taking off the *ſacramental teſt*, and giving a full liberty of conſcience to all religions (I ſuppoſe that profeſſed Chriſtianity). It ſeems that the *preſbyterians*, in the latter years of king *Charles* the ſecond, upon account of certain plots (allowed by biſhop *Burnet* to be genuine) had been, for a ſhort time, forbid to hold their conventicles. Whereupon theſe charitable *Chriſtians*, out of perfect reſentment againſt the church, received the

gracious offers of king *James* with the ſtrongeſt profeſſions of loyalty, and higheſt acknowledgments for his favour. I have ſeen ſeveral of their addreſſes, full of thanks and praiſes, with bitter inſinuations of what they had ſuffered; putting themſelves and the *papiſts* upon the ſame foot, as fellow-ſufferers for conſcience; and with the ſtyle of *our brethren the Roman catholicks*. About this time began the project of *cloſeting* (which hath ſince been practiſed many times with more art and ſucceſs) where the principal gentlemen of the kingdom were privately catechiſed, by his majeſty, to know whether, if a new parliament were called, they would agree to paſs an act for repealing the *ſacramental teſt*, and eſtabliſhing a general liberty of conſcience. But he received ſo little encouragement, that, deſpairing of ſucceſs, he had recourſe to his diſpenſing power, which the judges had determined to be part of his prerogative. By colour of this determination he preferred ſeveral *preſbyterians*, and many *papiſts*, to civil and military employments. While the king was thus buſied, it is well known that monſieur *Fagel*, the *Dutch* envoy in *London*, delivered the opinion of the prince and princeſs of *Orange* concerning the repeal of the *teſt*; whereof the king had ſent an account to their highneſſes, to know how far they approved of it. The ſubſtance of their anſwer, as reported by *Fagel*, was this, *That their highneſſes thought very well of a liberty of conſcience; but by no means of giving employments to any other perſons than thoſe who were of the national*

national church. This opinion was confirmed by ſeveral reaſons: I cannot be more particular, not having the paper by me, although it hath been printed in many accounts of thoſe times. And thus much every moderate churchman would, perhaps, ſubmit to: but to truſt any part of the civil power in the hands of thoſe whoſe intereſt, inclination, conſcience, and former practices have been wholly turned to introduce a different ſyſtem of religion and government, hath very few examples in any chriſtian ſtate; nor any at all in *Holland*, the great patroneſs of univerſal toleration.

Upon the firſt intelligence king *James* received of an intended invaſion by the prince of *Orange*, among great numbers of *papiſts*, to increaſe his troops, he gave commiſſions to ſeveral *preſbyterians*; ſome of whom had been officers under the *rump*; and particularly he placed one *Richards*, a noted *preſbyterian*, at the head of a regiment, who had been governor of *Wexford* in *Cromwell's* time, and is often mentioned by *Ludlow* in his *memoirs*. This regiment was raiſed in *England* againſt the prince of *Orange*: the colonel made his ſon a captain, whom I knew, and who was as zealous a *preſbyterian* as his father. However, at the time of the prince's landing, the father, eaſily foreſeeing how things would go, went over, like many others, to the prince, who continued him in his regiment; but, coming over a year or two after to aſſiſt in raiſing the ſiege of *Derry*, he behaved himſelf ſo like

like either a coward or a traitor, that his regiment was taken from him.

I will now conſider the conduct of the church-party during the whole reign of that unfortunate king. They were ſo unanimous againſt promiſing to paſs an act for repealing the teſt, and eſtabliſhing a general liberty of conſcience, that the king durſt not truſt a parliament; but, encouraged by the profeſſions of loyalty given him by his *preſbyterian* friends, went on with his diſpenſing power.

The church clergy, at that time, are allowed to have written the beſt collection of tracts againſt *popery*, that ever appeared in *England*; which are, to this day, in the higheſt eſteem. But, upon the ſtricteſt enquiry, I could never hear of above one or two papers publiſhed by the *preſbyterians* at that time upon the ſame ſubject. Seven great prelates (he of *Canterbury* among the reſt) were ſent to the tower for preſenting a petition, wherein they deſired to be excuſed in not obeying an illegal command from the king. The biſhop of *London*, Dr. *Compton*, was ſummoned to anſwer before the commiſſioners for eccleſiaſtical affairs, for not ſuſpending Dr. *Sharp* (afterwards archbiſhop of *York*) by the king's command. If the *preſbyterians* expreſſed the ſame zeal upon any occaſion, the inſtances of it are not, as I can find, left upon record, or tranſmitted by tradition. The proceedings againſt *Magdalen-college* in *Oxford*, for refuſing to comply with the king's mandate for admitting a profeſſed *papiſt* upon their foundation, are a ſtanding proof

of

of the courage and firmneſs in religion ſhewn by that learned ſociety to the ruin of their fortunes. The *preſbyterians* know very well, that I could produce many more inſtances of the ſame kind. But theſe are enough in ſo ſhort a paper as I intend at preſent.

It is indeed very true, that, after king *William* was ſettled on the *Engliſh* throne, the *preſbyterians* began to appear, and offer their credentials, and demand favour: and the new king, having been originally bred a *Calviniſt*, was deſirous enough to make them eaſy (if that would do it) by a legal toleration; although, in his heart, he never bore much affection to that ſect: nor deſigned to favour them farther than as it ſtood with the preſent ſcheme of politicks; as I have long ſince been aſſured by the greateſt men of whig principles at that time in *England*.

It is likewiſe true, nor will it be denied, that when the king was poſſeſſed of the *Engliſh* crown, and the remainder of the quarrel was left to be decided in this kingdom; the *preſbyterians* wiſely choſe to join with the *proteſtant* army, rather than with that of king *James* their old friend, whoſe affairs were then, in a manner, deſperate. They were wiſe enough to know, that this kingdom, divided againſt itſelf, could never prevail againſt the united power of *England*. They fought *pro aris et focis*; for their eſtates and religion; which latter will never ſuffer ſo much by the church of *England*, as by that of *Rome*, where they are counted

counted hereticks as well as we: and, conſequently, they have no other game to play. But what merit they can build upon having joined with a *proteſtant* army, under a king they acknowledged, to defend their own liberties and properties againſt a *popiſh* enemy under an abdicated king; is, I confeſs, to me abſolutely inconceivable; and, I believe, will equally be ſo for ever to any reaſonable man.

When theſe ſectaries were, ſeveral years ago, making the ſame attempt for aboliſhing the teſt, many groundleſs reports were induſtriouſly and ſeaſonably ſpread of an invaſion threatened by the *pretender* on the north of *Ireland*. At which time the *preſbyterians*, in their pamphlets, argued in a menacing manner, that, if the *pretender* ſhould invade thoſe parts of the kingdom, where the numbers and eſtates of the *diſſenters* chiefly lay, they would ſit ſtill, and *let us fight our own battles*; ſince they were to reap no advantage, which ever ſide ſhould be victors. If this were the courſe they intended to take in ſuch a caſe, I deſire to know how they could contrive ſafely to ſtand neuters, otherwiſe than by a compact with the *pretender* and his army to ſupport their neutrality, and protect them againſt the forces of the crown? This is a neceſſary ſuppoſition; becauſe they muſt otherwiſe have inevitably been a prey to both. However, by this frank declaration they ſufficiently ſhewed their good will, and confirmed the common charge laid at their door; that a *Scottiſh* or northern *preſbyterian* hates

hates our epiſcopal eſtabliſhed church more than *popery* itſelf. And the reaſon for this hatred is natural enough; becauſe it is the church alone that ſtands in the way between them and power; which *popery* doth not.

Upon this occaſion I am in ſome doubt, whether the political ſpreaders of thoſe chimerical invaſions made a judicious choice in fixing the northern parts of *Ireland* for that romantic enterprize. Nor can I well underſtand the wiſdom of the *preſbyterians* in countenancing and confirming thoſe reports; becauſe, it ſeems to caſt a moſt infamous reflexion upon the loyalty and religious principles of their whole body: for, if there had been any truth in the matter, the conſequence muſt have been allowed that the *pretender* counted upon more aſſiſtance from his father's friends, the *preſbyterians*, by chuſing to land in thoſe very parts, where their number, wealth, and power moſt prevailed, rather than among thoſe of his own religion. And therefore, in charity to this ſect, I rather incline to believe, that thoſe reports of an invaſion were formed and ſpread by the race of ſmall politicians, in order to do a ſeaſonable job.

As to *popery* in general, which, for a thouſand years paſt, hath been introducing and multiplying corruptions both in doctrine and diſcipline; I look upon it to be the moſt abſurd ſyſtem of Chriſtianity, profeſſed by any nation. But I cannot apprehend this kingdom to be in much danger from it. The eſtates of *papiſts* are very few; crumbling into ſmall

ſmall parcels, and daily diminiſhing; their common people are ſunk in poverty, ignorance, and cowardice; and of as little conſequence as women and children. Their nobility and gentry are at leaſt one half ruined, baniſhed, or converted: they all ſoundly feel the ſmart of what they ſuffered in the laſt *Iriſh* war: ſome of them are already retired into foreign countries; others, as I am told, intend to follow them; and the reſt, I believe, to a man, who ſtill poſſeſs any lands, are abſolutely determined never to hazard them again for the ſake of eſtabliſhing their ſuperſtition. If it hath been thought fit, as ſome obſerve, to abate of the law's rigour againſt *popery* in this kingdom, I am confident it was done for very wiſe reaſons, conſidering the ſituation of affairs abroad, at different times, and the intereſt of the *proteſtant* religion in general. And as I do not find the leaſt fault in this proceeding; ſo I do not conceive, why a ſunk diſcarded party, who neither expect nor deſire any thing more than a quiet life, ſhould, under the names of *high-flyers*, *jacobites*, and many other vile appellations, be charged ſo often in print, and at common tables, with endeavouring to introduce *popery* and the *pretender*; while the *papiſts* abhor them above all other men, on account of the ſeverities againſt their prieſts in her late majeſty's reign, when the *now diſbanded reprobate party* was in power. This I was convinced of ſome years ago by a long journey into the ſouthern parts; where I had the curioſity to ſend for many prieſts of the pariſhes I paſſed

paſſed through, and, to my great ſatisfaction, found them every where abounding in profeſſions of loyalty to the late king *George*; for which they gave me the reaſons abovementioned; at the ſame time complaining bitterly of the hardſhips they ſuffered under the QUEEN's *laſt miniſtry*.

I return from this digreſſion to the modeſt demands of the *preſbyterians* for a repeal of the *ſacramental teſt*, as a reward for their merits at the *Reſtoration* and the *Revolution*; which merits I have fairly repreſented, as well as my memory would allow me. If I have committed any miſtakes, they muſt be of little moment. The facts and principal circumſtances are what I have obtained and digeſted from reading the hiſtories of thoſe times written by each party; and many thouſands have done the ſame as well as I, who, I am ſure, have, in their minds, drawn the ſame concluſions.

This is the faction, and theſe the men, who are now reſuming their applications, and giving in their bills of merit to both kingdoms upon two points, which of all others they have the leaſt pretenſions to offer. I have collected the facts with all poſſible impartiality from the current hiſtories of thoſe times; and have ſhewn, although very briefly, the gradual proceedings of thoſe ſectaries, under the denominations of *puritans*, *presbyterians*, and *independents*, for about the ſpace of an hundred and eighty years, from the beginning of queen *Elizabeth* to this preſent time. But, notwithſtanding all that can be ſaid, theſe very ſchiſmaticks

(for

(for ſuch they are in temporals as well as ſpirituals) are now again expecting, ſoliciting, and demanding (not without inſinuated threats, according to their cuſtom) that the parliament ſhould fix them upon an equal foot with their church eſtabliſhed. I would fain know to what branch of the legiſlature they can have the forehead to apply. Not to my lords the biſhops; who muſt have often read how the predeceſſors of this very faction, acting upon the ſame principles, drove the whole bench out of the houſe; who were then, and hitherto continue, one of the three eſtates: not to the temporal peers, the ſecond of the three eſtates, who muſt have heard, that, immediately after thoſe rebellious fanaticks had murdered their king, they voted a houſe of lords to be uſeleſs and dangerous, and would let them ſit no longer, otherwiſe than when elected as commoners: not to the houſe of commons; who muſt have heard, that, in thoſe fanatic times, the *preſbyterian* and *independent* commanders in the army, by military power, expelled all the moderate men out of the houſe, and left a *rump* to govern the nation: laſtly, not to the crown; which thoſe very *ſaints* deſtined *to rule the earth* rampled under their feet, and then, in cold blood, murdered the bleſſed wearer.

But the ſeſſion now approaching, and a clan of diſſenting teachers being come up to town from their northern head quarters, accompanied by many of their elders and agents, and ſupported, by a general contribution, to ſolicit their eſtabliſhment with

with a capacity of holding all military, as well as civil, employments, I think it high time that this paper ſhould ſee the light. However, I cannot conclude without freely confeſſing, that if the *preſbyterians* ſhould obtain their ends, I could not be ſorry to find them miſtaken in the point, which they have moſt at heart by the repeal of the *teſt*; I mean the benefit of employments. For after all, what aſſurance can a *Scottiſh* northern diſſenter, born on *Iriſh* ground, have, that he ſhall be treated with as much favour as a *TRUE SCOT* born beyond the *Tweed?*

I am ready enough to believe, that all I have ſaid will avail but little. I have the common excuſe of other men, when I think myſelf bound, by all religious and civil ties, to diſcharge my conſcience, and to warn my countrymen upon this important occaſion. It is true, the advocates for this ſcheme promiſe a new world after this bleſſed work ſhall be compleated; that all animoſity and faction muſt immediately drop; that the only diſtinction in this kingdom will then be of *papiſt* and *proteſtant:* for as to *whig* and *tory*, *high-church* and *low-church*, *jacobite* and *Hanoverian*, *court* and *country party*, *Engliſh* and *Iriſh* intereſts, *diſſenters* and *conformiſts*, *new light* and *old light*, *anabaptiſt* and *independent*, *quaker* and *muggletonian*; they will all meet and jumble together into a perfect harmony at the ſeſſions and aſſizes, on the bench, and in the revenues; and upon the whole, in all civil and military truſts, not excepting the great councils of

the nation. For it is wiſely argued thus: that a kingdom being no more than a larger knot of friends met together, it is againſt the rules of good manners to ſhut any perſon out of the company, except the *papiſts*, who profeſs themſelves of another club.

I am at a loſs to know, what arts the *presbyterian* ſect intends to uſe in convincing the world of their loyalty to kingly government, which (long before the prevalence, or even the birth of their *independent* rivals) as ſoon as the king's forces were overcome, declared their principles to be againſt monarchy, as well as epiſcopacy and the houſe of lords, even until the king was reſtored: at which event, although they were forced to ſubmit to the preſent power, yet I have not heard, that they did ever, to this day, renounce any one principle, by which their predeceſſors then acted; yet this they have been challenged to do, or at leaſt to ſhew that others have done it for them, by a certain [*p*] doctor, who, as I am told, hath much employed his pen in the like diſputes. I own, they will be ready enough to inſinuate themſelves into any government: but, if they mean to be honeſt and upright, they will and muſt endeavour by all means, which they ſhall think lawful, to introduce and eſtabliſh their own ſcheme of religion, as neareſt approaching to the word of God, by caſting out all ſuperſtitious ceremonies, eccleſiaſtical titles, habits,

[*p*] The late Dr. TISDEL, who died *June* 1731.

diſtinction

diſtinctions, and ſuperiorities, as rags of *popery*, in order to a *thorough reformation*; and as in charity bound to promote the ſalvation of their countrymen, wiſhing with St. *Paul*, *that the whole kingdom were as they are*. But what aſſurance will they pleaſe to give, that, when their ſect ſhall become the national eſtabliſhed worſhip, they will treat Us DISSENTERS as we have treated them? Was this their courſe of proceeding during the dominion of the *ſaints?* Were not all the remainders of the epiſcopal church in thoſe days, eſpecially the clergy, under a perſecution for above a dozen years equal to that of the primitive Chriſtians under the heathen emperors? That this proceeding was ſuitable to their principles, is known enough; for many of their preachers then writ books expreſly againſt allowing any liberty of conſcience in a religion different from their own; producing many arguments to prove that opinion, and among the reſt one frequently inſiſted on; that allowing ſuch a liberty would be to *eſtabliſh iniquity by a law* [*q*]. Many of theſe writings are yet to be ſeen; and, I hear, have been quoted by the doctor abovementioned.

As to the great objection of proſtituting that holy inſtitution, the bleſſed ſacrament, by way of a teſt before admittance into any employment; I aſk, whether they would not be content to receive it *after their own manner* for the office of a judge, for

[*q*] See many hundred quotations to prove this, in the treatiſe called, *Scotch Preſbyterian Eloquence.*

that of a commiſſioner in the revenue, for a regiment of horſe, or to be a lord juſtice. I believe they would ſcruple it as little, as a long grace before and after dinner, which they can ſay without *bending a knee*; for, as I have been told, their manner of taking bread and wine, in their conventicles, is performed with little more ſolemnity than at their common meals. And therefore, ſince they look upon our practice, in receiving the elements, to be idolatrous, they neither can nor ought, in conſcience, to allow us that liberty, otherwiſe than by connivance, and a bare toleration, like what is permitted to the *papiſts*. *But leſt we ſhould offend them*, I am ready to change this teſt for another; although I am afraid, that ſanctified reaſon is, by no means, the point where the difficulty pinches, and is only offered by pretended churchmen; as if they could be content with our believing, that the impiety and profanation of making the ſacrament a teſt were the only objection, I therefore propoſe, that before the preſent law be repealed, another may be enacted; that no man ſhall receive any employment before he ſwears himſelf to be a true member of the church of *Ireland*, in doctrine and diſcipline, *&c.* and that he will never frequent or communicate with any other form of worſhip. It ſhall likewiſe be further enacted, that whoever offends, *&c.* ſhall be fined five hundred pounds, impriſoned for a year and a day, and rendered incapable of all public truſt for ever. Otherwiſe I do inſiſt, that thoſe pious, indulgent

dulgent, external profeſſors of our national religion ſhall either give up that fallacious hypocritical reaſon for taking off the teſt, or freely confeſs, that they deſire to have a gate wide open for every ſect without any teſt at all, except that of ſwearing loyalty to the king: which, however, conſidering their principles with regard to monarchy yet unrenounced, might, if they would pleaſe to look deep enough into their own hearts, prove a more bitter teſt, than any other that the law hath yet invented.

For from the firſt time that theſe ſectaries appeared in the world, it hath been always found, by their whole proceedings, that they profeſſed an utter hatred to kingly government. I can recollect, at preſent, three civil eſtabliſhments, where *Calviniſts* and ſome other reformers, who rejected *epiſcopacy*, poſſeſs the ſupreme power; and theſe are all republicks; I mean, *Holland*, *Geneva*, and the reformed *Swiſs* cantons. I do not ſay this in diminution or diſgrace to commonwealths; wherein I confeſs I have much altered many opinions under which I was educated, having been led, by ſome obſervation, long experience, and a thorough deteſtation for the corruptions of mankind: inſomuch, that I am now juſtly liable to the cenſure of *Hobbes*, who complains, that the youth of *England* imbibe ill opinions from reading the hiſtories of ancient *Greece* and *Rome*, thoſe renowned ſcenes of liberty and every virtue.

But as to monarchs, who muſt be ſuppoſed well to ſtudy and underſtand their own intereſt; they will beſt conſider, whether thoſe people, who in all their actions, preachings, and writings, have openly declared themſelves againſt regal power, are to be ſafely placed in an equal degree of favour and truſt, with thoſe who have been always found the true and only friends to the *Engliſh* eſtabliſhment. From which conſideration I could have added one more article to my new teſt, if I had thought it worth my time.

I have been aſſured, by ſome perſons who were preſent, that ſeveral of theſe diſſenting teachers, upon the firſt arrival hither to ſolicit the repeal of the teſt, were pleaſed to expreſs their gratitude by publickly drinking the healths of certain eminent patrons, whom they pretend to have found among us. If this be true, and that the teſt muſt be delivered up by the very *ſuperiors appointed to defend it*; the affair is already, in effect, at an end. What *ſecret* reaſons thoſe patrons may have given for ſuch a return of brotherly love, I ſhall not enquire: *For, O my ſoul, come not thou in their* ſecret; *unto their* aſſembly, *mine honour, be not thou united. For in their anger they ſlew a man, and in their ſelf-will they digged down a wall. Curſed be their anger, for it was fierce; and their wrath, for it was cruel. I will divide them in* Jacob, *and ſcatter them in* Iſrael.

THE

THE

ADVANTAGES

proposed by

Repealing the *Sacramental Test*.

IMPARTIALLY CONSIDERED.

Written in the Year 1732.

WHOEVER writes impartially upon this subject, must do it not only as a mere secular man; but as one who is altogether indifferent to any particular system of christianity. And, I think, in whatever country that religion predominates, there is one certain form of worship and ceremony, which is looked upon as the established; and consequently, only the priests of that particular form are maintained at the public charge; and all civil employments bestowed among those, who comply (at least outwardly) with the same establishment.

This method is strictly observed, even by our neighbours the *Dutch*, who are confessed to allow the fullest liberty of conscience of any christan state; and yet are never known to admit any persons into

civil offices, who do not conform to the legal worſhip. As to their military men, they are, indeed, not ſo ſcrupulous; being, by the nature of their government, under a neceſſity of hiring foreign troops, of whatever religious denomination, upon every great emergency, and maintaining no ſmall number in time of peace.

This caution therefore of making one eſtabliſhed faith, ſeems to be univerſal, and founded upon the ſtrongeſt reaſons; the miſtaken or effected zeal of obſtinacy and enthuſiaſm having produced ſuch a number of horrible deſtructive events throughout all *Chriſtendom*. For whoever begins to think the national worſhip is wrong in any important article of practice or belief, will, if he be ſerious, naturally have a zeal to make as many proſelytes as he can; and a nation may poſſibly have an hundred different ſects with their leaders; every one of which hath an equal right to plead, that they muſt *obey God rather than man*; muſt *cry aloud and ſpare not*; muſt *lift up their voice like a trumpet*.

This was the very caſe of *England* during the fanatic times. And againſt all this there ſeems to be no defence, but that of ſupporting one eſtabliſhed form of doctrine and diſcipline; leaving the reſt to a bare liberty of conſcience, but without any maintenance or encouragement from the publick.

Wherever this national religion grows ſo corrupt, or is thought to do ſo by a very great majority of landed people joined to the governing party, whether

ther prince or ſenate, or both, it ought to be changed; provided the work might be done without blood or confuſion. Yet, whenever ſuch a change ſhall be made, ſome other eſtabliſhment muſt ſucceed, although for the worſe; allowing all deviations, that would break the union, to be only tolerated. In this ſenſe, thoſe who affirm that every law, which is contrary to the law of God, is void in itſelf, ſeem to be miſtaken: for many laws in *popiſh* kingdoms and ſtates, many more among the *Turks*, and, perhaps, not a few in other countries, are directly againſt the divine laws; and yet, God knows, are very far from being void in the executive part.

Thus for inſtance, if the three eſtates of parliament in *England* (whereof the lords ſpiritual, who repreſent the *church*, are one) ſhould agree and obtain the royal aſſent to aboliſh epiſcopacy, together with the liturgy, and the whole frame of the *Engliſh* church, as *burthenſome*, *dangerous and contrary to holy ſcripture*, and that *preſbytery*, *anabaptiſm*, *quakeriſm*, *independency*, *muggletonianiſm*, *browniſm*, *familiſm*, or any other ſubdivided ſect among us, ſhould be eſtabliſhed in its place: without queſtion all peaceable ſubjects ought paſſively to ſubmit; and the predominant ſect muſt become the religion eſtabliſhed; the publick maintaining no other teachers, nor admitting any perſons of a different religious profeſſion into civil offices, at leaſt if their intention be to preſerve the nation in peace.

Suppoſing then, that the preſent ſyſtem of religion were aboliſhed; and *presbytery*, which I find ſtands

ſtands the faireſt, with its ſynods and claſſes, and all its forms and ceremonies eſſential or circumſtantial, were erected into the national worſhip: their teachers, and no others, could have any legal claim to be ſupported at the public charge, whether by ſtipends or tithes; and only the reſt of the ſame faith to be capable of civil employments.

If there be any true reaſoning in what I have laid down, it ſhould ſeem, that the project now in agitation for repealing the *teſt act*, and yet leaving the name of an eſtabliſhment to the preſent national church, is altogether inconſiſtent; and may admit of conſequences, which thoſe, who are the moſt indifferent to any religion at all, are poſſibly not aware of.

I preſume, whenever the *teſt* ſhall be repealed, which obliges all men, who enter into office under the crown, to receive the ſacrament according to the rites of the church of *Ireland*; the way to employments will immediately be left open to all *diſſenters* (except *papiſts*) whoſe conſciences can ſuffer them to take the common oaths in ſuch caſes preſcribed; after which, they are qualified to fill any lay ſtation in this kingdom, from that of chief governor to an exciſe-man.

Thus, of the three judges on each bench, the firſt may be a *presbyterian*, the ſecond a *free-will baptiſt*, and the third a *churchman*, the *lord chancellor* may be an *independent*: the revenues may be managed by ſeven commiſſioners of as many different ſects; and the like of all other employments: not to mention the ſtrong probability, that the lawful-

neſs

neſs of taking oaths may be *revealed* to the quakers, who then will ſtand upon as good a foot for preferment, as any other loyal ſubjects. It is obvious to imagine, under ſuch a motly adminiſtration of affairs, what a claſhing there will be of intereſt and inclinations; what pullings and hawlings backwards and forwards; what a zeal and biaſs, in each religioniſt, to advance his own tribe, and depreſs the others. For, I ſuppoſe, nothing will be readier granted, than that how indifferent moſt men are in faith and morals, yet, whether out of artifice, natural complexion, or love of contradiction, none are more obſtinate in maintaining their own opinions, and worrying all who differ from them, than thoſe who publickly ſhew the leaſt ſenſe either of religion or common honeſty.

As to the latter, biſhop *Burnet* tells us, that the *presbyterians*, in the fanatic times, profeſſed themſelves to be above morality; which, as we find in ſome of their writings, was numbered among the *beggarly elements:* and accordingly, at this day, no ſcruples of conſcience, with regard to conformity, are, in any trade or calling, inconſiſtent with the greateſt fraud, oppreſſion, perjury, or any other vice.

This brings to my memory a paſſage in *Montaigne*, of a common proſtitute, who, in the ſtorming of a town, when a ſoldier came up to her chamber and offered violence to her chaſtity, rather choſe to venture her neck by leaping out of the window than ſuffer a rape; yet ſtill continued her trade of lewdneſs, while ſhe had any cuſtomers left.

I con-

I confeſs, that, in my private judgment, an unlimited permiſſion of all ſects whatſoever (except *papiſts*) to enjoy employments would be leſs pernicious to the publick, than a fair ſtruggle between two contenders; becauſe in the former caſe, ſuch a jumble of principles might poſſibly have the effect of contrary poiſons mingled together; which a ſtrong conſtitution might, perhaps, be able for ſome time to ſurvive.

But however I ſhall take the other and more probable ſuppoſition, that this battle for employments is to be fought only between the *presbyterians*, and thoſe of the church *yet* eſtabliſhed. I ſhall not enter into the merits of either ſide by examining, which of the two is the better ſpiritual oeconomy, or which is moſt ſuited to our civil conſtitution; but the queſtion turns upon this point: When the *presbyterians* ſhall have got their ſhare of employments (which muſt be one full half, or elſe they cannot look upon themſelves as fairly dealt with) I aſk, whether they ought not, by their own principles, and by the ſtricteſt rules of conſcience, to uſe the utmoſt of their ſkill, power, and influence, in order to reduce the whole kingdom to an uniformity in religion, both as to doctrine and diſcipline moſt agreeable to the word of God. Wherein, if they can ſucceed without blood (as under the preſent diſpoſition of things it is very poſſible they may) it is to be hoped they will at laſt be ſatisfied: only I would warn them of a few difficulties. The firſt is of compromiſing among them-

themſelves that important controverſy about the *old light* and the *new*; which otherwiſe may, after this eſtabliſhment, ſplit them as wide as *papiſt* and *proteſtant*, *whig* and *tory*, or *churchman* and *diſſenter*; and, conſequently, the work will be to begin again: for, in religious quarrels, it is of little moment, how few or ſmall the differences are: eſpecially, when the diſpute is only about power. Thus the zealous *presbyterians* of the *north* are more alienated from the eſtabliſhed clergy, than from the *Romiſh* prieſts; taxing the former with idolatrous worſhip, as diſguiſed *papiſts*, *ceremony mongers*, and many other terms of art; and this for a very powerful reaſon; becauſe the clergy ſtand in their way, which the *popiſh* prieſts do not. Thus I am aſſured, that the quarrel between *old* and *new light-men* is managed with more rage and rancour, than any other diſpute of the higheſt importance; and this, becauſe it ſerves to leſſen or increaſe their ſeveral congregations, from whom they receive their contributions.

Another difficulty, which may embarraſs the *presbyterians* after their eſtabliſhment, will be, how to adjuſt their claim of the *kirk's* independency on the civil power, with the conſtitution of this monarchy; a point ſo delicate, that it hath often filled the heads of great patriots with dangerous notions of the church-clergy without the leaſt ground of ſuſpicion.

As to the *preſbyterians* allowing liberty of conſcience to thoſe of epiſcopal principles, when their own *kirk* ſhall be predominant; their writings are ſo univerſally agreed in the negative, as well as their

practice

practice during *Oliver's* reign, that, I believe, no reaſonable churchman (who muſt then be a *diſſenter*) will expect it.

I ſhall here take notice, that, in the diviſion of of employments among the *presbyterians*, after this approaching repeal of the *teſt-act*, ſuppoſing them, in proper time, to have an equal ſhare, the odds will be three or four to one on their ſide in any farther ſcheme they may have towards making their religion national. For, I reckon all thoſe gentlemen ſent over from *England*, whatever religion they profeſs or have been educated in, to be of that party: ſince it is no mark of prudence for any perſon to oppoſe the current of a nation, where they are, in ſome ſort, only ſojourners; unleſs they *have it in direction*.

If there be any maxim in politics not to be controuled, it muſt be the following: That thoſe, whoſe private intereſt is united with the intereſt of their country, ſuppoſing them to be of equal underſtanding with the reſt of their neighbours, will heartily wiſh, that the nation ſhould thrive. Out of theſe are indubitably excepted all perſons, who are ſent, from another kingdom, to be employed in places of profit or power; becauſe they cannot poſſibly bear affection to the place where they ſojourn, even for life; their ſole buſineſs being to advance themſelves by following the advice of their *principals*. I except likewiſe thoſe perſons, who are taken into offices, although natives of the land; becauſe they are greater gainers while they keep their offices, than they could poſſibly be by mending the miſerable condition of their country.

I except,

I except, *thirdly*, all hopers, who, by balancing accounts with themſelves, turn the ſcale on the ſame ſide; becauſe the ſtrong expectation of a good certain ſalary will outweigh the loſs by bad rents received out of lands in money-leſs times.

If my lords the biſhops, who I hear are now employed in a ſcheme for regulating the conduct and maintenance of the inferior clergy, ſhall, in their wiſdom and piety, and love of the church, conſent to this repeal of the *teſt*, I have not the leaſt doubt, that the whole reverend body will chearfully ſubmit to their ſpiritual fathers; of whoſe paternal tenderneſs for their welfare they have already found ſo many *amazing* inſtances.

I am not therefore under the leaſt concern about the clergy on this account. They will *(for ſome time)* be no great ſufferers by this repeal; becauſe I cannot recollect, among all our ſects, any one, that giveth latitude enough to take the oaths required at an inſtitution to a church-living; and until that bar ſhall be removed, the preſent epiſcopal clergy are ſafe for two years. Although it may be thought ſomewhat unequal, that, in the *northern* parts, where there may be three *diſſenters* to one *churchman*, the whole revenue ſhall be engroſſed by him who hath ſo ſmall a part of the cure.

It is true indeed, that this diſadvantage, which the *diſſenters* at preſent lie under, of a diſability to receive church-preferments, will be eaſily remedied by the repeal of the *teſt*. For the *diſſenting* teachers are under no incapacity of accepting civil and military

litary employments; wherein they agree perfectly with the *popiſh* clergy; among whom great cardinals and prelates have been commanders of armies, chief miniſters, knights of many orders, ambaſſadors, ſecretaries of ſtate, and in moſt high offices under the crown; although they aſſert the *indelible character*, which no ſectaries among us did ever aſſume. But that many, both *presbyterians* and *independents*, commanders, as well as private ſoldiers, were profeſſed preachers in the time of their dominion, is allowed by all. *Cromwell* himſelf was a preacher; and hath left us one of his ſermons in print, exactly in the ſame ſtyle and manner with thoſe of our modern *presbyterian* teachers: ſo was colonel *Howard*, Sir *George Downing*, and ſeveral others, whoſe names are on record. I can therefore ſee no reaſon, why a painful *presbyterian* teacher, as ſoon as the *teſt* ſhall be repealed, may not be privileged to hold, along with the ſpiritual office and ſtipend, a commiſſion in the army, or the civil liſt in *commendam*: for, as I take it, the church of *England* is the only body of *Chriſtians*, which, in effect, diſqualifies thoſe, who are employed to preach its doctrine, from ſharing in the civil power, farther than as ſenators: yet this was a privilege begun in times of *popery*, many hundred years before the *reformation*, and woven with the very inſtitution of our limited monarchy.

There is, indeed, another method, whereby the ſtipends of diſſenting teachers may be raiſed, and the farmer much relieved; if it ſhould be thought proper

proper to reward a people ſo deſerving, and ſo loyal by their principles. Every biſhop, upon the vacancy of a church-living, can ſequeſter the profits for the uſe of the next incumbent. Upon a lapſe of half a year, the donation falls to the archbiſhop, and after full year to the crown, during pleaſure. Therefore it would be no hardſhip for any clergyman *alive*, if (in thoſe parts of *Ireland*, where the number of ſectaries much exceeds that of the conformiſts) the profits, when ſequeſtered, might be applied to the ſupport of the diſſenting teacher, who hath ſo many ſouls to take care of: whereby the poor tenants would be much relieved in thoſe hard times, and in a better condition to pay their rents.

But there is another difficulty in this matter, againſt which a remedy doth not ſo readily occur. For ſuppoſing a *teſt-act* repealed, and the diſſenters, in conſequence, fully qualified for all ſecular employments; the queſtion may ſtill be put, whether thoſe of *Ireland* will be often the perſons on whom they ſhall be beſtowed; becauſe it is imagined, there may be [r] another *ſeminary* in view, *more numerous* and *more needy*, as well as *more meriting*, and more eaſily contented with ſuch low offices; which ſome nearer neighbours hardly think it worth ſtirring from their chimney ſides to obtain. And I am told, it is the common practice of thoſe who are ſkilled in the management of bees, that when

(r) *Scotland.*

they ſee a foreign ſwarm at ſome diſtance, approaching with an intention to plunder their hives, theſe artiſts have a trick to divert them into ſome neighbouring apiary, there to make what havock they pleaſe. This I ſhould not have hinted, if I had not known it already to have gotten ground in many ſuſpecting heads; for it is the peculiar talent of this nation to ſee dangers afar off: to all which I can only ſay, that our native *presbyterians* muſt, by pains and induſtry, raiſe ſuch a fund of *merit*, as will anſwer to a birth ſix degrees more to the *north*. If they cannot arrive at this perfection, as ſeveral of the eſtabliſhed church have compaſſed by indefatigable pains, I do not well ſee, how their affairs will much mend by repealing the *teſt:* for to be qualified by law to accept an employment, and yet to be diſqualified in fact, as it will much increaſe the mortification, ſo it will withdraw the pity of many among their well-wiſhers, and utterly deprive them of that *merit* they have ſo long made, of being a loyal *true proteſtant* people, perſecuted only for religion.

If this happen to be their caſe, they muſt wait maturity of time; until they can, by prudent, gentle ſteps, make their faith become the religion eſtabliſhed in the nation; after which, I do not in the leaſt doubt, that they will take the moſt effectual methods to ſecure their power againſt thoſe, who muſt then be *diſſenters* in their turn; whereof, if we may form a future opinion from preſent times, and the diſpoſitions of *diſſenters*, who love to make

a *thorough reformation*, the number and qualities will be very inconſiderable.

Thus I have, with the utmoſt ſincerity, after long thinking, given my judgment upon this arduous affair; but with the utmoſt deference and ſubmiſſion to publick wiſdom and power.

QUERIES

Relating to the

SACRAMENTAL TEST.

Written in the Year 1732.

QUERY, WHETHER hatred and violence between parties in a ſtate be not more inflamed by different views of intereſt, than by the greater or leſſer differences between them either in religion or government?

Whether it be any part of the queſtion at this time, which of the two religions is worſe, *popery* or *fanaticiſm*; or not rather, which of the two (having both the ſame good will) is in the hopefulleſt condition to ruin the church?

Whether the ſectaries, whenever they come to prevail, will not ruin the church as infallibly and effectually as the *papiſts?*

Whether the prevailing ſectaries could allow liberty of conſcience to *diſſenters* without belying all their former practice, and almoſt all their former writings?

Whether many hundred thouſand *Scotch* preſbyterians are not full as virulent againſt the epiſcopal church, as they are againſt the *papiſts*; or as they would have us think the *papiſts* are againſt them?

Whether the *Dutch*, who are moſt diſtinguiſhed for allowing liberty of conſcience, do admit any perſons who profeſs a different ſcheme of worſhip from their own, into civil employments, although they *may* be forced, by the nature of their government, to receive mercenary troops of all religions?

Whether the *diſſenters* ever pretended, until of late years, to deſire more than a bare toleration?

Whether, if it be true, what a ſorry pamphleteer aſſerts, who lately writ for repealing the *teſt*, that the *diſſenters*, in this kingdom, are equally numerous with the churchmen, it would not be a neceſſary point of prudence, by all proper and lawful means, to prevent their further increaſe?

The great argument given by thoſe, whom they call *low* churchmen, to juſtify the large tolerations allowed to *diſſenters*, hath been; that, by ſuch indulgencies, the rancour of ſectaries would gradually wear off, many of them would come over to us, and their parties, in a little time, crumble to nothing.

Query, Whether, if what the above pamphleteer aſſerts, that the ſectaries are equal in numbers with conformiſts, be true, it doth not clearly follow, that thoſe repeated tolerations have operated directly contrary to what thoſe *low* church politicians pretended to foreſee and expect?

Whether any clergyman, however dignified or diſtinguiſhed, if he think his own profeſſion moſt agreeable to holy ſcripture and the primitive church, can really wiſh in his heart, that all ſectaries ſhould be upon an equal foot with the churchmen in the point of civil power and employments?

Whether epiſcopacy, which is held by the church to be a divine and apoſtolical inſtitution, be not a fundamental point of religion, particularly in that eſſential one of conferring holy orders?

Whether, by neceſſary conſequences, the ſeveral expedients among the ſectaries to conſtitute their teachers are not abſolutely null and void?

Whether the ſectaries will ever agree to accept ordination only from biſhops?

Whether the biſhops and clergy will be content to give up epiſcopacy, as a point indifferent, without which the church can well ſubſiſt?

Whether that great tenderneſs towards ſectaries, which now ſo much prevails, be chiefly owing to the fears of *popery*, or to that ſpirit of atheiſm, deiſm, ſcepticiſm, and univerſal immorality, which all good men ſo much lament?

Granting *popery* to have any more errors in religion than any one branch of the ſectaries, let us examine the actions of both, as they have each effected the peace of theſe kingdoms, with allowance for the ſhort time, which the ſectaries had to act in, who are in a manner *but of yeſterday*. The *papiſts*, in the time of king *James* the ſecond, uſed all endeavours to eſtabliſh their ſuperſtition, wherein they failed

failed by the united power of *Engliſh* church-proteſtants with the prince of *Orange's* aſſiſtance. But it cannot be aſſerted, that theſe bigotted *papiſts* had the leaſt deſign to oppoſe or murder their king, much leſs to aboliſh kingly government; nor was it their intereſt or inclination to attempt either.

On the other ſide, the *puritans*, who had, almoſt from the beginning of queen *Elizabeth's* reign, been a perpetual thorn in the church's ſide, joining with the *Scotch* enthuſiaſts in the time of king *Charles* the firſt, were the principal cauſe of the *Iriſh rebellion* and *maſſacre*, by diſtreſſing that prince, and making it impoſſible for him to ſend over timely ſuccours. And after that pious prince had ſatisfied his parliament in every ſingle point to be complained of, the ſame ſectaries, by poiſoning the minds and affections of the people with the moſt falſe and wicked repreſentations of their king, were able, in the compaſs of a few years, to embroil the three nations in a bloody rebellion at the expence of many thouſand lives; to turn the kingly power into anarchy; to murder their prince in the face of the world, and (in their own ſtyle) to deſtroy the church *root and branch*.

The account therefore ſtands thus. The *papiſts* aimed at one pernicious act, which was to deſtroy the *proteſtant* religion; wherein, by God's mercy, and the aſſiſtance of our glorious king *William*, they abſolutely failed. The ſectaries attempted the three moſt infernal actions, that could poſſibly enter into the hearts of men forſaken by God; which

were the murder of a moſt pious king, the deſtruction of the monarchy, and the extirpation of the church; and ſucceeded in them all.

Upon which I put the following queries: Whether any of thoſe ſectaries have ever yet, in a ſolemn publick manner, renounced any one of thoſe principles, upon which their predeceſſors then acted?

Whether, conſidering the cruel perſecutions of the epiſcopal church during the courſe of that horrid rebellion, and the conſequences of it until the happy *reſtoration*, it is not manifeſt, that the perſecuting ſpirit lies ſo equally divided between the *papiſts* and the ſectaries, that a feather would turn the balance on either ſide?

And therefore, laſtly, Whether any perſon of common underſtanding, who profeſſeth himſelf a member of the church eſtabliſhed, although, perhaps, with little inward regard to any religion (which is too often the caſe) if he loves the peace and welfare of his country, can, after cool thinking, rejoice to ſee a power placed again in the hands of ſo reſtleſs, ſo ambitious, and ſo mercileſs a faction, to act over all the ſame parts a ſecond time?

Whether the candor of that expreſſion, ſo frequent of late in ſermons and pamphlets, of the *ſtrength and number of the* papiſts *in* Ireland, can be juſtified? For as to their number, however great, it is always magnified in proportion to the zeal or politicks of the ſpeaker and writer; but it is a groſs impoſition,

impoſition, upon common reaſon, to terrify us with their ſtrength. For *popery*, under the circumſtances it lies in this kingdom, although it be offenſive and inconvenient enough from the conſequences it hath to encreaſe the rapine, ſloth, and ignorance, as well as poverty of the natives, is not properly dangerous in that ſenſe, as ſome would have us take it; becauſe it is univerſally hated by every part of a different religious profeſſion. It is the contempt of the wiſe; the beſt topick for clamours of deſigning men; but the real terror only of fools. The landed *popiſh* intereſt, in *England*, far exceeds that among us even in proportion to the wealth and extent of each kingdom. The little that remains here is daily dropping into *proteſtant* hands by purchaſe or deſcent; and that affected complaint of counterfeit converts will fall, with the cauſe of it, in half a generation, unleſs it be raiſed or kept alive as a continual fund of merit and eloquence. The *papiſts* are wholly diſarmed; they have neither courage, leaders, money, nor inclinations to rebel; they want every advantage, which they formerly poſſeſſed, to follow that trade; and wherein even with thoſe advantages they always miſcarried: they appear very eaſy and ſatisfied under that connivance, which they enjoyed during the whole laſt reign; nor ever ſcrupled to reproach another party, under which they pretend to have ſuffered ſo much ſeverity.

Upon theſe conſiderations, I muſt confeſs to have ſuſpended much of my pity towards the great dreaders of *popery*; many of whom appear to be hale, ſtrong, active,

active, young men; who, as I am told, eat, drink, and ſleep heartily; and are very chearful (as they have exceeding good reaſon) upon all other ſubjects. However, I cannot too much commend the generous concern, which our neighbours, and others who come from the ſame neighbourhood, are ſo kind to expreſs for us upon this account; although the former be farther removed from the danger of *popery* by twenty leagues of ſalt-water: but this, I fear, is a digreſſion.

When an artificial report was raiſed here, many years ago, of an intended invaſion by the *pretender* which blew over, after it had done its office) the *diſſenters* argued, in their talk and in their pamphlets, after this manner, applying themſelves to thoſe of the church: Gentlemen, if the *pretender* had landed, as the law now ſtands, we durſt not aſſiſt you; and therefore, unleſs you take off the *teſt*, whenever you ſhall happen to be invaded in earneſt, if we are deſired to take up arms in your defence, our anſwer ſhall be: Pray, gentlemen, fight your own battles: we will not do your drudgery. This way of reaſoning I have heard from ſeveral of their chiefs and abetters in an hundred converſations; and have read it in twenty pamphlets: and I am confident it will be offered again, if the project ſhould fail to take off the *teſt*.

Upon which piece of oratory and reaſoning, I form the following query. Whether, in caſe of an invaſion from the *pretender* (which is not quite ſo proboble as from the *grand ſignior*), the *diſſenters* can, with

with prudence and ſafety, offer the ſame plea; except they ſhall have made a previous ſtipulation with the invaders? And whether the full freedom of their religion and trade, their lives, properties, wives, and children, are not, and have not always been reckoned, ſufficient motives for repelling invaſions; eſpecially in our ſectaries, who call themſelves the *trueſt proteſtants*, by virtue of their pretended or real fierceneſs againſt *popery*.

Whether omitting or neglecting to celebrate the day of the martyrdom of the bleſſed king *Charles* the firſt, enjoined by act of parliament, can be juſtly reckoned a particular and diſtinguiſhing mark of good affection to the preſent government?

Whether in thoſe churches, where the ſaid day is obſerved, it will fully anſwer the intent of the ſaid act, if the preacher ſhall commend, excuſe, palliate, or extenuate the murder of that royal martyr; and place the guilt of that horrid rebellion, with all its conſequences, the following uſurpations, the entire deſtruction of the church, the cruel and continual perſecutions of thoſe who could be diſcovered to profeſs its doctrines, with the enſuing *babel* of fanaticiſm, to the account of that bleſſed king, who, by granting the petition of right, and paſſing every bill that could be aſked for the ſecurity of the ſubject, had, by the confeſſion of thoſe wicked men before the war began, left them nothing more to demand?

Whether ſuch a preacher as I have named (whereof there have been more than *one*, not many years paſt,

even in the preſence of viceroys) who takes that courſe as a means for promotion, may not be thought to ſtep a little out of the common road, in a monarchy where the deſcendents of that moſt bleſſed martyr have reigned to this day?

I ground the reaſon of making theſe queries on the title of the act; to which I refer the reader.

REASONS

Humbly offered to the

PARLIAMENT OF IRELAND

For REPEALING the

SACRAMENTAL TEST, IN FAVOUR OF THE CATHOLICKS.

Written in the Year 1732 [s].

IT is well known, that the firſt conquerors of this kingdom were *Engliſh catholicks*, ſubjects to *Engliſh catholick* kings, from whom, by their valour and ſucceſs, they obtained large portions of land, given them as a reward for their many victories over the *Iriſh:* to which merit our *brethren*, the diſſenters of any denomination whatſoever, have not the leaſt pretenſions.

It is confeſſed, that the poſterity of thoſe firſt victorious *catholicks* were often forced to riſe in their own defence againſt new colonies from *England*, who treated them, like mere native *Iriſh*, with innumerable oppreſſions, depriving them of their

[s] The author having before examined the preſbyterians plea of merit, with reſpect to their own principles and practices, has, in this tract, put them in the balance againſt papiſts.

lands,

lands, and driving them, by force of arms, into the moſt deſperate parts of the kingdom; till in the next generation the children of theſe tyrants were uſed in the ſame manner by new *Engliſh* adventurers, which practice continued for many centuries. But it is agreed on all hands, that no inſurrections were ever made, except after great oppreſſions by freſh invaders. Whereas all the rebellions of *puritans*, *preſbyterians*, *independents*, and other ſectaries, conſtantly began before any provocations were given, except that they were not ſuffered to change the government in church and ſtate, and ſeize both into their own hands; which, however, at laſt they did, with the murder of their king, and of many thouſands of his beſt ſubjects.

The *catholicks* were always deſenders of monarchy, as conſtituted in theſe kingdoms; whereas our *brethren*, the *diſſenters*, were always republicans both in principle and practice.

It is well known, that all the *catholicks* of theſe kingdoms, both prieſts and laity, are true *whigs*, in the beſt and moſt proper ſenſe of the word; bearing as well in their hearts, as in their outward profeſſion, an entire loyalty to the royal houſe of *Hanover*, in the perſon and poſterity of *George* the ſecond, againſt the *pretender* and all his *adherents*. To which they think themſelves bound in gratitude, as well as conſcience, by the lenity wherewith they have been treated ſince the death of queen *Anne*, ſo different from what they ſuffered in the four laſt years of that princeſs, during the admini-

adminiſtration of that *wicked* miniſter the earl of *Oxford*.

The *catholicks* of this kingdom humbly hope, that they have at leaſt as fair a title as any of their *brother* diſſenters to the appellation of *proteſtants*. They have always *proteſted* againſt the ſelling, dethroning, or murdering their kings; againſt the uſurpations and avarice of the *court* of *Rome*; againſt *deiſm*, *atheiſm*, *ſocinianiſm*, *quakeriſm*, *muggletoniaſm*, *fanaticiſm*, *browniſm*, as well as againſt all *Jews*, *Turks*, *infidels*, and *hereticks*. Whereas the title of *proteſtants* aſſumed by the whole herd of diſſenters (except ourſelves) dependeth entirely upon the *proteſting againſt archbiſhops*, *biſhops*, *deans*, *and chapters*, *with their revenues*; *and the whole hierarchy*; which are the very expreſſions uſed in the *ſolemn league and covenant* [*t*], where the word *popery* is only mentioned *ad invidiam*; becauſe the *catholicks* agree with the epiſcopal church in thoſe fundamentals.

Although the *catholicks* cannot deny, that, in the great rebellion againſt king *Charles* the firſt, more ſoldiers of their religion were in the parliament army, than in his majeſty's troops; and that many jeſuits and friers went about, in the diſguiſe of *presbyterian* and *independent* miniſters, to preach up

[*t*] A ſolemn league and covenant entered into between the *Scots* and *Engliſh* fanaticks, in the rebellion againſt king *Charles* the firſt, 1643, by which they ſolemnly engaged, among other things, "To "endeavour the extirpation of prelacy, that is, church government by "archbiſhops, biſhops, deans, archdeacons, and all other epiſcopal offi-"cers, depending on that hierarchy."

rebellion,

rebellion, as the beſt hiſtorians of thoſe times inform us; yet the bulk of *catholicks*, in both kingdoms, preſerved their loyalty entire.

The *catholicks* have ſome reaſon to think it a little hard, when their enemies will not pleaſe to diſtinguiſh between the rebellious riot committed by that brutal ruffian Sir *Phelim O Neal*, with his tumultuous crew of rabble, and the forces raiſed afterwards by the *catholick* lords and gentlemen of the *Engliſh* pale in defence of the king, after the *Engliſh* rebellion began. It it is well known, that his majeſty's affairs were in great diſtraction ſome time before by an invaſion of the *covenanting*, *Scotiſh*, *kirk rebels*, and by the baſe terms the king was forced to accept, that they might be kept in quiet at a juncture when he was every hour threatened at home by that fanatic party, which ſoon after ſet all in a flame. And, if the *cacholick* army in *Ireland* fought for their king againſt the forces ſent over by the parliament then in actual rebellion againſt him, what perſon of loyal principles can be ſo partial to deny, that they did their duty by joining him with the marquis of *Ormond* and other commanders, who bore their commiſſions from the king? For which great numbers of them loſt their lives, and forfeited their eſtates; a great part of the latter being now poſſeſſed, by many deſcendents from thoſe very men, who had drawn their ſwords in the ſervice of that rebellious parliament which cut off his head and deſtroyed monarchy. And what is more amazing, although the ſame perſons,

perſons, when the *Iriſh* were entirely ſubdued, continued in power under the *rump*, were chief confidents and faithful ſubjects to *Cromwell*, yet, being wiſe enough to foreſee a *reſtoration*, they ſeized the forts and caſtles here out of the hands of their *old brethren in rebellion*, for the ſervice of the king; juſt ſaving the tide, and putting in a ſtock of merit ſufficient not only to preſerve the land which the *catholicks* loſt by their loyalty, but likewiſe to preſerve their civil and military employments, or be higher advanced.

Thoſe inſurrections wherewith the *catholicks* are charged, from the beginning of the ſeventeenth century to the great *Engliſh* rebellion, were occaſioned by many oppreſſions they lay under. They had no intention to introduce a *new* religion, but to enjoy the liberty of preſerving the *old*; the very ſame which their anceſtors profeſſed from the time that *Chriſtianity* was firſt introduced into this iſland, which was by *catholicks*; but whether mingled with corruptions, as ſome pretend, doth not belong to the queſtion. They had no deſign to change the government; they never attempted to fight againſt, to impriſon, to betray, to ſell, to bring to a trial, or to murder their king. The ſchiſmaticks acted by a ſpirit directly contrary; they united in a *ſolemn league and covenant* to alter the whole ſyſtem of ſpiritual government eſtabliſhed in all chriſtian nations, and of apoſtolic inſtitution; concluding the tragedy with the murder of the king in cold blood, and upon mature deliberation;

at the ſame time changing the monarchy into a commonwealth.

The *catholicks* of *Ireland*, in the great rebellion, loſt their eſtates for fighting in defence of their king. The ſchiſmaticks, who cut off the father's head, forced the ſon to fly for his life, and overturned the whole ancient frame of government, religious and civil: obtained grants of thoſe very eſtates, which the *catholicks* loſt in defence of the ancient conſtitution, many of which eſtates are, at this day, poſſeſſed by the poſterity of theſe ſchiſmaticks: and thus they gained by their *rebellion*, what the *catholicks* loſt by their *loyalty*.

We allow the *catholicks* to be *brethren* of the diſſenters; ſome people indeed (which we cannot allow) would have *them* to be our children, becauſe *we* both diſſent from the church eſtabliſhed, and both agree in aboliſhing this perſecuting ſacramental teſt, by which *negative diſcouragement* we are both rendered incapable of civil and military employments. However, we cannot but wonder at the bold familiarity of theſe ſchiſmaticks in calling the members of the national church their *brethren* and *fellow proteſtants*. It is true, that all theſe ſects (except the *catholicks*) are *brethren* to each other in faction, ignorance, iniquity, perverſeneſs, pride, and (if we except the *quakers*) in rebellion. But, how the churchmen can be ſtyled their *fellow proteſtants*, we cannot comprehend: becauſe, when the whole *babel* of ſectaries joined againſt the church, the king, and the nobility, for twenty

twenty years, in a MATCH AT FOOT BALL, where the proverb expreſly tells us, that *all are* FELLOWS; while the three kingdoms were toſſed to and fro, the churches and cities and royal palaces ſhattered to pieces by their *balls*, their *buffets*, and their *kicks*; the victors would allow no more FELLOWS AT FOOT BALL; but murdered, ſequeſtered, plundered, deprived, baniſhed to the plantations, or enſlaved, all their oppoſers who had *loſt the game*.

It is ſaid the world is governed by *opinion*; and politicians aſſure us, that all power is founded thereupon. Wherefore, as all human creatures are fond to diſtraction of their own opinions, and ſo much the more, as thoſe opinions are abſurd, ridiculous, or of little moment; it muſt follow, that they are equally fond of power. But no opinions are maintained with ſo much obſtinacy as thoſe in religion, eſpecially by ſuch zealots, who never bore the leaſt regard to religion, conſcience, honour, juſtice, truth, mercy, or common morality farther than in outward appearance, under the maſk of hypocriſy to promote their diabolical deſigns. And therefore biſhop *Burnet*, one of their oracles, tells us honeſtly, that the *ſaints* of thoſe fanatic times pronounced themſelves above morality; which they reckoned among *beggarly elements*; but the meaning of theſe two laſt words thus applied, we confeſs to be above our underſtanding.

Among thoſe kingdoms and ſtates which firſt embraced the Reformation, *England* appears to

have received it in the moſt regular way; where it was introduced in a peaceable manner, by the ſupreme power of a king [*u*] and the three eſtates in parliament; to which, as the higheſt legiſlative authority, all ſubjects are bound paſſively to ſubmit. Neither was there much blood ſhed on ſo great a change of religion. But a conſiderable number of lords, and other perſons of quality through the kingdom, ſtill continued in their old faith, and were, notwithſtanding their difference in religion, employed in offices civil as well as military, more or leſs in every reign, until the teſt act in the time of king *Charles* the ſecond. However, from the time of the Reformation, the number of *catholicks* gradually and conſiderably leſſened. So that, in the reign of king *Charles* the firſt, *England* became, in a great degree, a proteſtant kingdom, without taking the ſectaries into the number; the legality whereof, with reſpect to human laws, the *catholicks* never diſputed; but the *puritans*, and other ſchiſmaticks, without the leaſt pretence to any ſuch authority, by an open rebellion deſtroyed that legal Reformation, as we obſerved before, murdered their king, and changed the monarchy into a republick. It is therefore not to be wondered at, if the *catholicks*, in ſuch a *babel* of religions, choſe to adhere to their own faith left them by their anceſtors, rather than ſeek for a better

[*u*] *Henry* VIII.

among

among a rabble of hypocritical, rebellious, deluding knaves, or deluded enthuſiaſts.

We repeat once more, that if a national religion be changed by the ſupreme legiſlative power, we cannot diſpute the human legality of ſuch a change. But we humbly conceive, that if any conſiderable party of men, which differs from an eſtabliſhment, either old or new, can deſerve liberty of conſcience, it ought to conſiſt of thoſe, who, for want of conviction, or of right underſtanding the merits of each cauſe, conceive themſelves bound in conſcience to adhere to the religion of their anceſtors; becauſe they are of all others leaſt likely to be authors of innovations either in church or ſtate.

On the other ſide; if the reformation of religion be founded upon rebellion againſt the king, without whoſe conſent, by the nature of our conſtitution, no law can paſs; if this reformation be introduced by only one of the three eſtates, I mean the commons, and not by one half even of thoſe commons, and this by the aſſiſtance of a rebellious army; again, if this Reformation were carried on by the excluſion of nobles both lay and ſpiritual (who conſtitute the other part of the three eſtates), by the murder of their king, and by aboliſhing the whole ſyſtem of government; the *catholicks* cannot ſee why the ſucceſſors of thoſe ſchiſmaticks, who are univerſally accuſed by all parties, except themſelves, and a few infamous abetters, for ſtill retaining the ſame principles in religion and govern-

ment, under which their predeceſſors acted; ſhould pretend to a better ſhare of civil or military truſt, profit and power, than the *catholicks*, who, during all that period of twenty years, were continually perſecuted with the utmoſt ſeverity, merely on account of their loyalty and conſtant adherence to kingly power.

We now come to thoſe arguments for repealing the ſacramental teſt, which equally affect the *catholicks*, and their brethren the diſſenters.

Firſt, we agree with our fellow-diſſenters, that [x] *perſecution, merely for conſcience ſake, is againſt the genius of the goſpel.* And ſo likewiſe is *any law for depriving men of their natural and civil rights, which they claim as men.* We are alſo ready enough to allow, that *the ſmalleſt negative diſcouragements, for uniformity's ſake, are ſo many perſecutions.* Becauſe, it cannot be denied, that the ſcratch of a pin is, in ſome degree, a real wound, as much as a ſtab through the heart. In like manner, an incapacity by law for any man to be made a judge, a colonel, or juſtice of the peace, *merely on a point of conſcience, is a negative diſcouragement*, and, conſequently, a real perſecution: for in this caſe, the author of the pamphlet, quoted in the margin [y], puts a very pertinent and powerful queſtion: *If God be the ſole Lord of the conſcience*,

[x] *Vid.* Reaſons for the repeal of the ſacramental teſt.
[y] *Vid.* Reaſons for the repeal of the ſacramental teſt.

why

why ſhould the rights of conſcience be ſubject to human juriſdiction? Now, to apply this to the *catholicks*; the belief of tranſubſtantiation *is a matter purely of religion and conſcience, which doth not affect the political intereſt of ſociety, as ſuch: therefore why ſhould the rights of conſcience, whereof* God *is the ſole* Lord, *be ſubject to human juriſdiction?* And why ſhould God be deprived of this right over a *catholick's* conſcience, any more than over that of any other diſſenter?

And whereas another author, among our brethren the diſſenters, hath very juſtly complained, that, by this perſecuting teſt act, great numbers of *true proteſtants* have been forced to leave the kingdom, and fly to the plantations, rather than ſtay here *branded* with an incapacity for civil and military employments; we do affirm, that the *catholicks* can bring many more inſtances of the ſame kind; ſome thouſands of their religion having been forced, by the ſacramental teſt, to retire into other countries, rather than live here under the incapacity of wearing ſwords, ſitting in parliament, and getting that ſhare of power and profit which belong to them as *fellow Chriſtians*, whereof they are deprived *merely upon account of conſcience, which would not allow them to take the ſacrament after the manner preſcribed in the liturgy.* Hence it clearly follows, in the words of the ſame [z] author, That *if we*

[z] See Reaſons againſt the teſt.

catholicks *are incapable of employments, we are puniſhed for our diſſent, that is, for our conſcience, which wholly turns upon political conſiderations.*

The *catholicks* are willing to acknowledge the king's ſupremacy, whenever their brethren, the diſſenters, ſhall pleaſe to ſhew them an example.

Further, the *catholicks*, whenever their religion ſhall come to be the national eſtabliſhed faith, are willing to undergo the ſame *teſt* offered by the author already quoted. His words are theſe: *To end this debate, by putting it upon a foot, which, I hope, will appear, to every impartial perſon, a fair and equitable one: we* catholicks *propoſe, with ſubmiſſion to the proper judges, that effectual ſecurity be taken againſt perſecution, by obliging all, who are admitted into places of power and truſt, whatever their religious profeſſion be, in the moſt ſolemn manner, to diſclaim perſecuting principles.* It is hoped the publick will take notice of theſe words; *Whatever their religious profeſſion be*; which plainly include the *catholicks*; and for which we return thanks to *our diſſenting brethren.*

And whereas it is objected by thoſe of the eſtabliſhed church, that, if the ſchiſmaticks and fanaticks were once put into a capacity of poſſeſſing civil and military employments, they would never be at eaſe, till they had raiſed their own way of worſhip into the national religion through all his majeſty's dominions, equal with the *true orthodox Scottiſh kirk*; which, when they had once brought

to

to paſs, they would no more allow liberty of conſcience to epiſcopal diſſenters, than they did in the time of the great *Engliſh* rebellion, and in the ſucceeding fanatic anarchy, till the king was reſtored. There is another very learned ſchiſmatical [*a*] pamphleteer, who, in anſwer to a malignant libel called, *The preſbyterian plea of merit*, &c. clearly wipes off this aſperſion, by aſſuring all epiſcopal proteſtants of the preſent church, upon his own word, and to his own knowledge, that our brethren, the diſſenters, will never offer at ſuch an attempt. In like manner the *catholicks*, when legally required, will openly declare, *upon their words and honours*, that, as ſoon as their *negative diſcouragements* and their *perſecution* ſhall be removed by repealing the ſacramental teſt, they will leave it entirely to the merits of the cauſe, whether the kingdom ſhall think fit to make their faith the eſtabliſhed religion or not.

And again, whereas our *preſbyterian* brethren, in many of their pamphlets, take much offence, that the great rebellion in *England*, the murder of the king, with the entire change of religion and government, are perpetually objected againſt them both in and out of ſeaſon, by our common enemy the preſent conformiſts; we do declare, in the defence of our ſaid brethren, that the reproach aforeſaid is *an old worn-out thread-bare cant*, which they always

[*a*] Vindication of the proteſtant diſſenters.

diſdained

diſdained to anſwer: and I very well remember, that having once told a certain conformiſt, how much I wondered to hear him and his tribe dwelling perpetually on ſo beaten a ſubject; he was pleaſed to divert the diſcourſe with a fooliſh ſtory, which I cannot forbear telling to his diſgrace. He ſaid, there was a clergyman in *Yorkſhire*, who, for fifteen years together, preached every *Sunday* againſt drunkenneſs: whereat the pariſhioners being much offended, complained to the archbiſhop; who having ſent for the clergyman, and ſeverely reprimanded him, the miniſter had no better an anſwer, than by confeſſing the fact; adding, that all the pariſh were drunkards; that he deſired to reclaim them from one vice, before he would begin upon another; and ſince they ſtill continued to be as great drunkards as before, he reſolved to go on, except his grace would pleaſe to forbid him.

We are very ſenſible how heavy an accuſation lieth upon the *catholicks* of *Ireland*; that ſome years before king *Charles* the ſecond was reſtored, when theirs and the king's forces were entirely reduced, and the kingdom declared, by the *rump*, to be ſettled; after all his majeſty's generals were forced to fly to *France*, or other countries, the heads of the ſaid *catholicks*, who remained here in an enſlaved condition, joined to ſend an invitation to the duke of *Lorrain*; engaging, upon his appearing here with his forces, to deliver up the whole iſland to his power, and declare him their ſovereign; which, after

after the Reſtoration, was proved againſt them by dean *Boyle*, ſince primate, who produced the very original inſtrument at the board. The *catholicks* freely acknowledge the fact to be true; and, at the ſame time, appeal to all the world, whether a wiſer, a better, a more honourable, or a more juſtifiable project could have been thought of. They were then reduced to ſlavery and beggary by the *Engliſh* rebels, many thouſands of them murdered, the reſt deprived of their eſtates, and driven to live on a ſmall pittance in the wilds of *Connaught*; at a time when either the *rump*, or *Cromwell*, abſolutely governed the three kingdoms. And the queſtion will turn upon this, whether the *catholicks*, deprived of all their poſſeſſions, governed with a rod of iron, and in utter deſpair of ever ſeeing the monarchy reſtored, for the preſervation of which they had ſuffered ſo much, were to be blamed for calling in a foreign prince of their own religion, who had a conſiderable army to ſupport them, rather than ſubmit to ſo infamous an uſurper as *Cromwell*, or ſuch a bloody and ignominious conventicle as the *rump*. And I have often heard not only our friends the diſſenters, but even our common enemy the conformiſts, who are converſant in the hiſtory of thoſe times, freely confeſs, that, conſidering the miſerable ſituation the *Iriſh* were then in, they could not have thought of a braver or more virtuous attempt; by which they might have been inſtruments of reſtoring the lawful monarch,

at

at leaſt to the recovery of *England* and *Scotland* from thoſe betrayers and ſellers, and murderers of his royal father.

To conclude; whereas the laſt quoted author complains very heavily and frequently of a BRAND that lies upon them, it is a great miſtake: for the firſt original BRAND hath been long taken off; only we confeſs the ſcar will probably remain, and be viſible for ever to thoſe, who know the principles by which they acted, and until thoſe principles ſhall be openly renounced; elſe it muſt continue to all generations, like the mark ſet upon *Cain*, which, ſome authors ſay, deſcended to all his poſterity; or like the *Roman* noſe and *Auſtrian* lip; or like the long bag of fleſh hanging down from the gills of the people in *Piedmont*. But, as for any *brands* fixed on ſchiſmaticks for ſeveral years paſt, they have been all made with *cold iron*; like thieves who, by the BENEFIT OF THE CLERGY, are condemned to be only burned in the hand; but eſcape the pain and the mark by being in *fee* with the JAYLOR. Which advantage the ſchiſmatical teachers will never want, who, as we are aſſured, and of which there is a *very freſh inſtance*, have the ſouls and bodies, and purſes of their people a hundred times more at their mercy, than the *catholick* prieſts could ever pretend to.

Therefore, upon the whole, the *catholicks* do humbly petition *(without the leaſt inſinuation of threatening)* that, upon this *favourable* juncture, their

their incapacity for civil and military employments may be wholly taken off, for the very ſame reaſons (beſides others more cogent) that are now offered by their *brethren* the *diſſenters*.

And your petitioners, as in duty bound, ſhall ever pray, &c.

Dublin,
Nov. 1733.

In this controverſy the author was again victorious, for the *teſt* was not repealed.

SOME

SOME

REASONS

AGAINST

The BILL for ſettling the Tithe of *Hemp*, *Flax*, &c. by a *Modus* [*b*].

THE clergy did little expect to have any cauſe of complaint againſt the preſent houſe of commons; who, in the laſt ſeſſion, were pleaſed to throw out a bill [*c*] ſent them from the lords, which that reverend body apprehended would be very injurious to them, if it paſſed into a law: and who, in the preſent ſeſſion, defeated the arts and endeavours of *ſchiſmaticks* to repeal the *ſacramental teſt*.

For although it hath been allowed on all hands, that the former of thoſe bills might, by its neceſſary conſequences, be very diſpleaſing to the lay gentlemen of the kingdom, for many reaſons purely ſecular; and that this laſt attempt for repealing

[*b*] Many eminent clergymen, who oppoſed this ſcheme, applied to Dr. *Swift* to write againſt it, which he readily conſented to upon their giving him ſome hints, and, two days after, the following reaſons were preſented to ſeveral members of parliament, which had ſo good an effect, that the bill was dropped.

[*c*] For the biſhops to divide livings.

the *teſt* did much more affect, at preſent, the temporal intereſt, than the ſpiritual; yet the whole body of the lower clergy have, upon both thoſe occaſions, expreſſed equal gratitude to that honourable houſe for their juſtice and ſteadineſs, as if the clergy alone were to receive the benefit.

It muſt needs be therefore a great addition to the clergy's grief, that ſuch an aſſembly, as the preſent houſe of commons, ſhould now, with an expedition more than uſual, agree to a bill for encouraging the linen manufacture with a clauſe, whereby the church is to loſe two parts in three of the legal tithe in flax and hemp.

Some reaſons why the clergy think ſuch a law will be a great hardſhip upon them are, I conceive, thoſe that follow. I ſhall venture to enumerate them with all deference due to that honourable aſſembly.

Firſt, the clergy ſuppoſe that they have not, by any fault or demerit, incurred the diſpleaſure of the nation's repreſentatives: neither can the declared loyalty of the preſent ſett, from the higheſt prelate to the loweſt vicar, be in the leaſt diſputed: becauſe there are hardly ten clergymen through the whole kingdom, for more than nineteen years paſt, who have not been either preferred entirely upon account of their declared affection to the *Hanover* line, or higher promoted as the due reward of the ſame merit.

There is not a landlord, in the whole kingdom, reſiding ſome part of the year at his country ſeat, who

who is not, in his own conſcience, fully convinced, that the tithes of his miniſter have gradually ſunk, for ſome years paſt, one third, or at leaſt one fourth of their former value, excluſive of all non-ſolvencies.

The payment of tithes, in this kingdom, is ſubject to ſo many frauds, brangles, and other difficulties, not only from *papiſts* and *diſſenters*, but even from thoſe who profeſs themſelves *proteſtants*; that, by the expence, the trouble, and vexation of collecting, or bargaining for them, they are, of all other rents, the moſt precarious, uncertain, and ill paid.

The landlords, in moſt pariſhes, expect, as a compliment, that they ſhall pay little more than half the value of the tithes for the lands they hold in their own hands; which often conſiſt of large domains: and it is the miniſter's intereſt to make them eaſy upon that article, when he conſiders what influence thoſe gentlemen have upon their tenants.

The clergy cannot but think it extremely ſevere, that, in a bill for encouraging the linen manufacture, they alone muſt be the ſufferers, who can leaſt afford it. If, as I am told, there be a tax of three thouſand pounds a year paid by the publick, for a farther encouragement to the ſaid manufacture, are not the clergy equal ſharers in the charge with the reſt of their fellow-ſubjects? What ſatisfactory reaſon can be therefore given, why they alone ſhould bear the whole additional weight, unleſs

leſs it will be alledged that their property is not upon an equal foot with the properties of other men. They acquire their own ſmall pittance by at leaſt as honeſt means as their neighbours, the landlords, poſſeſs their eſtates; and have been always ſuppoſed, except in rebellious or fanatical times, to have as good a title: for no families now in being can ſhew a more ancient. Indeed, if it be true, that ſome perſons (I hope they were not many) were ſeen to laugh when the rights of the clergy were mentioned; in this caſe an opinion may poſſibly be ſoon advanced, that they have no rights at all. And this is likely enough to gain ground, in proportion as the contempt of all religion ſhall increaſe, which is already in a very forward way.

It is ſaid, there will be alſo added, in this bill, a clauſe for diminiſhing the tithe of hops, in order to cultivate that uſeful plant among us: and here likewiſe the load is to lie entirely on the ſhoulders of the clergy, while the landlords reap all the benefit. It will not be eaſy to foreſee where ſuch proceedings are like to ſtop: or whether, by the ſame authority, in civil times, a parliament may not as juſtly challenge the ſame power in reducing all things titheable, not below the tenth part of the product (which is, and ever will be, the clergy's equitable right), but from a tenth part to a ſixtieth or eightieth, and from thence to nothing.

I have heard it granted, by ſkilful perſons, that the practice of taxing the clergy, by parliament,

without their own conſent, is a new thing, not much above the date of ſeventy years: before which period, in times of peace, they always taxed themſelves. But things are extremely altered at preſent: it is not now ſufficient to tax them in common with their fellow-ſubjects, without impoſing an additional tax upon them, from which, or from any thing equivalent, all their fellow ſubjects are exempt; and this in a country profeſſing *Chriſtianity*.

The greateſt part of the clergy, throughout this kingdom, have been ſtripped of their glebes by the confuſion of times, by violence, fraud, oppreſſion, and other unlawful means; all which glebes are now in the hands of the laity. So that they now are generally forced to lie at the mercy of landlords for a ſmall piece of ground in their pariſhes, at a moſt exorbitant rent, and uſually for a ſhort term of years, whereon to build a houſe, and enable them to reſide. Yet, in ſpight of theſe diſadvantages, I am a witneſs, that they are generally more conſtant reſidents, than their brethren in *England*; where the meaneſt vicar hath a convenient dwelling, with a barn, a garden, and a field or two for his cattle; beſides, the certainty of his little income from honeſt farmers, able and willing not only to pay him his dues, but likewiſe to make him preſents, according to their ability, for his better ſupport. In all which circumſtances the clergy of *Ireland* meet with a treatment directly contrary.

It is hoped the honourable houſe will conſider, that it is impoſſible for the moſt ill-minded, avaricious, or cunning clergyman to do the leaſt injuſtice to the meaneſt cottager in his pariſh in any bargain for tithes, or other eccleſiaſtical dues. He can, at the utmoſt, only demand to have his tithe fairly laid out; and does not once, in a hundred times, obtain his demand. But every tenant, from the pooreſt cottager to the moſt ſubſtantial farmer, can, and generally doth, impoſe upon the miniſter, by fraud, by theft, by lyes, by perjuries, by inſolence, and ſometimes by force; notwithſtanding the utmoſt vigilance and ſkill of himſelf and his proctor. Inſomuch, that it is allowed, that the clergy in general receive little more than one half of their legal dues; not including the charges they are at in collecting or bargaining for them.

The land rents of *Ireland* are computed to about two millions, whereof one tenth amounts to two hundred thouſand pounds. The beneficed clergymen, excluding thoſe of this city, are not reckoned to be above five hundred; by which computation, they ſhould each of them poſſeſs two hundred pounds a year, if thoſe tithes were equally divided, although, in well-cultivated corn countries, it ought to be more; whereas they hardly receive one half of that ſum, with great defalcations, and in very bad payments. There are, indeed, a few glebes in the north pretty conſiderable; but, if theſe and all the reſt were in like manner equally divided, they would not add five pounds a year to

every clergyman. Therefore, whether the condition of the clergy in general among us be juſtly liable to envy, or able to bear a heavy burthen, which neither the nobility, nor gentry, nor tradeſmen, nor farmers, will touch with one of their fingers; this, I ſay, is ſubmitted to the honourable houſe.

One terrible circumſtance in this bill is, that of turning the tithe of *flax* and *hemp* into what the lawyers call a *modus*, or a certain ſum in lieu of a tenth part of the product. And by this practice of claiming a *modus* in many pariſhes by ancient cuſtom, the clergy, in both kingdoms, have been almoſt incredible ſufferers. Thus, in the preſent caſe, the tithe of a tolerable acre of *flax*, which, by a medium, is worth twelve ſhillings, is, by the preſent bill, reduced to four ſhillings. Neither is this the worſt part in a *modus*; every determinate ſum muſt, in proceſs of time, ſink from a fourth to a four and twentieth part, or a great deal lower, by that neceſſary fall attending the value of money, which is now at leaſt nine tenths lower all over *Europe*, than it was four hundred years ago, by a gradual decline; and even a third part at leaſt, within our own memories, in purchaſing almoſt every thing required for the neceſſities or conveniencies of life; as any gentleman can atteſt, who hath kept houſe for twenty years paſt. And this will equally affect poor countries, as well as rich. For, although I look upon it as an impoſſibility that this kingdom ſhould ever thrive under its pre-

ſent diſadvantages, which, without a miracle, muſt ſtill increaſe; yet, when the whole caſh of the nation ſhall ſink to fifty thouſand pounds, we muſt, in all our traffick abroad, either of import or export, go by the general rate, at which money is valued in thoſe countries that enjoy the common privileges of human kind. For this reaſon no corporation (if the clergy may preſume to call themſelves one) ſhould, by any means, grant away their properties in perpetuity upon any conſideration whatſoever; which is a rock that many corporations have ſplit upon to their great impoveriſhing, and ſometimes to their utter undoing; becauſe they are ſuppoſed to ſubſiſt for ever, and becauſe no determination of money is of any certain perpetual intrinſic value. This is known enough in *England*, where eſtates, let for ever, ſome hundred years ago, by ſeveral ancient noble families, do not, at this preſent, pay their poſterity a twentieth part of what they are now worth at an eaſy rent.

A tax affecting one part of a nation, which already bears its full ſhare in all parliamentary impoſitions, cannot poſſibly be juſt, except it be inflicted as a puniſhment upon that body of men, which is taxed, for ſome great demerit or danger to the publick apprehended from thoſe upon whom it is laid. Thus the *papiſts* and *nonjurors* have been doubly taxed for refuſing to give proper ſecurities to the government; which cannot be objected againſt the clergy. And therefore, if this bill ſhould paſs, I think it ought to be with a preface,

ſhewing wherein they have offended, and for what diſaffection or other crime they are puniſhed.

If an additional exciſe upon ale, or a duty upon fleſh and bread, were to be enacted, neither the victualler, butcher, nor baker would bear any more of the charge than for what themſelves conſumed, but it would be an equal general tax through the whole kingdom: whereas, by this bill, the clergy alone are avowedly condemned to be deprived of their ancient, inherent, undiſputed rights, in order to encourage a manufacture, by which all the reſt of the kingdom are ſuppoſed to be gainers.

This bill is directly againſt *magna charta*, whereof the firſt clauſe is for confirming the inviolable rights of holy church; as well as contrary to the oath taken, by all our kings, at their coronation, where they ſwear to defend and protect the church in all rights.

A tax laid upon employments is a very different thing. The poſſeſſors of civil and military employments are no corporation; neither are they any part of our conſtitution; their ſalaries, pay, and perquiſites, are all changeable at the pleaſure of the prince who beſtows them, although the army be paid from funds raiſed and appropriated by the legiſlature. But the clergy, as they have little reaſon to expect, ſo they deſire, no more than their ancient legal dues: only indeed with the removal of many grievous impediments in the collection of them; which, it is to be feared, they muſt wait for until more favourable times. It is well known that they

they have already, of their own accord, ſhewn great indulgence to their people upon this very article of *flax*, ſeldom taking above a fourth part of their tithe for ſmall parcels, and oftentimes nothing at all for new beginners; waiting, with patience, until the farmers were able, and until greater quantities of land were employed in that part of huſbandry; never ſuſpecting that their good intentions ſhould be perverted in ſo ſingular a manner to their detriment by that very aſſembly, which, during the time that convocations (which are an original part of our conſtitution, ever ſince *Chriſtianity* became national among us) are thought fit to be ſuſpended, God knows for what reaſon, or from what provocations; I ſay, from that very aſſembly, who, during the intervals of convocations, ſhould rather be ſuppoſed to be guardians of the rights and properties of the clergy, than to make the leaſt attempt upon either.

I have not heard, upon enquiry, that any of thoſe gentlemen, who, among us without doors, are called the court-party, diſcover the leaſt zeal in this affair. If they had thoughts to interpoſe, it might be conceived they would ſhew their diſpleaſure againſt this bill, which muſt very much leſſen the value of the king's patronage upon promotion to vacant ſees, in the diſpoſal of deanries, and other conſiderable preferments in the church, which are in the donation of the crown; whereby the viceroys will have fewer good preferments to beſtow on their dependents, as well as upon the kindred

of members, who may have a ſufficient ſtock of that ſort of merit, whatever it may be, which may, in future times, moſt prevail.

The *diſſenters*, by not ſucceeding in their endeavours to procure a repeal of the *teſt*, have loſt nothing, but continue in a full enjoyment to their toleration; while the clergy, without giving the leaſt offence, are, by this bill, deprived of a conſiderable branch of their ancient legal rights, whereby the ſchiſmatical party will have the pleaſure of gratifying their revenge—*hoc Graii voluere.*

The farmer will find no relief by this *modus*, becauſe, when his preſent leaſe ſhall expire, his landlord will, infallibly, raiſe the rent in an equal proportion upon every part of land where flax is ſown, and have ſo much a better ſecurity for payment at the expence of the clergy.

If we judge by things paſt, it little avails that this bill is to be limited to a certain time of ten, twenty, or thirty years. For no landlord will ever conſent that a law ſhall expire, by which he finds himſelf a gainer; and of this there are many examples, as well in *England* as in this kingdom.

The great end of this bill is, by proper encouragement, to extend the linen manufacture into thoſe countries where it hath hitherto been little cultivated: but this encouragement of *leſſening the tithe of flax and hemp* is one of ſuch a kind as, it is to be feared, will have a directly contrary effect. Becauſe, if I am rightly informed, no ſett of men hath, for their number and fortunes, been more induſtrious

induſtrious and ſucceſsful than the clergy, in introducing that manufacture into places which were unacquainted with it, by perſuading their people to ſow *flax* and *hemp*, by procuring ſeed for them, and by having them inſtructed in the management thereof; and this they did not without reaſonable hopes of increaſing the value of their pariſhes after ſome time, as well as of promoting the benefit of the publick. But if this *modus* ſhould take place, the clergy will be ſo far from gaining, that they will become loſers by their extraordinary care, by having their beſt arable lands turned to *flax* and *hemp*, which are reckoned great impoveriſhers of land: they cannot therefore be blamed, if they ſhould ſhew as much zeal to prevent its being introduced or improved in their pariſhes, as they hitherto have ſhewed in the introducing and improving of it. This, I am told, ſome of them have already declared, at leaſt ſo far as to reſolve not to give themſelves any more trouble than other men about promoting a manufacture, by the ſucceſs of which they only of all men are to be ſufferers. Perhaps, the giving even a further encouragement than the law doth, as it now ſtands, to a ſett of men who might, on many accounts, be ſo uſeful to this purpoſe, would be no bad method of having the great end of the bill more effectually anſwered; but this is what they are far from deſiring; all they petition for is no more than to continue on the ſame footing with the reſt of their fellow-ſubjects.

If

If this *modus* of paying by the acre be to paſs into a law, it were to be wiſhed, that the ſame law would not only appoint one or more ſworn ſurveyors, in each pariſh, to meaſure the lands, on which *flax* and *hemp* are ſown, but alſo ſettle the price of ſurveying, and determine whether the incumbent or farmer is to pay for each annual ſurvey. Without ſomething of this kind, there muſt conſtantly be diſputes between them, and the neighbouring juſtices of peace muſt be teized as often as thoſe diſputes happen.

I had written thus far, when a paper was ſent to me, with ſeveral reaſons againſt the bill, ſome whereof, although they have been already touched, are put in a better light, and the reſt did not occur to me. I ſhall deliver them in the author's own words.

I. That tithes are the patrimony of the church: and, if not of divine original, yet at leaſt of great antiquity.

II. That all purchaſes and leaſes of titheable lands, for many centuries paſt, have been made and taken, ſubject to the demand of tithes, and thoſe lands ſold and taken juſt ſo much the cheaper on that account.

III. That if any lands are exempted from tithes, or the legal demands of ſuch tithes leſſened by act of parliament, ſo much value is taken from the proprietor of the tithes, and veſted in the proprietor of the lands, or his head tenants.

IV. That

IV. That no innocent, unoffending perſon can be ſo deprived of his property, without the greateſt violation of common juſtice.

V. That to do this, upon a proſpect of encouraging the linen or any other manufacture, is acting upon a very miſtaken and unjuſt ſuppoſition; inaſmuch as the price of the lands, ſo occupied, will be no way leſſened to the farmer by ſuch a law.

VI. That the clergy are content chearfully to bear (as they now do) any burthen, in common with their fellow-ſubjects, either for the ſupport of his majeſty's government, or the encouragement of the trade of the nation; but think it very hard, that they ſhould be ſingled out to pay heavier taxes than others, at a time, when, by the decreaſe of the value of their pariſhes, they are leſs able to bear them.

VII. That the legiſlature hath hitherto diſtinguiſhed the clergy by exemptions, and not by additional loads, and the preſent clergy of the kingdom hope they have not deſerved worſe of the legiſlature than their predeceſſors.

VIII. That, by the original conſtitution of theſe kingdoms, the clergy had the ſole right of taxing themſelves, and were in poſſeſſion of that right as low as the Reſtoration; and, if that right be now devolved upon the commons, by the ceſſion of the clergy, the commons can be conſidered, in this caſe, in no other light than as the guardians of the clergy.

IX. That

IX. That, beſides thoſe tithes always in the poſſeſſion of the clergy, there are ſome portions of tithes lately come into their poſſeſſion by purchaſe; that, if this clauſe ſhould take place, they would not be allowed the benefit of theſe purchaſes, upon an equal foot of advantage with the reſt of their fellow-ſubjects. And that ſome tithes, in the hands of impropriators, are under ſettlements and mortgages.

X. That the gentlemen of this houſe ſhould conſider, that loading the clergy, is loading their own younger brothers and children, with this additional grievance, that it is taking from the younger and poorer to give to the elder and richer; and,

Laſtly, That, if it were, at any time, juſt and proper to do this, it would however be too ſevere to do it now, when all the tithes of the kingdom are known, for ſome years paſt, to have ſunk above one third part in their value.

Any income, in the hands of the clergy, is at leaſt as uſeful to the publick, as the ſame income in the hands of the laity.

It were more reaſonable to grant the clergy, in three parts of the nation, an additional ſupport, than to diminiſh their preſent ſubſiſtence.

Great employments are, and will be, in the hands of *Engliſhmen*; nothing left for the younger ſons of *Iriſhmen* but vicarages, tide-waiters places, *&c.* therefore no reaſon to make them worſe.

The *modus*, upon the *flax* in *England*, affects only lands reclaimed ſince the year 1690, and is at

at the rate of five ſhillings the *Engliſh* acre, which is equivalent to eight ſhillings and eight pence *Iriſh*, and that to be paid before the farmer remove it from the field. *Flax* is a manufacture of little conſequence in *England*, but is the ſtaple in *Ireland*; and if it increaſes (as it probably will) muſt, in many places, joſtle out corn, becauſe it is more gainful.

The clergy of the eſtabliſhed church have no intereſt, like thoſe of the church of *Rome*, diſtinct from the true intereſt of their country, and therefore ought to ſuffer under no diſtinct impoſitions or taxes of any kind.

The bill, for ſettling the *modus* of *England*, was brought in, the firſt year of the reign of king *George* I. when the clergy lay, very unjuſtly, under the imputation of ſome diſaffection; and encouraged the bringing in of ſome fens in *Lincolnſhire*, which were not to be continued under *flax*; but it left all lands, where *flax* had been ſown before that time, under the ſame condition of tithing, in which they were before the paſſing of that bill: whereas this bill takes away what the clergy are actually poſſeſſed of.

That the woollen manufacture is the ſtaple of *England*, as the linen is that of *Ireland*, yet no attempt was ever made in *England* to reduce the tithe of wool for the encouragement of that manufacture. This manufacture hath already been remarkably favoured by the clergy, who have hitherto been generally content with leſs than half, ſome with

with ſix pence a garden, and ſome have taken nothing.

Employments, they ſay, have been taxed; the reaſons for which taxation will not hold with regard to property, at leaſt till employments become inheritances. The commons always have had ſo tender a regard to property, that they would never ſuffer any law to paſs, whereby any particular perſons might be aggrieved without their own conſent.

N. B. *Some alterations have been made in the bill about the* modus, *ſince the above paper was written; but they are of little moment.*

END OF VOL. IX.

MVSEVM BRITAN NICVM